



FEB 14 1950

JANUARY 1950

VOL. 4 . NO. 1

D
PERIODICAL ROOM
GENERAL LIBRARY
UNIV. OF MICH.

The
Middle East
Journal

1.50 per copy

Published Quarterly by

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

Board of Governors

GEORGE CAMP KEISER, *Chairman*

MOORE GATES

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

JOSEPH M. UPTON

MORTIMER GRAVES

WALLACE MURRAY

EDWIN M. WRIGHT

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

Editor

HARVEY P. HALL

Editorial Assistant

PATRICIA B. NATIRBOV

Business Secretary

ANNE WOODWARD

Board of Advisory Editors

DOUGLAS D. CRARY

PETER G. FRANCK

C. GROVE HAINES

HERBERT J. LIEBESNY

ROBERT F. OGDEN

AFIF I. TANNOUS

WILLIAM DIAMOND

HAROLD W. GLIDDEN

J. C. HUREWITZ

RAYMOND F. MIKESELL

WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH

LEWIS V. THOMAS

T. CUYLER YOUNG

Published quarterly by The Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C. Subscription price, \$6.00 a year; single copies \$1.50, postpaid to any address in the world. Mail all communications to The Editor, The Middle East Journal, 1830 Nineteenth St., N.W., Washington 9, D. C. Entered as second-class matter January 9, 1948 at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Additional entry at the post office at Baltimore, Md.

Vol. 4, No. 1. Copyright 1950, The Middle East Institute. Printed in U.S.A.

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

VOLUME 4

JANUARY 1950


NUMBER 1

Table of Contents

The Syrian Coups d'État of 1949.....	<i>Alford Carleton</i>	1
The Sheikdom of Kuwait.....	<i>Mary Cubberly Van Pelt</i>	12
Hyderabad: Muslim Tragedy.....	<i>Wilfred Cantwell Smith</i>	27
TVA's in the Middle East.....	<i>Feliks Bochenski and William Diamond</i> ...	52
DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY.....		83
DOCUMENTS		94
Legislation on the Sea Bed and Territorial Waters of the Persian Gulf, by <i>Herbert J. Liebesny</i>		
Royal Pronouncement concerning the Policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with Respect to the Subsoil and Sea Bed of Areas in the Persian Gulf Contiguous to the Coasts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (text)		
Decree regarding Territorial Waters of Saudi Arabia (text)		
Documents and Situation Reports: A Selected Listing		
ECONOMIC REVIEW		100
The Iranian Seven Year Development Plan		
Background and Organization, by <i>S. Rezazadeh Shafaq</i>		
Problems and Proposals, by <i>J. D. Lotz</i>		
BOOK REVIEWS		106
Recent Books on Iran, by <i>T. Cuyler Young</i>		
Reviews		
Bonné: State and Economics in the Middle East, reviewed by <i>S. B. Himadeh</i>		
Kayser: The Life and Time of Jehudah Halevi, reviewed by <i>Solomon L. Skoss</i>		
Rathjens: Die Pilgerfahrt nach Mekka, reviewed by <i>George W. Hoffman</i>		
Badaoui: Les Problèmes du Travail et les Organisations Ouvrières en Égypte, reviewed by <i>William J. Handley</i>		
Punekar: Trade Unionism in India, reviewed by <i>Rajani Kanta Das</i>		
Winstedt: Indian Art, reviewed by <i>Amiya Chakravarty</i>		
Menon: Delhi-Chungking, reviewed by <i>Maynard Owen Williams</i>		
Evans-Pritchard: The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, reviewed by <i>Robert Gale Woolbert</i>		
Maugham: North African Notebook, reviewed by <i>Manfred Halpern</i>		
Koestler: Promise and Fulfillment, reviewed by <i>Hal Lehrman</i>		
Trimmingham: Islam in the Sudan, reviewed by <i>Richard Hill</i>		
Carruthers: Beyond the Caspian, reviewed by <i>Elizabeth E. Bacon</i>		
Books Also Noted		
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE.....		126
Index to Volume 3 (1949), Nos. 2287 — 3075.....		138
List of Periodicals Regularly Surveyed.....		140

THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL is indexed in *International Index
to Periodicals and Public Affairs Information Service*

The Middle East Journal, in conformity with the objectives of its publisher, The Middle East Institute, takes no editorial stand on the problems of the Middle East. Its sole criterion is that material published be sound and informative, and presented without emotional bias. All opinions expressed, therefore, are those of the individual authors and not necessarily those of the *Journal* or of the Institute.



The Middle East

© 1988 by the Board of Regents of the University of California, Los Angeles. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission is prohibited.

The Middle East Journal

VOLUME 4

JANUARY 1950

NUMBER 1

THE SYRIAN COUPS D'ÉTAT OF 1949

Alford Carleton

THE RAPID RISE to power and as sudden decline of the fortunes of Colonel Husni Za'im furnish in brief scope a glimpse into the social, economic, and political forces at work in Syria today. No one person, least of all a foreigner, can claim to know all the facts involved nor to see them all in clear perspective. Yet the dramatic events of those nineteen and a half weeks reveal clearly some of the significant underlying trends in the development of Syrian politics.

For an understanding of the events of Colonel Za'im's brief public career one must distinguish at least three factors in the general background of Syrian life and thought. The first is a

♦ ALFORD CARLETON is President of Aleppo College, having served in that position since 1937. He is personally acquainted with many of the political leaders in Syria, and was in close contact with them and with Syrian public opinion during the events described in his article.

basic contradiction in the Syrian attitude to foreign powers: on the one hand the determined nationalism of a people struggling for complete independence, and on the other, the "realism" of the people of a small state always on the lookout for that association with a larger power or group of powers that may most usefully promote their national interest. The two alternate in predominance, but are constantly present; it is impossible to say which is the more fundamental. It is not even safe to say that the determined nationalism rests with the Sunni-Muslim-Arab majority in Syria and the eye watchful for outside support belongs to the minorities, racial or religious. The only statement that is consistently safe at the present time is that when a Syrian speaks of "the foreigner" he means primarily the French.

Although there is a specific bitterness against France, trained for and fed on the opposition to the Mandate during the quarter century ending in 1946, the use of the term *franji* for all westerners is based on the predominance of French influence in the Levant over a much longer period — French education, French culture, French etiquette, among some groups even a general French outlook on life. The attitude of any political group in Syria toward the French is far more significant to the average Syrian than its attitude toward any other foreign power.

The second background factor to get firmly in mind is the lack of internal cohesion in Syrian nationalism. Although united in opposition to external pressure, as exemplified by France, the national movement has been united in little else. With the realization of independence, this lack of basic unity has come to the surface and factions, parties, and movements have multiplied. Loyalty to an individual leader has often been more significant than the possession of a party platform in the formation of a political movement. All this is very natural when one thinks of the sudden and relatively recent transition from many decades of clandestine resistance to foreign rulers. When one thinks of the first struggles for mutual understanding among the American colonies, of the slow haggling process by which a federal government was at last organized, and the long struggle for integration into a real United States — a struggle not fully complete after a hundred and seventy-five years — it is easy to ap-

precipitate that the political life of Syria is not now a simple conflict between two or three well organized and compact political groups, each with its well established organization, policy, and means of influencing public opinion. Political dominance in Syria is much closer to the level of ward politics and much more a matter of catch-as-catch-can wrestling between individual political leaders and their small groups of personal adherents. The opposition between the group in power and the groups out of power is correspondingly intense, more a personal struggle than a conflict of party platforms.

The third factor that needs to be clearly realized is the degree of frustration in the Arab world, built up by a long series of events and culminating in the establishment of the State of Israel. The hope of independence and real self-government, growing slowly through long years of Ottoman rule, seemed in 1919 to be on the verge of fulfilment. Then came the era of the mandates, with an artificial separation of the Arab world into diverse states under the dictates of foreign political influences. "Independence" was, in Syria, several times given and taken away, again by the force of outside circumstance. When real self-government did come, it was in the turmoil of the postwar world of 1946. When all that had been dreamed did not result from independence, the end of the "honeymoon" came with a shock. On top of it all came the deep frustration of being unable to defend the integrity of the Arab world, whether around the table of the United Nations or on the field of battle in Palestine. So the scene in Syria was set for any change which would give hope of a New Order.

It was during the period of disillusionment with the former Syrian leaders that Husni Za'im came to public notice as more than simply a high officer in the Syrian Army. During the period of near anarchy following the fall of the Mardam Cabinet in December 1948, it was the intervention of the army and the personal tour of the country by Colonel Za'im, as Commander-in-Chief, that restored order and a measure of public confidence. It is unlikely that there was any public interest in the institution of a military regime, although looking back one can realize that the events of those few days awakened in Colonel Za'im a sense

of the need for more forceful leadership and a conviction that he, himself, held the key to the security and the welfare of the state.

The principal events of the coup d'état of March 30, 1949, are too well known to need repetition.¹ Sufficient to say that within a few hours, and without any bloodshed, the old regime was completely overthrown, President al-Quwwatli and a few others were in prison, a few more were under house arrest, and all power was in the hands of Colonel Husni Za'im. The alliterative title of The Leader (al-Za'im Husni Za'im) was taken up as a symbol of the fact that all power was in the hands of the one man who had engineered, with a bare handful of collaborators, a complete change of government. The public welcome for the change was widespread. The very success of such a dramatic stroke made it easy to accept it, and the appeal for a New Order met a ready response in the hearts of people weary of the ineptitudes and the incapacities of the old regime.

There were rumors aplenty. At first, Aleppo opinion saw it all as a counterstroke of former Prime Minister Jamil Bey Mardam Bey, out of power since the previous December but always considered to be intimate with army leaders. Beirut papers saw in the overthrow of the al-Quwwatli regime some certain link with King Abdallah and his Greater Syria Plan. The Amman radio recalled recent French shipments of arms to Syria, and suspected instigation on the part of France. Yet as the next few days went by it became clear that the dramatic change of government was without direct external inspiration. Colonel Za'im and his colleagues had acted solely on their own convictions. That their action later fitted the interests of certain foreign powers better than those of others was coincidental, and had no part in the primary decision to overthrow the regime.

For a few days the implications of the coup d'état for the internal form of government were equally vague. In his early proclamations, al-Za'im spoke of "those who will now assume the civil power," and he referred to his consultations with Faris Bey al-Khuri as with the President of the Parliament. Yet noth-

¹ See *Middle East Journal*, III (1949), pp. 316-17; 327-28.

ing definite came out of the talks. Some political groups held back from collaboration with Colonel Za'im because of the unconstitutional nature of the new regime. Others were hesitant lest foreign interference — presumably from one or another of the Arab states — would step in and overthrow the New Order. Others were probably not consulted because of their known sympathy for former President al-Quwwatli and the old regime. When the Parliament was called in special session and asked to legitimize the New Order, it refused to do so — acting presumably on the same motives that held the recognized political parties away from Colonel Za'im — in spite of the general public approval of the change of regime. In consequence, Parliament was dismissed and Colonel Za'im now took the title of Head of the State. As foreign powers, both near and far, hesitated to recognize a regime with no form of constitutional government, Colonel Za'im personally invited individuals to fill the more requisite cabinet posts. This government was promptly recognized by the Arab states and by a number of other nations.

The policies proclaimed by the new Head of the State were complete independence, always a popular plank in any platform; close collaboration with the other Arab states, very welcome in Syria; reforms on the general pattern set by the Turkish Republic; and the building up of a strong Syria through the reorganization of its army and the introduction of compulsory military service. The intention of the new regime to work at these reforms with vigor was dramatized by the appointment of new provincial governors with both civil and military authority. These men were sent to their posts in army planes, welcomed with parades, and escorted about their duties by squads of military police on motorcycles. In all these changes the public took pride, as evidence of a decisive new start in national life, and the regime of al-Za'im Husni Za'im was off to a good start. Additional good luck for the new regime lay in the fact that it came to power in a relatively prosperous year of crops. By a happy coincidence, therefore, official fiat and the laws of supply and demand could work together to bring about a sharp reduction in the price of bread. Nothing could have convinced the common man more effectively of the benefit of the new regime over the old.

The greatest single contribution of the period of Husni Za'im to the political thinking of Syria was the demonstration that public order could be strictly enforced, and proof that the public likes it that way. The change was noticed by all levels in the population — including the professional agitator among students — and with such approval that the succeeding regime has often been reminded that it ought to do as well, in that particular thing, as did Husni Za'im. In the process, for good or ill, the police and the gendarmerie were put under the control of the Army rather than of the Department of the Interior.

The group of changes based upon the example of Turkey did not meet with as complete and instant approval, but there was on the whole popular satisfaction that Syria should move in that direction. Had the more provocative aspects of the question been pushed, such as the unveiling of women, there might have been much less enthusiasm, but Za'im limited himself in that field to a few press statements. In less dramatic — though perhaps more fundamental — matters, however, there was definite progress in the direction of the separation of Church and State, and limitation on the powers of the religious hierarchy. The powers of the *evkaf* (Muslim Religious Foundations) were considerably limited. The Syrian University was reorganized on more Western lines. The authority of the Muslim religious law was restricted by the substitution of a civil code. The code adopted was one which had been drawn up in Egypt, on the best European models, by a group of jurists eager for legal reform. In consequence of the change, the office of qadi remains chiefly a traditional ornament on the retinue of State, and some of the best lawyers in Syria feel that the relative separation of Church and State may remain as the one permanent contribution to the life of Syria made by Husni Za'im during his brief period in high office.

The new regime announced the immediate undertaking of numerous public works which had been long discussed but on which no action had been taken — the construction of Latakia Harbor, the Euphrates Water Project for Aleppo, the building of the railway across the Syrian Desert, and the like. Most important of all, from the point of view of the economic life of the country,

was the ratification of the agreements with the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line (TAPline) and the Middle East Pipe Line companies. Evident as it was that the conclusion of such agreements was economically wise, the political aspect of actually coming to terms with powerful foreign interests — “surrendering to the concession-hunting imperialists” — had been too much for any of the preceding governments. Yet in the first rush of changes made by Husni Za'im, the approval of these agreements went by with no objection save that raised by the Communist minority, and to the very general satisfaction of the people.

In spite of the cordial reception given the new regime and the very real contributions it made to the life of Syria, certain misgivings began to arise — at first secretly, but as time went on more and more openly. The first to appear was at the close association between Za'im and certain Muslim minorities. With Circassian and Daghestani relationships in his own ancestry, and with French military tradition to support him in the use of minority groups in the army, it was perhaps natural that he should have leaned heavily on the Circassian and Kurdish units in the planning of the coup d'état. In any case, it was those units that were used in the principal cities of Syria at the time of the overthrow of the al-Quwwatli regime, while the straight Arab units were kept busy at the front in Palestine. Whatever his motive, it was very easy to say, afterwards, that Colonel Za'im had mistrusted the loyalty of the Arab troops, and had preferred to build his power on “strangers” more to his liking. Added impetus was given to this objection when Kurds and Circassians were given more and more places of confidence in the new administration. In part, this feeling that Za'im had been partial to the representatives of minority groups accounts for the linking of the fate of his Prime Minister, Muhsin Barazi, to that of his own.

Far greater uneasiness was created by the suspicion of particularly close relationship between Za'im and the Egyptian and French legations. To these nations, interested in the maintenance of a certain balance of power in the Arab world, hearty support of Husni Za'im was a foregoing conclusion. As his own position grew more insecure, it was natural that he should lean

more and more upon the support of friendly powers. But people soon began to remember what had been overlooked in the heat of the Palestinian war — that Colonel Za'im had ordered the use of French as the common language in the transmission of army commands. The French training and background of the Syrian forces may have justified the expedient, but in retrospect it brought to the surface the whole long loyalty of Husni Za'im to France, as an officer in the *Troupes du Levant*. Similarly the violence of his quarrels with King Abdallah was taken to reflect outside stimulation, inasmuch as Transjordan had given no visible provocation to justify them. It was not long until there was a carefully suppressed but constant rumor of closer and closer linking of his fortunes to those of France — the one foreign power to which one could not show partiality without wakening the nationalistic fervor of a quarter century of struggle against the Mandatory Power.

Such discontent was further strengthened by the failure of the new regime to define its position in relation to the existing political parties in Syria. Only the Communist Party was, from the first, outlawed. The other parties continued in states of greater or less activity until only a short time before the "election" of June 25. During that period, Za'im made little effort to win over the old parties, nor did he show any inclination to link his regime with one of them to the exclusion of the others, or to put any effort into the building of a party of his own. No country of the Middle East is accustomed to living in such a political vacuum, and the failure of Za'im to make proper provision for the working of the political mind of the people was perhaps the first clear indication of his political ineptitude.

Such political ineptitude was perhaps to be expected — and even admired — on the part of one who prided himself on being a bluff soldier, despising the intricacies and the red tape of administrative bureaucracy. When that disregard of administrative organization began to cost him the loyalty and cooperation of the most faithful and capable officers in the government, however, it took on a new significance. From that time on, things began to depend more and more upon Za'im himself; and without superhuman energy and ability he could not assume the

growing load. Men began to find his projects unrealized and his promises unfulfilled. With the loss of confidence in his ability to carry through his reforms, the sincerity of support for Za'im began to wane.

The spark that touched off active opposition, however, was quite another. The show of discipline and power which had first drawn the people to him slowly degenerated into love of pomp and personal aggrandizement. His obvious intention of being President at any price, the assumption of the title of Marshal — together with a \$5,000 baton to dignify his office —, the costly honors bestowed upon King Farouk, the expensive parties, the magnificent residence prepared for Marshal Za'im at government expense, and the increasing number of personal luxuries and indulgences were all noted by a watchful public. Though none apart from a very few intimates considered the possibility of the liquidation of the regime, the public was being slowly and unconsciously prepared for the change when it did come.

Two other factors influencing public opinion unfavorably were the June election, and "l'affaire Saadeh." The purpose of the election was to submit to the voters of Syria the questions of the election of Marshal Za'im as President of the Republic, and the ratification by the people of each and every administrative act which had been taken in the interim between the deposition of President al-Quwwatli and the election of President Za'im. The whole election was so obviously set up and railroaded through, however, that the positive results were more than cancelled out by the general dislike of the essentially democratic Arabs for the demonstration of dictatorial methods.

The second case was that of the treatment of Anton Saadeh, the leader of the Syrian National Party, who had been involved in a revolt in Lebanon and had taken refuge in Syria. President Za'im had accepted him as a political refugee, publicly entertained him, and otherwise extended all the traditional rights of Arab hospitality. Then, when the Lebanese Government was able to bring pressure through foreign powers, President Za'im as suddenly turned Saadeh over to the authorities of Lebanon, in which country he was tried and executed. Quite in addition to

the bitter opposition aroused among the followers of the Saadeh Party in Syria, the action of President Za'im touched a point of pride with all Arabs, and the general feeling that he had betrayed one who was his guest added many to the ranks of his critics.

When the news came out on the morning of August 14, therefore, that Husni Za'im had been arrested by a military group under the leadership of Colonel Sami Hinnawi, and had been tried by court martial and executed, there was no violent reaction on the part of the population. Speculation and rumor were everywhere, and a measure of surprise. A few regretted the form of the overthrow of the regime, saying that it "smelled too much like the Janissaries," or comparing Za'im's fate with the more generous treatment he had given President al-Quwwatli. There was not the same air of festivity which had accompanied the news of the previous coup d'état. A combination of fatalism and the known criticisms of the Za'im regime helped the new government to take power without any difficulty. Then as the days went by, and the faults of Za'im which had previously circulated in bated breath were spoken in the market place, there was general acceptance of the decision of Sami Hinnawi and his associates as fully justified.

There was also considerable surprise, at first, that Prime Minister Muhsin Barazi had been included in the violent end of the Za'im regime. As people felt more and more free to talk about it, however, the facts slowly came to light. Barazi was suspected of having played a double part in the original coup d'état. He was "the evil genius" of the Za'im regime, having been a close partner in the more personal dealings whereby the Leader was enriched at the expense of the state. In addition, he was considered to be the only one who might, perhaps for the above reasons, try to lead a violent opposition to the decision to end the Za'im regime.

It gradually came to light that the second coup d'état was, in a real sense, merely the fulfilment of the original intention of the first. Those who had been Za'im's associates in the overthrow of the al-Quwwatli regime had to be rid of him before they could accomplish the original purpose of the first conspiracy,

which was to unseat those who had proved themselves incompetent in the administration of the state and the conduct of the Palestine war, and to replace them in civil authority by those who had been the most upright and able critics of the old regime.

There are two points at which current opinion should be corrected. The first is to make plain that there was no direct connection, in the case of the second coup d'état, with the attitude of either party to the State of Israel. Vital as that question is to all Arabs, and powerful as that consideration is in any political program in Syria, the decision to end the regime of Husni Za'im was taken on the same basic grounds as the decision to terminate the Presidency of Shukri al-Quwwatli — namely those of incapacity in the affairs of state, and turning of public power to personal ends. The second point to make clear is that the People's Party leaders, who were destined to assume office under the Hinnawi regime, had themselves no knowledge or part in the plot for the overthrow of Za'im.

The net results of the rise and fall of Husni Za'im, therefore, have been four. First, a demonstration that the maintenance of a high standard of public security and order is a basic condition of public favor in Syria. Second, a renewed demonstration that any sign of partiality for France will awaken opposition beyond that of any other external loyalty. Third, indication of the basic interest of the people of Syria in closer cooperation among the Arab states. And fourth, clear indication that, by and large, the people of Syria prefer the secularization of life witnessed in Turkey to any effort to bind the people to the traditional culture pattern of Islam.

The new government, invited to take power after the second coup d'état and confirmed in power by the elections of November 15, found itself liberated from the weight of blame for failure in Palestine which afflicted the al-Quwwatli regime, and on a more democratic basis than the administration of Husni Za'im. It was ready to move forward along the lines of progress indicated by its predecessor. But the tendency of the military to continue to maneuver behind the scenes, as was apparent in the Army coup of December 19, remained as a disturbing and unpredictable political factor.

THE SHEIKHDOM OF KUWAIT

Mary Cubberly Van Pelt

THE RECENT discovery of oil in Kuwait, and the active development by American and British interests of a deposit in that area estimated to be one of the richest in the world, have focused all eyes upon that little known but ancient Arab sheikhdom.

Situated in the heart of the Middle East, near the headwaters of the Persian Gulf, and cornered by desert and sea, Kuwait has remained until recently an isolated, almost fanatically Muslim, community. Yet its position has long been strategic; the harbor is shown on fifteenth century charts and a settlement marked on its shores. It has known, alternately, prosperity and adversity. The widespread depression following World War I, coupled with a blockade by Saudi Arabia, drastically reduced Kuwait's trade and brought its economy to the brink of ruin, from which it happily now appears to have almost fully recovered. In fact Kuwait today is experiencing a phenomenal oil boom.

Present-day Kuwait comprises an area of approximately 6,000 square miles, and has a population estimated at 100,000 persons, its chief port and capital city, al-Kuwait, numbering some 70,000 souls. The bay which Kuwait encloses, and upon which al-Kuwait is located, was known to ancient mariners as "el Grane."¹ Early charts refer to "el Kadema,"² a settlement located at the northwest angle of the Persian Gulf; following the establishment of a small fort, it became known as "el

¹ A corruption of the Arabic dual form *al-qurayn*, "the two horns."

² Arabic, *al-qadimah*, "the place of antiquity."

♦ MARY CUBBERLY VAN PELT lived from 1917 to 1940 in the Persian Gulf area — until 1920 on the Island of Bahrein as a student of Arabic, and after that in Kuwait as a member of the Arabian Mission of the Reformed Church in America. Through her position as Superintendent of Kuwait Hospital for Men and of the Hospital for Women and Children, she came into close and constant contact with all classes of the people; and through her long residence was afforded the opportunity of studying the political, cultural, and physical changes that were taking place between World Wars I and II. At present she is on the staff of Gallaudet College, Washington, D. C.

Koweit."³ The northern channel of the bay, reaching a depth of nine fathoms and bordered by precipitous cliffs of sandstone, is less frequented than the southern "horn." The latter lies well within the shelter of the headland, and offers its shallowing waters on a flat, low desert shore. On its beaches the sailor, from early days, has brought his boats to rest, mended his sails, and traded cargoes for fresh mutton from the flocks of the Bedouin. Around this snug harbor, with its ample anchorage and adequate beach, several important activities have grown up, including shipbuilding, pearl-fishing, general trade, and commerce.

Unlike other centers in the Persian Gulf area, Kuwait has a dry climate except for a few weeks only of humidity in May and September. Rainfall, scanty and irregular, is confined to the period between late October and early March. When showers are early, and occur at proper intervals of time, there is sufficient grazing for the flocks; and during seasons of ample rainfall the desert does veritably "blossom as the rose." Not all plants put in their appearance each year, but well over 100 varieties have been identified. Temperatures reach 110 degrees Fahrenheit by June, climb rapidly, and maintain a uniformly steady level of 115 to 117 degrees Fahrenheit until late September. Higher temperatures have been recorded, but do not remain for long. Snow and ice are unknown, as the thermometer seldom reaches the freezing point. The *shimal*, a northerly wind which blows steadily for some four or five weeks in early mid-summer, is welcomed as a breeze, but also dreaded, as the sandstorms it brings plague mariner, townsman, and Bedouin alike. However, the dry climate and lack of water serve the Kuwaiti, for malaria and fevers prevalent in other ports of the Persian Gulf and in the neighboring country of Iraq are not indigenous to the Kuwait area.

Among the inhabitants of the port of al-Kuwait, during the period 1915-1940, some 10,000 were Persians and the others Arabs, including a goodly number of negroes, many of whom were slaves, the property of well-to-do families. The people of Kuwait stem from all the tribes of the Najd plateau. High class and conservative, proud and stout-hearted, the Arab in Kuwait

³ Arabic diminutive form, *al-kuwayt*, "the little fort."

looks upon life almost defiantly. He is an individualist, and a man of convictions. Lean and fibrous, with black hair and brown eyes, he lives in an environment which demands constant struggle with the problems of the desert and the sea. He is able, ingenious, artful, and crafty, but carries a high code of honor within his breast and will go to great lengths to keep his pledged word. Skillful in discerning the qualities and motives of his fellows, and believing in the dignity of man, the Arab of Kuwait lives his life with a considerable sense of democracy. He is an embodiment of the truth that it takes a strong Arab to lead an Arab.

HOUSE AND HOME

When approaching the city of al-Kuwait from the sea, the general impression is one of sand-colored houses fringing the water and receding toward the desert, shimmering in heat-glare under a dome of brazen sky. The Arab has blasted the rock from reefs of coral in the bay for piers, breakwaters, and buildings. Prior to the coming of cement, he used the native mud, with or without straw, in the making of mortar, and the outcroppings of limestone were burnt for plaster, applied as a thin veneer for finishing walls. Beams and poles for ceilings are imported from India and East Africa, and mats arrive by boat from the delta area of Iraq. Houses are flat-roofed, usually but one story in height, with the rooms invariably arranged to face upon a courtyard. Occasionally a single chamber is added over some particular room and a narrow, outside stairway is built to lead to it: the flat roofs are a definite part of the living space for many months of the year. Very few rooms have windows which face on the street and glass is seldom used. Larger establishments will have a separate courtyard for men and their guests.

In the harem each wife is allotted a room which is her domain; although such a type of life affords little privacy, there is considerable independence. The principal meal of the day is prepared in the kitchen for everyone, but each family unit has its own tray and eats by itself. A round mat, woven of date palm fronds, serves as a table placed on the floor. Around it each member of the family gathers, the left foot tucked under, the right knee drawn up to support the right arm. It is a Muslim

custom to employ only the right hand at meals, which are partaken with dexterity and decorum from the main tray of rice and its accompanying stew, meat, or fish. Although dates are not grown in Kuwait, they are a staple part of the diet. For the morning and noonday meals bread is served with well-sugared tea; the loaves are thin and flat, and made from whole-wheat flour milled by hand.

Arab coffee, of which one hears so much, does not accompany any meal, but is served upon rising, after meals, and frequently during the day for social purposes. Because it is a "bitter," a "sweet," usually a date, is offered just before the coffee is served. The making of Arab coffee is an art, and its serving has a ritual all its own.

The Bedouin naturally enjoy the use of more milk and butter-fat than do the townspeople, but many families keep a goat which is sent out to pasture each day with the community shepherd. There are few vegetables at any season, but the demand increases from year to year. The water found in the area is not sufficiently fresh, nor in quantity to permit gardening. A few melons, cucumbers, and tomatoes are grown in the spring and early winter. However, the soil must be washed free of salt before planting, and irrigation is required nightly. Since there are no date palms or other trees under which to plant the vegetables, it is necessary to cover the plants to shield them from the heat of the sun, even in February. By the end of March the vines are shrivelled and lifeless.

RELIGIOUS LAW AND SOCIAL CUSTOM

The Arabs of Kuwait are strong monotheists, largely of the Sunni sect of Islam, and incline to the more austere and puritanical forms of Muslim religious thinking. Their mosques are unadorned and religious practice is fundamental; children are taught to perform their prayers, to keep the Fast during the month of *rammadhan*, to give alms and feed the poor. The head of a family strives to make an annual sacrifice, lest any of his family may have sinned. To make the Pilgrimage to the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina at least once in a lifetime is the ambition and purpose of everyone. Allah is, among the other ninety

and nine attributes in the Muslim mind, all-powerful, all-controlling. This belief has had a profound influence on the development of Muslim peoples everywhere, and has not failed to leave its mark on the innately religious Kuwaiti.

The law of the land is Koranic of the Malekite rite. Social structure has this law, together with the Muslim Traditions, as its foundation and working principles. It is interpreted by the ulema, or the learned, and executed at the behest of the ruler.

Poligamy, concubinage, and slavery are all legal, and practiced to the extent of individual whim and purse. The rule for poligamy limits wives to four at a time; however, a poor man can ill afford plurality of wives, nor yet frequent divorce.

Marriages in Kuwait are invariably contracted by the parents or by paid agents. They are declared before the religious judge and a sum of money is paid to the parents of the bride-to-be; with this a trousseau including gold ornaments is supposed to be bought. These ornaments are thereafter her own, and can be taken with her if she is divorced. Marriages of first cousins are customary but not compulsory, as is often alleged. Contracting parties rarely have seen each other, and courtship begins with marriage. It is only the virgin who has no say whatsoever as to whom she shall marry and when she shall marry.

Divorce is easily effected by the man for any or no reason, and there is no stigma attached to it. There is no public opportunity for employment of women, and remarriage is the usual practice. Great inequality in age and experience can and very often does exist between husband and wife. Although children belong to the father, many women are left with the responsibility of little children after being divorced, and often receive scant, if any, help from the father.

Women know little marital security, but a surprisingly large number of marriages endure. In a harem, espial is the preoccupation of every woman, and she knows that she and her children are subjected in turn to the surveillance of each and every member of her household and community. She must, indeed, develop a Daedalian mind if she would contrive to maintain any privacy, and outwit much malice prepense. She must teach her children, long before they can talk, to protect her and their own family

affairs: other persons must not know the facts, simply because they have no right to them. Consequently, considerable attention is paid to the effort of finding a courteous but completely misleading reply to many queries of a personal nature.

Arab women and girls in al-Kuwait are intelligent, endowed with charm and a grace of manner, and are taught the deportment of a lady. Girls are veiled early, lead somewhat sheltered lives, and learn the accomplishments customary to their environment. The custom of seclusion for women is strictly adhered to, and together with the wearing of the veil accounts in large measure for the lag in education. In days past limited number received private instruction, but it was not until late in 1938 that education for girls became the fashion. His Highness Sheikh Sir Ahmad al-Jabir al-Subah, K.C.S.I., K.C.I.E., officially gave the needed impetus by setting aside a building and importing two Egyptian women teachers to establish the first public school for girls in the state of Kuwait. The opportunity was eagerly accepted and at the end of a few months the girls proudly displayed new accomplishments.

Slavery is legitimate in the social and religious system of Islam. The Arab throughout Arabia, including Kuwait, has his slaves, male and female, provided he can afford them. When Great Britain made treaty arrangements with the local rulers in the 1890's to protect the pearling fleets from piracy, it was specified that no cargo entering the Persian Gulf should include human beings intended for sale. There are those who hold that there is no trade in slaves from Africa at this time, but the Arab is not the one who asserts it. The African medicine man possesses a secret method by which infants are marked with both tribal and family identifications; consequently, slaves bearing such markings in Arabia bear evidence that they are natives of Africa.

It is not difficult to purchase a slave in Kuwait, provided one is available for sale; if not, those desiring to do so make a point of going or sending an agent for that purpose to Mecca, one of the great slave markets of the world. Some persons are not inclined to favor slavery, and although there may be individuals in their household of African descent, whom they have purchased, they still do not exercise the right of ownership to any

great extent. Marriages are arranged by the master amongst his slaves; the children, although his property, are reared by their parents, and some privacy is afforded the family unit.

It can be truthfully said that slaves in Kuwait are generally well treated, and that this is in accordance with the wishes of Sheikh Sir Ahmad. Any slave, man or woman, who has a complaint may seek the Sheikh and secure protection until the controversy can be adjusted. An unreasonable master may be fined the cost of his slave and lose him. Resale of slaves in Kuwait is usually arranged with the owner and takes place privately, but not necessarily so. There have been owners who freed their slaves in their wills, or on their deathbeds, thus cutting off their heirs, but feeling they have done a meritorious act. Slave women who bear sons to their masters are occasionally given their freedom; but since children belong to the father, it is greatly to the advantage of the woman to remain in the house of the father of her son, and thereby retain her security.

ECONOMIC LIVELIHOOD

The merchants in al-Kuwait form its well-to-do class. Its native sons, however, are better known for their maritime pursuits, their prowess in ship-building, sailing, and pearl-fishing.

The Kuwaiti shipwright is widely recognized for his superior workmanship and skill in designing. While necessity compels him to import all timber, he purchases the best the west coast of India and the east coast of Africa afford for his purpose. The great *boom*⁴ is a recognized Kuwaiti design, and the grace of its lateen sails is often noted. Substantially everything consumed by the inhabitants is imported into Kuwait, which in turn serves as the natural entrepôt for supplies into the hinterland. The ports of Aden, Mombasa, Zanzibar, Ceylon, Basra, Bundar Abbas, Jask, Karachi, and Bombay — to name but a few — all know the majesty of the Kuwaiti *boom* entering their harbors to exchange cargoes of dates, wool and hides, for timber, hemp, sugar, rice, tea, coffee, cloth, and other staples.

Another boat of special design is used for the transportation

⁴ The Kuwaiti *boom* is a deep-water craft of several hundred tons, usually three-masted, and carrying large lateen sails.

of water from the nearby delta of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and a fleet of these sailing vessels supplies drinking water to the city; no other arrangement has been developed, nor potable water found within all that desert land. Still other designs in craft, built in varying sizes, serve for the fleet on the pearling banks of the Persian Gulf. There are also numerous minor craft which are used for fishing and other harbor purposes.

RECENT HISTORY

For several generations members of the house of al-Subah have been, as they still are, the traditional owner-rulers of the area of Kuwait. Muhammad al-Subah, ruler over Kuwait in the latter years of the nineteenth century, managed to keep his state free from the suzerainty of the Turks. He gave refuge to Abd al-Rahman al-Saud and his family when they were driven from their capital at al-Riadh, in central Arabia, including his son, the present ruler of Saudi Arabia, King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Saud, who grew up in al-Kuwait. In 1897, Sheikh Muhammad was allegedly assassinated soon after his younger brother Mubarrak returned to al-Kuwait from a sojourn in Bombay. Mubarrak immediately seized the throne.

The new Sheikh found himself plunged into world affairs almost at once. In this same year Kaiser Wilhelm II told of his dream of a railway from Berlin through Baghdad to the city of al-Kuwait — sole harbor on the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf. The Turks had never held any part of the lands of al-Subah, but they claimed Kuwait as part of their empire. The British had been pressing up the coasts of the Persian Gulf for nearly a century; Arab rulers to the south had formed alliances with them, arranging for protection from piracy for the pearling fleets.

Under Sheikh Mubarrak and with the changing times, Kuwait grew and trade with the Bedouin prospered. Mubarrak took the trouble to foster the Sauds of Najd, still living in exile in al-Kuwait. Greatly admiring the adolescent Abd al-Aziz, he took him into his council chamber where he met men of local, tribal, and foreign influence. Mubarrak hailed Abd al-Aziz as the scion of the Saud family, which he outfitted several times,

enabling it to regain leadership of the tribes and possession of its central Arabian capital of al-Riadh.

AMERICAN MISSION ACTIVITY

Sheikh Mubarrak was also on very good terms with the powerful Sheikh Khuzal of Muhammarah, the Bandar Shapur area of today. It was at Sheikh Khuzal's palace that he met the American physician and surgeon who was then stationed in Basra. Through this contact, Sheikh Mubarrak in 1912 brought the American Mission to al-Kuwait with a view to providing modern medical facilities for his people. Since then a sober, ably-controlled project, largely medical but with educational and evangelistic units, has remained in al-Kuwait as a prominent influence from the Western world. By virtue of the character and professional skill of the members of the Mission and the Sheikh's welcome, much of the prejudice against Christians as residents in the community gradually softened, and within ten years the hospital for men which the Mission had built had to be supplemented by a special hospital for women and children. The Subah have always used the facilities of these modern hospitals for themselves, the members of their households, and for those wounded in battle. Year by year these facilities have had to be enlarged and the American Mission continues to serve an increasing number of the people of Kuwait and of the incoming Bedouin from the outlying districts and Najd.

During the years of World War I, the pick of the young men of the best families began to be assigned to learn English in a school for boys which was organized by the American Mission to meet the demand for education at that time. The boys who attended that school have become men and transact the business for the newer enterprises of today. The time was not then ripe for the introduction of education for girls.

POLITICS OF WORLD WAR I

In the period shortly prior to the outbreak of World War I, Kuwait was visited by secret agents from various governments. The astute Sheikh Mubarrak listened to the representatives of France, Turkey, Germany, Russia, and Great Britain, and mean-

while watched the trend of events. Finally he flatly refused to accede to the proposal of Kaiser Wilhelm to build the Baghdad Railway to al-Kuwait. Thus Sheikh Mubarrak saved Kuwait for himself and for his people, and closed the Kuwaiti door to the East. Rebuffed by Sheikh Mubarrak, the Germans pressed the Turks to depose him; however, the threat reached his ears, and the Turkish envoy found him forewarned and smug, safe in his secret alliance with Great Britain, and under the direct protection of its powerful navy. Since that time, a British Political Agent has resided in Kuwait.

More experienced than his people, Sheikh Mubarrak often used astute strategy to bring his public into line with his forward policies. One of the truly great Arabs, his subjects have been justly proud of his leadership. He seemed to possess a perceptivity that enabled him to make quick, emphatic judgments, and security of person and property existed under his rule. His policies were far reaching and fundamentally sound. His son, Sheikh Jabir, who succeeded to the throne upon Mubarrak's death in 1915, lived but a short time, and another son then came to power. This son was Sheikh Salim, who had spent most of his life out in the desert with the tribes.

STRUGGLE WITH IBN SAUD

After World War I, Kuwait found itself in the midst of political flux and ferment. Sheikh Salim's kingdom, however, was not affected by the imperialistic rivalries of European powers so much as by the puritanical Wahhabi movement, then at white heat in the desert. By that time Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Saud had become leader of the tribes of Central Arabia, and desperately needed a Persian Gulf port for the entry of his supplies. The strategic value of the harbor at al-Kuwait he well knew, so he set his armies, fired by religious fervor, toward the sheikhdom. As the city was unprotected and had itself no troops, it promised to be an easy prey. Sheikh Salim and the city fathers threw up a mud wall to protect al-Kuwait and dispatched a small force against Ibn Saud's army. This force was defeated at the wells and village of Jahara, twenty miles to the west of the city. During a short truce, while Ibn

Saud prepared his men for the occupation of al-Kuwait, Sheikh Salim formally invited Great Britain to assume the defense of his kingdom. A few days later, on October 24, 1920, Ibn Saud withdrew his forces, deeming his cavalry with their lances and rifles inadequate against the airplanes and big guns by then defending the port. Thus another Subah saved his kingdom for himself and for his people.

In retaliation for his strategic defeat and the loss of this coveted seaport — natural center for supplies for his then fast-growing kingdom — Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Ibn al-Saud established a land blockade which was enforced for twenty-odd years. It is not of his choosing, but despite it, that the port of al-Kuwait has remained "a free Arab town on the Persian Gulf."

Economically, the blockade strangled al-Kuwait. Its merchant fleet lay idle; and its seamen, in an effort to support their families, suffered even greater economic slavery in the pearl-diving industry than before. The immediate buyer of pearls is the Arab merchant who rows from boat to boat collecting the catch. He pays with promises, awaiting the market price, and departs for Bombay where Indian and Parisian purchasers, acting as brokers for investors and lapidarists, buy up the bulk of his supply. During this time of depression there was no sale for pearls, for the Saudi blockade from the desert was coincidental with lean years in the United States and elsewhere. Shipbuilding naturally followed the decline of pearl-fishing and merchant fleet importations, the two industries which support it.

SEARCH FOR REHABILITATION

His Highness Sheikh Sir Ahmad Ibn Jabir al-Subah, who succeeded to the throne in 1921 upon the death of his uncle, Sheikh Salim, inherited the Saudi blockade and also was forced to endure lean years. He opened the royal treasury to bolster private enterprise and alleviate conditions among his destitute people. Grimly and actively, he sought advisers and studied every proposal made to him for the development of the natural resources of his state.

A few miles out from al-Kuwait lies the rim of hills holding within it a pool of pitch, hills which the Arab has always called

al-Burkan, "The Crater." Iran and the Bahrein Islands were producing oil, and favorable reports of geologists and geophysical parties about the possibilities at al-Burkan and elsewhere in Kuwait soon brought the concessionaires.

In 1934 Sheikh Sir Ahmad fought through a joint concession, granting on a fifty-fifty basis to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company of Great Britain and the Gulf Oil Corporation of the United States permission to form the Kuwait Oil Company for the purpose of developing any oil that should be found in his territory.

The Kuwait Oil Company concession covers the whole of Kuwait's territory, about 6,000 square miles, for a term of seventy-five years from December 23, 1934. The drilling operations at the present time are confined to the Burkan site, which is 28 miles south of the Bay of Kuwait and fourteen miles from the Gulf coast. Some fifty wells fan out from the "crater." Approximately fifty 168,000-barrel tanks occupy a position on the ridge ten miles nearer the coast. The oil flows by gravity to a topping plant, with a capacity of 20,000 barrels a day, and loading terminal on the coast at the village of Fahahil, now called Mina al-Ahmadi. A six-berth loading jetty, each to accommodate a 25,000-ton tanker and capable of loading 8,500 barrels an hour, nears completion. It is proposed in the future to tie Kuwait production into a pipeline to be constructed from Iran to the Mediterranean, and to an additional pipeline to the Mediterranean to be built by still another oil group.

The Kuwait Oil Company has better than 15,000 employees and an American-British community of over 2,000 persons residing on the ridge in the new city which has been named Ahmadi. The American and British families live an air-conditioned, American-suburban life, all but unaware of the Arab. Nevertheless, their very presence already has created situations which have taken Muslim tolerance and exquisite self-restraint combined with international diplomatic tact to resolve.

Adjacent to the recognized state of Kuwait is a neutral zone which it shares in undivided sovereignty with Saudi Arabia. In July 1948, the American Independent Oil Company announced an agreement with H.H. Sheikh Sir Ahmad providing full oil rights in his half share of this zone. The concession was

reported to be for fifty years at a dead rental per annum of \$600,000; the royalty on production to be \$2.50 per ton. The Sheikh of Kuwait also has some participation in the operating company. Geological exploration of the area has been under way during the year, and drilling operations began in December 1949.

IMPACT OF WEALTH

Within the year after the first oil concession was granted in 1934, supplies began to arrive and new employment came to the men of Kuwait. For the first time in history, except for the small staffs of the British Political Agency and the American Mission, the worker was paid his daily wage in cash. His steady employment posed a problem for dhow captains who had, in the long, lean years, advanced their funds in loans to persons who were now loathe to leave the new steady employment and return to work off their old debts. The economic formula which has subsequently evolved ensures the sea captains of both diving and merchant fleets a return for what once was moribund capital; and at the same time frees the worker who had become hostage to the family debt. Specifically, Sheikh Sir Ahmad became arbiter for each individual who wished to enter the employ of the Kuwait Oil Company. He established records and arranged for regular payments of an agreed amount, until the debts of the workers should be cleared. Government records and the modern automatic payday soon began to wipe out the age-old system which had left most breadwinners enslaved by debt.

Good housing, good hospitals, good water supply, gas lines for cooking, schools for methods and technicians, all are part of the arrangements for the Arabs in the employ of the Kuwait Oil Company who live at Ahmadi and Burkan. All of these things carry their share in the changing picture of Arab life in the area.

The changes that are taking place in al-Kuwait itself and on the Bay of the Two Horns, however, are due to state and private enterprise. The ample harbor which sheltered the ships of the ancients is undismayed when fifteen or twenty freighters anchor in its channel. The Arab has powered his lighters and built jetties to accommodate all. A wide street, lined with colonnaded shops,

after the fashion of Baghdad, has been cut through the city from the shore to the *sufat*, where the market place for camel caravans shares its space with transport trucks. The main part of the city is being largely rebuilt. Al-Kuwait now has a modern banking system, electricity, telephones; agencies for radios, automobiles, motor oils, tires, spare parts. Repair shops, landing companies, and municipal offices all offer new employment.

His Highness has established state schools and state hospitals, with extension clinics serving each section of the city. It is his intention to place, as quickly as possible, every advantage at the disposal of his people. Each member of the Subah family has a share in the new-found income; they are, by and large, stable and sincere persons interested and intent upon the proper development of their lands.

The soil of Kuwait is not unproductive, as is evidenced by the prompt appearance of green after the first light rain. Search for water continues to be made in various sections of the state; the cost of such operations is fabulous, but to date have been unrewarding. In the meantime, the waters of the Shatt al-Arab continue to pour fruitlessly into the nearby headwaters of the Persian Gulf. Opportunity is still open for the skill and imagination of engineering and irrigation experts; if the opportunity for agriculture could be added to the economy of the state of Kuwait the people would benefit enormously. No attempt has been made to date to approximate the mineral resources, but this will very likely be done in the not-too-distant future.

Lack of funds is no longer the critical problem it has been in years past and His Highness fully expects to place every opportunity for education, sanitation, health, and medical treatment, as well as other facilities, at the disposal of the people of Kuwait. The isolation of Arabia Deserta is broken. Just what of the old order will survive and what of the new will prove enduring, as the West rushes out to meet the East, could be the subject of varied speculation. It remains to be seen whether the development of the oil resources can put at the disposal of the desert Arab an adequate and acceptable way of life, commensurate with his potential buying power, or whether in defense of his own ideals, the Arab in the future will drive his flocks farther and farther

into the desert and pitch his tents in sections uninvaded by modern machinery and men of other faiths.

Al-Kuwait still remains at heart the conservative, aristocratic Muslim city it has always been. The intellectual structure of Islam has not been seriously undermined by modern influence; the Procrustean bed of Islam is still extant. The name of Allah is on every tongue to accompany every effort. But for how long? Conservative though the high-class Kuwaiti Arab is, he can and does think; he can and will change; he will absorb, as do all peoples, something of the good and something of the bad that come near enough to him to be observed. The Arab, though obscure for several centuries, can hardly remain in obscurity for long. Arab youth is alert and alive. New ideas are reaching him by air, by land, and by sea.

Opportunity and responsibility stand at the door of the West; and especially to the United States and Great Britain is given the opportunity to share their best with the Arab and make of him an ally whose strength and whose ideals would be of great value at this time in our world.

HYDERABAD: MUSLIM TRAGEDY

Wilfred Cantwell Smith

THE INDIAN EMPIRE under British rule was a complex of diverse political forms, religions, cultures, and social strata, diversely interrelated. These complexities have in general been subsumed under a higher unity. But a section of them pushed themselves roughly to the surface when the state of Hyderabad came to settle its affairs with the Dominion of India after the ending of the British Raj in August 1947. The barriers that divided India into religious communities, language areas, and economic classes ran heedlessly across Hyderabad's political frontiers, themselves anomalous. Virtually every inhabitant of the state was also a member of one or more other communities transcending Hyderabad both geographically and ideally. The several groups have variously contributed to, and been variously thrown about by, the swirl of events, which is the story of the sudden rearranging of the pattern of unity, both within the state and of Hyderabad within India.

BACKGROUND DESCRIPTION

Lying around the heart of the Dakhin plateau, squarely athwart the main north-south and east-west routes of India, Hyderabad covers some 82,000 square miles.¹ It had a population at the 1941 census of over 16 million. Of these 13 percent, or about 2 million, were Muslims; 81 percent, or about 13 million, were Hindus (or 64 percent if one excludes the 3 million Untouchables from an enumeration of this community); and the remainder, about 1 million, were chiefly Christians and abo-

¹ Of the Indian States, only Kashmir was larger; but with one-quarter as many inhabitants.

♦ WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH was in India from 1940 to 1946, during most of which time he was lecturer in Islamic History at Forman Christian College, Lahore, and at the University of the Punjab. He is the author of *Modern Islam in India* (1946), a social study of the movements leading to the establishment of Pakistan; and of articles on the earlier history of the Muslim group in India. He again visited Hyderabad in the spring of 1949 in the course of a year's tour of the Middle East under a Rockefeller fellowship from Princeton, studying modern Muslim ideological developments. He is at present Professor of Comparative Religion at McGill University, Montreal.

original tribes. Of India's eleven chief language areas, the state brought together, in a political embrace, a segment of each of three: Andhra, Maharashtra, and the Karnatak. About one-third of the first, the cultural and linguistic region of the Telugu, lay within Hyderabad, constituting the eastern half of the state and numerically a little over half of the population; it is known as Tilangana. The western half of Hyderabad was again more or less neatly divided: into a northern area, whose 4 million Marathas constitute a sizeable corner of Maharashtra; and a southern, where live 2 million of the Karnatak's 12 million Kanarese. Of the Muslims, most speak Urdu, often in addition to a regional language.

Hyderabad was the major area in India where a political and social structure from medieval Muslim rule had been preserved more or less intact. The present ruler, the Nizam, owed not only his position, but also to some extent his boundaries, his predominantly Muslim ruling group around him, and so on, to the exploits and circumstances of his ancestor Asaf Jah, early 18th-century founder of the dynasty. The latter, one-time governor under Awrangzeb, in the days when the Mughul Empire was disintegrating, carved out for himself what feudal domain he could and ruled it as the Muslim feudal lords did rule in those days — not without the help of some Hindu nobility. His domain and his family have undergone vicissitudes in the two hundred years since, with now the Mughuls, now the British, now the Congress, ruling in Delhi; and now this, now that enemy at the gates. Yet the domain and its rulers persisted, in substance unchanged. This continuity itself has made part of the recent problem: it is not too fanciful an abstraction to view the turmoil of the past two years as Hyderabad's abrupt adjustment to a metamorphosis of conditions for which the rest of India has had many decades and Europe, on a vaster scale, some centuries.

At the head of the social order stood the Nizam, absolute ruler, and inordinately rich. Whether his repute as the world's wealthiest individual was valid is a question whose answer depends on how one estimates his unaudited reserves, and on how one reckons wealth; but in any case, besides his handsome official income from the state exchequer and his amassed treasures, he

personally owned more than 5 million acres of his state's land. There is not much evidence to suggest that his personality rose above the level of moral quality to which, throughout history, such a background has tempted dynastic rulers. Around him was an aristocracy of some 1,100 feudal lords who together with him not only owned but privately administered, in major cases with their own police and legal systems, a patchwork of landed estates tilled by 4 million tenants, and making up in all 26,000 square miles. Mention should be made, too, of the modern counterpart to the aristocrat: the big industrialist. Hyderabad had a handful of these, mostly Muslims, with two or three operating on a very big scale.² The State held, as a rule, 50 percent or more of the capital in important enterprises, a device which enabled the Nizam to keep and extend his control of affairs, as well as his wealth, and to subsidize chosen — normally Muslim — entrepreneurs.

Next in the social structure came the administrative and official class: government servants, whose social importance and relatively high incomes were characteristic of the whole Indian scene. Again, these were chiefly, but not entirely, Muslims. A significant proportion of them were recruited from among Indians outside the state. The upper ranks of these officials numbered perhaps 1,500. The army officer group was similarly composed.

The lower strata of government employ were also manned predominantly by Muslims; it was tacitly recognized, for instance, that the office of government errand boy or copyist was virtually the prerogative of the less well-to-do Muslims. In India the practice of son following father in trade and social status, with certain employments the monopoly of certain social groups, was not only established but, for the majority, sacred. The Muslims in Hyderabad formed, as it were, an upper caste. Shopkeepers, merchants, and the like, were of both communities. Lawyers and others in the professions were predominantly Hindu; while education, reflecting the Islamic culture of the state, was largely in Muslim hands.

Underneath all these groups stood (or stooped) the mass of

² The principal industries in the state were engineering, and cotton and tobacco mills.

the people: the usual peasantry of India, poor and long-suffering.³ The Muslim community included relatively few of these. The 20,000 villages of Hyderabad, as villages elsewhere in India, housed four-fifths of the population; but somewhat over half the Muslims lived in the state's five cities or its 118 towns. Many were petty industrial workers; and both in town and countryside a large number of Muslims were wretchedly poor.

Numerically, then, there were many exceptions to the principle that the Muslim community formed the ruling class. Nonetheless that principle stood; for the individuals who did compose the ruling class of the state were mostly Muslims, and their rule had a distinctive and deliberate Islamic tinge. All members of the Muslim community could, and almost all of them to varying degrees did, participate psychologically in that dominance. Moreover, the exploited, often desperate, Hindu poor could, and to varying degrees many did, include the entire Muslim group, poor and rich, in their resentment against the ruling class that dominated them. The scattering of Hindus in the landed aristocracy accepted the dominant Islamic nature of the state, content personally to be enjoying their immensely rewarding participation in the coterie.

Culturally, the state did achieve a certain unity. As India, for all its diversity, had an over-all cultural homogeneity, so on a smaller scale Hyderabad had elaborated a certain distinctive cultural pattern, of which at its best Mrs. Sarojini Naidu, for instance, was representative. Nonetheless, such unity was not strong or profound; and added only slight significance to the bare political unity. Few of the state's subjects were Hyderabadis primarily. The Muslim was more conscious of belonging to the Muslim community scattered throughout India, concentrated in Pakistan, and stretching far across the world. The Telugu-speaking Hyderabadis was increasingly conscious of his part in Andhra. Peasants often felt more allegiance to class than to regional loyalties; many Hindus thought of themselves primarily as "Indians."

The political structure of the state was superficially simple, all power being vested in the Nizam. He ruled, of late years,

³ The chief agricultural products of Hyderabad were cotton, tobacco, millet, wheat, rice, peanuts.

with the help of an Executive Council (his "Cabinet") appointed and dismissed by himself; and of an Assembly, little more than advisory in function, partly elected on a carefully limited franchise but with a slight majority appointed by the Nizam. There were Hindus, Parsis, Christians, Depressed-class representatives, and other non-Muslims in both the Council and the Assembly; but they were never in a majority. The Prime Minister was always a Muslim, often from outside the state.

POLITICAL PARTIES

Political activity in Hyderabad had no long history, though of recent years a certain keenness had increasingly replaced a former quiet that approached apathy. However, by 1947 various political parties existed. In the nature of the case, their only possible activity was agitation. Four organizations may be noted, each being related, at least in principle, to a major political body outside the state: Congress, Hindu Mahasabha, Communist Party, and Muslim League respectively.

The Hyderabad State Congress was formed in 1938. Its inception at that point represents the fact that there was spreading to the Native States, for the first time in serious proportions, that Indian nationalism which after a long history had just triumphed in the 1937 provincial elections. The Hyderabad State Congress, like Congress parties in other states, was not directly affiliated to the Indian National Congress; and in fact its announced program was local only, aimed at attaining responsible government within the state under the Nizam. However, it and similar organizations in other States had the vigorous moral support of the national party, shared a common ideology, and recognized that the wrenching of power from their local autocrats and the ejection of the British Raj from India were interwoven, if not identical, problems. They were federated in the All-India States' Peoples' Congress, of which in 1939 Jawaharlal Nehru was president. The Hyderabad Congress's first act was to launch a *satyagraha*, or civil disobedience, movement. The Nizam, of course, tried to crush it, with the usual police procedure. The organization was banned a few months after being founded, and remained illegal until 1946. The Nizam, however, made in 1939 the concession of slight reforms in the constitution.

The Congress movement was largely Hindu, both in membership and in ideology. This was inevitable, in the circumstances, since the populace was overwhelmingly Hindu arithmetically, and also any transfer of power, however slight, from the Nizam and his mainly Muslim ruling class to democratic institutions meant to that extent the circumscribing or ending of predominantly Islamic rule. Both communities were quite aware of this; and both exacerbated the tension. The Nizam, in suppressing the Congress, charged it with being communal; as a matter of fact, when its leaders were thrown into jail the direction of the *satyagraha* movement was taken over by the parties which were communal by profession: the Arya Samaj and the Hindu Mahasabha.

Of the Arya Samaj and Mahasabha movements, here lumped together for our purposes, this further must be mentioned: that the anti-Muslim sentiment which they represented and fanned was particularly strong in Marathwara, the northwest quarter of the state. The populace there shared with their fellow Marathas in adjoining parts of Bombay Province romantic anti-Muslim traditions going back to Shivaji, a 17th-century hero who had founded not only a kingdom but a great popular movement on the basis of explicitly Hindu resistance to the increasingly Muslim rule of the later Mughul Empire. This was the area that produced the fanatical Godse to assassinate Gandhi.

The next organization to be noted is the Andhra Mahasabha, also known as the Andhra Sangham⁴ — in effect, the Communists. During the 'thirties, each of the three main linguistic areas of Hyderabad had its cultural society, led by liberals, but in touch with the villages. Those of the Karnatak and Maharashtra do not concern us, though all three organizations found themselves to some extent being used as channels for the expression of the growing political discontent after the State Congress had become illegal. The Andhra Society leapt into prominence when Communist leaders, some of them former left-wing members of the Congress executive, having formed a state Communist Party in 1940, began to work through it and thereby to organize

⁴ Both phrases are Sanskrit for "Andhra Association" or "Society." Not to be confused with the Hindu Mahasabha (often called simply "the" Mahasabha), which means "Hindu Association."

the Tilangana peasantry. It so happened that in this particular case the response was very large indeed; and by the end of World War II the Communists were, through this organization, leading about the largest and for a brief moment perhaps the most effective peasant uprising in Asia outside of China. Village after village, especially in two administrative districts called Nalgonda and Warangal, on the Madras border, in 1943-44 refused to obey landlords' orders, to supply forced labor, or to pay taxes and rent. The state military and police descended on them with brutality, but somehow the peasants managed to throw them off.

The last political party to be noted is Muslim. In 1927, as a cultural organization, the Majlis-i-Ittihad-ul-Muslimin⁵ — popularly known as "the Ittihad" — was formed. Over the years it became increasingly political, reflecting within Hyderabad the developing all-India communalism of the Muslim League. Riding this wave of feeling, a fanatically communal lawyer, Qasim Razavi, ousted the former president who was attempting a political pact with the local Congress. Under Razavi's charge the organization fairly quickly became a militant and somewhat frenzied party, accused, not without cause, of being fascist in both spirit and structure. Most significantly, he created as an armed wing of the Ittihad a corps of "Razakar" Volunteers, ostensibly a sort of Home Guard to counteract Communist depredations, but in fact a major private army. They showed to themselves and others their ability to interfere with impunity in state politics, even to the extent of bearding the Prime Minister, in the disgraceful Dichpali mosque incident of 1946. The Ittihad's program was to "safeguard Islamic culture in the Deccan," which soon came to mean resistance to any modification of the Muslim character of Hyderabad's rule, and even extension of the political and social power of its Muslim community. This became explicit in the solemn religious oath of the Razakar who, on joining, pledged his life to the leader and to "fight to the last to maintain the supremacy of Muslim power in the Deccan." Under Razavi the Ittihad elaborated the doctrine that Hyderabad was an Islamic state, the Nizam being the

⁵ Arabo-Persian: "Council of the Union of Muslims."

representative and symbol of a sovereignty that pertained in fact to the Muslim community, and which he exercised on their behalf. Every Hyderabad Muslim, according to this view, became a participant, not only mystically but constitutionally, in the government of the State; and every Hindu became the subject not only of the Nizam, but virtually of all the Muslims. The middle and lower-class Muslims liked this idea with an increasing zeal.

The prospect of eventual British withdrawal from India had called forth from the protagonists varying attitudes regarding Hyderabad and the States question in general. The all-India Congress had long suggested, in general terms, that when the British Raj was finished, the princes would be finished with it; at the Haripura session (1938) it had forcefully asserted that *Purna Swaraj* (complete self-rule) must include the States, and that freedom there must be democratic. Gandhi later that year had warned the princes to be friendly with the Congress, since it might well soon replace the British as the ruling party. Nehru, speaking as president of the All-India States' Peoples' Conference in February 1939, and referring to the treaties which linked the States to "British imperialism," had said, "We recognize no such treaties and we shall in no event accept them."⁶

The Muslim League had taken pains not to consider the question. Jinnah, as part of his general policy of refusing, rather irately, to define Pakistan until the "principle" should be conceded, or to discuss any specific problems that partition would raise, had at first brushed aside the question when it was put to him. Eventually, in 1944, he explicitly stated that only British India was under consideration.⁷

The British Conservative Government—the princes' best friend—had long envisaged for India, according to Indian nationalists, no real freedom; according to themselves, an eventual independent state in which the Native States, under their ruling princes, would be powerful integral units.⁸ The

⁶ R. Coupland, *Indian Politics 1936-1942* (Oxford, 1943), p. 174.

⁷ *The Jinnah-Gandhi Talks* (Karachi, 1944), pp. 22, 23.

⁸ See the *Report of the Indian States Committee, 1928-29*. See also the Government of India Act, 1935. Opposition to the federal part of the Act was unanimous, and it was never implemented.

Labor Government, once withdrawal was squarely faced and partition had been adopted, announced that the two dominions about to be created out of British India, and also the princely States, were to become fully independent. The process of transferring power was so swift that many details were not worked out. However, it does seem clear that the men at Westminster who framed the Independence Act of 1947, and the British Cabinet in general, did definitely have in mind that Hyderabad and other States were to be free to choose any one of the three alternatives: joining India, joining Pakistan, or becoming autonomous.⁹

The Nizam himself was rather put out that Great Britain was inaugurating a new age in India without consulting him. He apparently asked that he be allowed to keep Hyderabad within the empire as a separate dominion on its own, but this request was refused.¹⁰ In June 1947, a week after the British announced partition, he publicly declared that he would join neither dominion at the start, but would see how things developed. His contention was that Hyderabad could have been integrated with the old India as a whole, but could not be with either part of it, now that there were to be two dominions, until he saw how relations between these two would work out. In other words, his sympathy, as a Muslim ruler, with Pakistan precluded his acceding to India. He also repeatedly stressed that he was choosing independence to avoid communal riots.

THE STANDSTILL AGREEMENT

With this much reference to background, we turn to a survey of the events in Hyderabad during the two years following

⁹ The Act itself merely stated, negatively, that the suzerainty of His Majesty over the States, with all that the relation involved, explicit or otherwise, came to an end on August 15. The positive inference as to the States' becoming "masters of their own fate" (Listowel) was drawn by British officials—e.g., Attlee in the House of Commons; and Lord Listowel as follows in the House of Lords: "They will then be entirely free to choose whether to associate with one or other of the Dominion Governments or to stand alone." (*Hyderabad's Relations with the Dominion of India* [publication of the Nizam's government], Vol. I, p. 4). However, it is only fair to point out that, as this speech in fact goes on at once to show, the Labor Government meant freedom from pressure from Great Britain. It is perhaps also relevant to mention that Hyderabad's status had always been less free in practice than in theory, and that the Nizam more than once (e.g., 1919, 1926) had had his knuckles rapped by Britain for presuming to forget this.

¹⁰ See the Nizam's letters to Mountbatten of July 9, 1947, and Aug. 8, 1947. *Hyderabad's Relations with the Dominion of India*, pp. 2, 5.

August 15, 1947. The first period extends from Independence Day to the end of November 1947, when a Standstill Agreement was at last signed. In the case of most of the other Native States lying on what Delhi considered to be the Indian side of the Indo-Pakistan boundary, the new era of independence opened with standstill agreements or actual accessions already hastily negotiated with their rulers. In the case of Hyderabad negotiations had been carried on at Delhi in the weeks preceding August 15, but had failed to produce agreement. The Indian Government made it quite plain that it emphatically wanted and expected accession, involving full and overt Delhi control of the three subjects of defense, foreign affairs, and communications, but offering Hyderabad autonomy in other matters. What it had in mind, and more or less stated in so many words, was that Hyderabad's status should continue as it was before, but with Delhi replacing London as the supreme power. Even Hyderabad's "autonomy" would therefore be subject to Delhi's supervision. The Nizam's contention was that, with London now out of the picture, he himself became supreme; he envisaged a treaty between equals, regulating the three subjects; and offered "any form of association . . . short of accession."¹¹ Both sides insisted on their respective positions, and no settlement was achieved, Delhi meanwhile growing restless in the realization that "no settlement" was tantamount to Hyderabad's slowly winning its separationist case. India therefore pressed for at least a Standstill Agreement recognizing the status quo until a fuller settlement should be arrived at. In slightly more than two months (October 18, 1947), a draft agreement was accepted in Delhi by both India and the Hyderabad delegation. The latter then went home to get the Nizam's signature. Their failure to do so is basic to all subsequent developments.

The Nizam and his cabinet at first agreed to the terms of the Standstill Agreement, and on the morning of October 28 the delegation was to return by special plane to Delhi with the signed document. But the preceding midnight in Hyderabad city, trams and buses began to run, and crowds of Ittihad Muslims collected, listened to Qasim Razavi harangue, and finally

¹¹ Letter to Mountbatten, Sept. 26, 1947. *Hyderabad's Relations with the Government of India*, Vol. I, p. 17; Government of India, *White Paper on Hyderabad*, Supplement, p. 8.

staged a mass demonstration outside the state guesthouse, where the delegates were staying, and the palace of the Nawab of Chhatari, the Prime Minister. The police did nothing. The crowds, estimated at 50,000, threatened to burn the buildings; they had already disconnected telephones and electricity. The mob dispersed at dawn only after extracting a promise that the agreement would not go through. The Nizam took no action except that of quietly accepting Chhatari's resignation and disbanding the negotiating committee.

The Nizam's new delegation, composed of Razavi's men, returned to Delhi but found Mountbatten adamant in refusing to alter even a comma of the previous draft; and in the end that agreement was in fact signed, on November 27. It was to remain in force for one year, without prejudice to the final relationship between the two parties. It provided for the temporary continuation, as between India and the Nizam, of "all agreements and administrative arrangements as to matters of common concern, including External Affairs, Defence and Communications" existing between Great Britain and the Nizam immediately before August 15; but expressly ruled out "paramountcy." It also denied India the right to send or keep troops in Hyderabad; and provided for arbitration of disputes. By and large, the terms of the agreement seemed to favor the Nizam, but the very fact of the agreement was at least temporarily and somewhat belatedly a point in favor of India.

The background to these negotiations is important. The Delhi Government, in these months, was living through its weakest moment. Immediately after partition came the massive cataclysm of the Punjab and other riots, the open fighting in Kashmir, and all the internal instabilities of the new dominion. There seemed a real possibility of war with Pakistan, and of economic or administrative breakdown at home.

The Nizam, on the other hand, felt not weakness but strength. He saw August 15 as a date on which his autocracy had expanded. When the sense of triumph which Indian independence brought to Hindu morale spilled over into Hyderabad, he frustrated it, jailing those who tried to celebrate by flying the Indian tricolor. The State Congress, in an upsurge of the feeling that

freedom had come but was not recognized, called for a new *satyagraha* movement, demanding accession to India. The Nizam replaced Sir Mirza Isma'il, his relatively liberal prime minister,¹² with the ex-Muslim-Leaguer Chhatari; and generally seemed to make it clear that it was the Ittihad, rather than the Congress, which was right in reacting to "independence" for Hyderabad — hence for its Muslim community — with ebullience. The success and impunity of their October 28 *putsch* still further encouraged them. Theirs was the sense of triumph; the counterpart of the dismay with which the incident was viewed in India and by local Hindus.

The seven months following the signing of the Standstill Agreement formed a period of protracted, ineffectual negotiation, culminating in the bathos of the near settlement of June 15, 1948. The background was one of mounting tension; both between the two governments and between the peoples concerned.

On the level of political forms, India's argument assumed that Hyderabad, like the other States, was in fact a part of India, although by an historical anomaly it was in theory a self-acting political unit. It must accede. The problem was simply that of working out a satisfactory formula by which it could adapt its theoretical status to the facts. India recognized the special circumstances, importance, tradition, and the like of the Nizam's government; this, it urged, was the reason why it had already conceded the Standstill Agreement, giving the State time and opportunity to accede with grace and dignity. But time was running out. To take advantage of the interlude to evade or even to postpone accession would be bad faith. India was not discussing whether Hyderabad would incorporate itself legally in India, but how and when it would do so.

The Nizam's government approached the negotiations in a quite different spirit. For it, the search was for a satisfactory formula that would express the admittedly close relation between the two states without sacrificing the sovereignty of either. On the time question, its tacit attitude was that the status quo

¹² Sir Mirza Isma'il had succeeded Chhatari in 1946 after the Dichpali mosque incident. An able and broad-minded man, he had embarked on a large-scale policy of reforms; and had he been retained as Prime Minister, it seems reasonable to believe that the whole subsequent disaster could have been avoided. But the vocal Muslims in the state opposed him; and the Nizam's sympathies were with them, not him.

would of course continue until a solution satisfactory to both sides had been found.

In effect, then, the negotiators made little progress toward any final settlement. Rather, they spent their time in mutual recriminations that the Standstill Agreement was being violated. Eventually, Hyderabad took the position that the dispute over the Standstill Agreement should be submitted to arbitration, as provided therein; India refused, retorting in effect that Hyderabad had so flagrantly violated the agreement in both letter and spirit that it could hardly appeal to it now. India would not countenance arbitration of questions not lying squarely on the road to accession; nor, in fact, of any question until that road was clearly being travelled.

Prior significance in this period lay with developments outside the official discussions. The chief background factor for India was the gradual surmounting by the Nehru Government of its initial monumental internal difficulties. Its growing strength was reflected in the increasingly domineering tone it adopted in the negotiations, a trend which tended to alienate rather than to daunt Hyderabad. Meanwhile, the Indian public was making felt through parliament its growing exasperation — in part deliberately kindled by Delhi's propaganda — with the Nizam and his policy and friends.

During 1948 India supplemented its political pressure with an economic blockade of Hyderabad state. There were also border raids, both from and into Hyderabad. These increased in frequency and depredation as the months went by. Both sides made detailed and fairly credible accusations against the other, and it seems probable that both were right in charging that the lower ranks, at least, of officialdom on each side were often implicated. The ideological war instigated the political groups — Congress on the India side, Razakar on the Hyderabad — to organize raiding bands. Advantage was taken of the lax situation also by adventurers and desperadoes, and by the Communists. The prevalence of these border incidents can readily be understood when one realizes not only the pitch of communal and other emotion that had been aroused, but also that the frontier of Hyderabad is not a single line: numerous enclaves of terri-

tory, both small and sizeable, dot the border area on both sides, and recall the original feudal nature of the state. Both Indian and Hyderabad police and troops had to penetrate each other's territory to perform their normal duties.

THE COMMUNISTS AND THE RAZAKARS

Within Hyderabad itself, attention must be paid principally to Communist and Razakar developments. Both organizations thrived. In Tilangana the Communists claimed at least 2,000 villages "liberated." "People's Independent Committees" (village soviets) were set up, and actually took over the running of a very extensive area: landlord and police control was broken, and peasant tribunals "liquidated" many of the old functionaries. The Andhra Mahasabha, systematically and brilliantly controlled by the Communist Party, distributed land, cancelled debt, seized stocks of food, and generally won firm peasant backing. It also dispatched its opponents, which after February 1948 included the Congress forces as well as — some now said instead of — those of the Nizam.

The Delhi Government, afraid of Communism generally, was undoubtedly perturbed by this uprising; was said, even, to be seriously alarmed lest the whole of Andhra become India's Manchuria, a solid Communist base for operations against its own regime. A settlement, therefore, became the more urgent; yet Delhi hesitated to unseat the Nizam altogether and disrupt the status quo too radically, lest a complete social breakdown play into Communist hands. Similarly the Indian blockade could be only an interim measure, since if once really effective it could soon produce the economic breakdown Delhi wished at once to threaten but to avoid.

The Nizam seems to have figured that the Communists' success threatened India more than it did him; he tried to divert rather than to suppress their activities. He ascribed his loss of control to India's refusal to supply his state with arms; and claimed the emergency as vindicating the necessity of the Razakars.

The Nizam's government, the Indian Government, and the Communists each at some point accused the other two of work-

ing together. And to each was a measure of truth. After Independence, the Communist Party of India had given the Delhi Government a qualified, if divisive, support with the slogan that Nehru was progressive, Patel reactionary. But at the Second Party Congress at Calcutta, February 28 to March 6, 1948, it reversed this policy and subsequently attacked the entire bourgeoisie and its party — the Congress — as "collaborationist" (i.e., with the Western Powers). In Hyderabad, prior to the Second Party Congress, the Communists worked with and even in the State Congress against the Nizam, demanding accession to India. Later, they bitterly denounced both accession and the Government of India, declaring that real freedom could come only after the overthrow of feudalism, which capitalist Delhi would not effect. From this point, clashes between local Communists and Congressmen were violent. Delhi charged that there was a direct understanding between the Nizam and the Communists, not only in that the former was encouraging, even subsidizing, Communists within India (particularly in Madras Province) but also that there was actual cooperation within his dominion. On May 4, 1948, the Nizam's government in fact lifted the ban on the Communist Party, which instructed its "liberated" villages to resist Indian troops when these should come. To the Americans and British, in order to win support for, or at least acquiescence at the United Nations in, their coming "police action" in Hyderabad, the Delhi Government later played up this Communist menace; and indicated privately that it planned to retain the Nizam and his group as a right-wing counterpoise to Communism.

The Razakar organization, meanwhile, was in full swing. The Nizam denied that it had government support. But its command of funds, arms, vehicles, and such scarce commodities as strictly rationed gasoline during the blockade, and the overt complicity of the minor authorities in its exploits, as well as the tacit approval of those higher up, made the denial unconvincing. Squads of armed Razakars terrorized villages, swaggered through the streets of the capital city, looted Hindu shops, raided railway trains, molested women, and generally took the law into their own hands. The police winked or applauded. Victims were

written off as "Communists." Strikingly little opposition to the Ittihad was forthcoming from the Muslim community. When a handful of older Muslims, retired officials, published a protest against the atrocities, they found themselves in trouble with the government, as well as with the Razakars. The Muslim editor of an unsympathetic paper was murdered as a "traitor," while a few other Congress Muslims had to flee the state, as many Hindus were doing. But most Muslims, if not actually favorable, acquiesced.

Through this period the Hyderabad Congress, its leaders in jail, was still carrying on *satyagraha* for accession. As can be imagined, Hindu feelings were incandescent.

RELATIONS OUTSIDE OF INDIA

Two outside relations of the Nizam deserve mention. One was with Great Britain. He felt that he had the support of conservative groups in Britain, out of sympathy for his regime and/or antipathy to Delhi's. Secondly, he (and more especially Qasim Razavi, himself from northern India) believed that the Muslim world was behind him; particularly that Pakistan, and the Muslims of India — numbering about 35 million, after partition —, could be counted on for support. The two actions that most infuriated the Indian public during this period were the Nizam's loan of 20 crores (\$60,000,000) to Pakistan at a crucial moment;¹⁸ and Razavi's fantastic statement that all Muslims in India were a fifth column. Though not so baldly, the Nizam himself used a similar argument in warning of communal disturbances throughout India if he were ill-treated. Actually, the position of Muslims in India was already so precarious that the deteriorating Hyderabad situation was an extreme embarrassment to them. Far from cheering for the Nizam, some of their representatives pleaded with the Hyderabad agent in Delhi to effect some settlement, lest they pay for the Nizam's intransigence.

¹⁸ The granting of the loan was made public on January 10, 1948, Hyderabad claiming that it had been arranged the previous autumn before the Standstill Agreement. This incident and the Communist successes, both largely propagandized, made dramatic to the Indian mind the threat represented by Hyderabad as a source of support "within" India to India's two principal enemies, external and internal.

FAILURE OF FURTHER NEGOTIATION

The official negotiations between the two governments made, as we have said, little visible progress toward a final solution. Presently India was rather telling Hyderabad how to behave — internally as well as externally. It demanded the breakup of the Razakar organization, for instance, and a little later the introduction of democratic government. However, on June 15, 1948, a new draft agreement was produced in Delhi, with two final and three interim provisions: the question of accession would be determined by plebiscite, and responsible government would be introduced following a Constituent Assembly established "early in 1949"; meanwhile, a government would be formed in consultation with the leaders of the major parties; Hyderabad would, on India's request, pass legislation similar to India's on defense, external affairs, and communications; and Indian troops might be stationed within the state if India constitutionally declared an emergency. India promised to call off its blockade and to help Hyderabad in a variety of ways if this agreement were accepted. The Nizam, however, refused to ratify the revised agreement. His professed reasons were that he wanted provision for arbitration, for more economic independence and for greater freedom to determine, himself, the composition of both the interim government and the Constituent Assembly (virtually, more scope for Muslim weightage); and that he would not agree to India's stationing of troops on its own decision.

India made it plain, both through a covering letter from Mountbatten to the Nizam and through Nehru's statement to parliament and his public speeches, that it regarded the June 15 draft as final. It must be accepted as it was; no further negotiation would be countenanced. It was an ultimatum — and was understood by Hyderabad as such: part of Hyderabad's complaint was precisely that India was dictating terms, and to enforce them was using, besides the now tightened blockade, both verbal and substantial threats of armed invasion. In other words, the dispute, at the theoretical level, remained exactly where it had always been: Hyderabad claimed to be an independent state, whereas the Delhi Government regarded it, and treated it, as a subordinate part of India.

UPSURGE OF THE RAZAKARS

During the three months that followed the rejection of the June draft, Delhi prepared for invasion, while Hyderabad did what little it could to prepare to meet it, including the sending of a belated appeal to the United Nations. The chief background development of the period was the growing Razakar domination of Hyderabad and the increasingly gruesome reports of this in India. These reports were often exaggerated, and in many instances fabricated, although the plain truth was distasteful enough. In any case, their effect, in an atmosphere already charged with Hindu-Muslim hatred, was provocative in the extreme.

Estimates of the numerical strength of the Razakars vary; the figure of 100,000 given by the Indian Government as a minimum, must be considered much too high. The organization consisted of trained and armed bands comprising brigand elements and bullies, and also frenzied religious zealots. They roamed the cities and eventually the villages, raping and looting, terrorizing and boasting, and dreaming wild Islamic dreams of Hyderabad-Muslim might. They talked of the day when the state would stretch to the Bay of Bengal; and seemed to think of the Nizam as becoming eventually the acknowledged ruler of all the Muslims of at least South India. They would go into a school and manhandle brutally a teacher for failing some Muslim pupil in an examination; or would burn down the house of some Hindu for reporting (however ineffectively) their depredations to the police. They had the important moral support of the individual members of the lower police and government ranks, who were of course chiefly Muslim, and of more and more of the civilian Muslim community, which was slowly losing its head.

At the top levels, Qasim Razavi was the public symbol, the flaming fanatic who had the popular devotion — slightly mad, perhaps. He was, however, but one of a half-dozen leaders: the others worked behind the scenes, and were perhaps more dishonest than deranged. One was in the palace circle, a close and long-standing confidant of the Nizam's; one or two got seated in the cabinet; one was chief of police. This last was able to frighten the Nizam into desired decisions by carefully presented

reports that if he did not acquiesce the police could not be relied upon. One member of this directing group was a major industrialist, whose generous financial backing was important to the whole enterprise. There was also some suggestion that even Hindu monied interests supported the Ittihad for its anti-Communist value.

Into the Razakar organization were brought quite a number of Muslim "refugees" from outside the state, while many thousands of Hindus, dismayed or terrified by the Razakar regime, fled to the neighboring provinces. One of the wild ideas in Razavi's mind, following the immense exchange of populations in the Punjab in 1947, may possibly have been that Hyderabad could become a Muslim state in population also, by attracting the Muslim minority from India and eventually driving out or outnumbering the local non-Muslims.

It is difficult to see what the Nizam and his advisers had in mind as an answer to the increasingly imminent invasion. The ordinary Muslims, carried away by their enthusiasm, told each other fantastic tales that the Nizam had scores of Lancasters poised at bases in Egypt and elsewhere ready to reduce Bombay, Madras, and Bezwada to shambles within hours; that if India should make a move, millions of Muslims there would rise and disorganize the country while Pakistan would triumphantly invade;¹⁴ that the United Nations would restrain and punish India; and, in the last resort, that God would save the Nizam and Muslim rule.

INVASION

On September 13, 1948, the Indian army, moving on five fronts, invaded Hyderabad; and in less than a week the conquest was complete. The Nizam's army, apparently more of an exhibition than a fighting force, offered negligible opposition. There were relatively few battle casualties except amongst Raza-

¹⁴ On the very day before the action began, the Hyderabad Government stated in its cable to the United Nations that invasion "is bound to cause unrestrained communal war throughout the Indian continent" — the latter phrase presumably including Pakistan. The following story, perhaps apocryphal but illuminating, is told: that the Pakistan Cabinet did discuss supporting Hyderabad, and was restrained by the statement of the present Governor General, himself from East Pakistan, that if Pakistan made a move not a Muslim would be left alive in Bengal. It should be noted, too, that the invasion came a few hours after Jinnah's death.

kars and other Ittihad civilian volunteers, who threw themselves in as a rather pathetic but devoted resistance.

Off the battlefield, however, the Muslim community fell before a massive and brutal blow, the devastation of which left those who did survive reeling in bewildered fear. Thousands upon thousands were slaughtered; many hundreds of thousands uprooted. The instrument of their disaster was, of course, vengeance. Particularly in the Marathwara section of the state, and to a less but still terrible extent in most other areas, the story of the days after "police action" is grim.

The only careful report on what happened in this period was made a few months later by investigators — including a Congress Muslim and a sympathetic and admired Hindu — commissioned by the Indian Government to study the situation. The report was submitted but has not been published; presumably it makes unpleasant reading. It is widely held that the figure mentioned therein for the number of Muslims massacred is 50,000. Other estimates by responsible observers run as high as 200,000, and by some of the Muslims themselves still higher. The lowest estimates, even those offered privately by apologists of the military government, come to at least ten times the number of murders with which previously the Razakars were officially accused.

Responsibility for the massacres and the accompanying terror is not easy to fix. The behavior of invading troops is seldom pretty; and in this instance the army personnel were emotionally involved in the communalism. However, the higher ranks did punish indiscipline, so that what there was of it was short-lived. In some instances it was charged that the invading army looked on while civilian reprisals took place. But the important point, apparently, was that police administration broke down, partly because of a collapse of morale on the part of the Muslims who constituted the force. The damage seems to have been done in the crucial days that elapsed between the invasion and the setting up of martial law. In some areas this was a matter of two or three days; in more outlying parts, control was re-effected only after a considerable period. No one questions the good faith of the military commander, who was, indeed, looked upon as an out-

standing administrator for both his ability and his strict justice. But in this interval, the populace widely rose against the local Muslim petty officials, against individual Muslims who had been browbeating them, or just against Muslims as Muslims; and wreaked agonizing vengeance. In some areas, all the men were stood in a line, and done to death. Of the total Muslim community in Hyderabad, it would seem that somewhere between one in ten and one in five of the adult males may have lost their lives in those few days. In addition to killing, there was widespread rape, arson, looting, and expropriation. A very large percentage of the entire Muslim population of the Districts fled in destitution to the capital or other cities; and later efforts to repatriate them met with scant success.

INDIAN MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

The Nizam, when India invaded, accepted the resignation of his cabinet; and when the Indian army was nearing his capital, acknowledged its commander as head of his new government, with himself still the constitutional head of the state. The military government took over the running of affairs, and remained in virtually dictatorial charge; responsible, of course, to Delhi. Its first task, as already mentioned, was restoring or imposing order.

The former cabinet, Razavi, many top officials, and all Muslims charged with being implicated in the worst aspects of the old regime (a few thousands in all) were arrested. Relatively few have been brought to trial. Restrictions, particularly on property, were placed on a larger number, and several officials lost their jobs. Yet the administration was continued with much of the lower staff still intact. Only the top levels were non-Muslim, and predominantly non-Hyderabad.

In the course of some months, the new government suppressed the Communist uprising in Tilangana, though not without the combined weight of intensive military and police operations, some thousands of summary arrests, and the shooting of leaders out of hand. In the economic field the crown lands and private feudal estates of the top aristocracy were taken over, and a limited program of land-tenure reform was initiated for the

smaller agriculturalist. Industrially and commercially, the same device of government control which had previously discriminated to help Muslims now operated on the whole against them.

Politically, the military administration aimed at a plebiscite to determine accession; at an elected assembly to determine a democratic constitution; and meanwhile at carrying on the government in an efficient and fair way.¹⁵ The invading troops had posed as an "army of liberation," restoring peace and freedom to a stricken land. Certainly, when Nehru visited the state following the "police action," he was welcomed with enthusiasm as a delivering hero by immense cheering crowds. Even constitutionally the theory was that the Nizam, now rescued from the grip of evil forces, was at last a free agent. He issued a formal statement denying duress; he had already withdrawn from the United Nations his complaint against India submitted while his previous government had been in office.¹⁶

¹⁵ Since the above was written, the Nizam, in a *firman* (pronunciamento) issued November 24, 1949, presumably at Delhi's instigation, summarily announced that the Indian Constituent Assembly's new constitution for India would apply also to Hyderabad; but added that this decision was subject to ratification by the constituent assembly of the state.

¹⁶ The progress of this case, though it had no influence on affairs in Hyderabad, may be briefly outlined here. On August 21, 1948, Hyderabad submitted to the UN a request that the dispute between itself and India be brought to the attention of the Security Council as a threat to peace. The request was circulated to the members, but the matter was not on the agenda at the next meeting (August 30). On September 12 the Hyderabad Government sent a further cable "earnestly requesting" that the complaint be considered at a meeting three days later. On the 13th, Indian troops marched; a further cable reported the fact. On the 16th, the Council met, the Hyderabad question constituting its provisional agenda. After much hesitation, and finally on the explicit understanding that such adoption was a necessary preliminary to, and not a decision on, the question of the competence of the Council to consider the case, the agenda was adopted. Hyderabad and Indian representatives were thereupon asked to state their case. The latter, arguing that Hyderabad was not competent to bring any question before the Council, asked for adjournment for five days "to present our documents"; this was granted. By that time, the occupation was complete, and the Nizam had sent new instructions withdrawing the complaint. Some of the smaller nations on the Council used strong language in denouncing India's action; but the discussion on whether the Nizam's withdrawal was valid, interwoven with that on whether he had been competent to complain in the first place, petered out in this (September 20) and the next (September 28) meetings. On October 6 Pakistan asked permission to participate the next time the question was discussed. On November 20 it sent a reminder. The matter then came up on November 25, but, crowded out, was postponed until December 15. On Pakistan's statement that its discussion would be lengthy, the matter was again deferred, to Lake Success (meetings since September 16 had been in Paris). On May 19 and 24, 1949, the matter was considered, India and Pakistan being heard—the former saying that all was now well and asking that the question, which was out of order anyway, be dropped from the agenda; the latter making a long and detailed charge against India before, during, and after the invasion, and suggesting that if the Council be in doubt as to the legal question of competence, that question be submitted, under the Charter, to the International Court. When these two had presented their

PRESENT STATUS OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY

It would seem beyond all cavil that the new regime was both welcomed, and justly welcomed, by the great majority of the population of Hyderabad. Even for the Muslim minority, the regime is on paper fair, substantially undiscriminating. But it would, indeed, be hardly human if at least the lower Hindu officials took no advantage of their new power to deviate from the ideal of impartiality. More calamitous is the plight of the village Muslim, who probably was not personally implicated in Razakar activities, but, glad enough to escape with his life, lost his home and goods at the time of the invasion and has but the little man's chance of getting them back. On a larger scale, the entire Muslim community suffered at once from insecurity, from the social and economic revolution which dislodged it as the ruling class. The Muslims' status as a community had been intimately bound up with an antique social structure which was now being discarded. In the new society their problem is not that of being given a status that they can call unjust, but the difficulty of building up for themselves any status at all. The loss of privilege is itself a downfall, in which legal justice may go with economic disaster. No social revolution, however necessary or just, can fail to disrupt the group which it abruptly ousts from power. In theory, the Hyderabad Muslims in the new order took their place indiscriminately along with everyone else; in practice, they, who had been seated as it were on the platform, have had to find themselves places on the floor already fully occupied by firmly established, and defiant, crowds. Even in a democracy the position, economic and other, of a small minority depends not only on the justice of the laws but also on the degree to which that minority is accepted by the major group. And in Hyderabad, although the laws be democratic, society will be Hindu.

Apart from the initial blow and the long-term readjustment to the loss of social integration and of function, the Muslims

cases, the Council adjourned without discussion; and the matter, though theoretically still on the agenda, has not again come up. The former Hyderabad delegate on August 18, 1949, wrote to the President of the Security Council submitting certain charges of mal-administration in Hyderabad, particularly with regard to the alleged denial to Qasim Razavi of a proper trial.

suffered also an inner dismay. It is too early yet to say whether this psychological upheaval may not prove in the end the most significant. It is part of the spiritual crisis through which Islam is passing in the modern world. The two chief factors in this crisis were both acute in the Hyderabad instance: the impact of an unassimilated modernity on an old-world way of life and its *Weltanschauung*; and the loss of power.

One wonders how the group, or anyway its leaders, could have lost their heads so starkly as they did before the invasion. Originally, the Nizam apparently felt that the British withdrawal from India, coupled with partition, would lead to chaos; and that out of the confusion he, with an army, wealth and prestige, stood a fair chance of emerging as a major power in a Balkanized India. The hope was not at first absurd, but should have faded within six months. After this, he made, as to power dynamics, a series of astonishing miscalculations, both internationally and in home affairs; until he allowed a vicious group of men within the state to acquire power to a point where he could no longer control them. He emerges as a clever man utterly destitute of wisdom. The Razakar leaders were ruthless fanatics and criminals who played for sordid stakes and lost. The mass of Muslims was poor and ignorant, leading lives in which there was little of significance except their religion and its social solidarity. They are traditionally gullible, ardent but easily misled. Several hundred thousand, however, had nothing to do with the Nizam or the Razakars; but the innocent, too, suffer for the mistakes of their community's leaders. The most significant blundering was that of the middle classes, the one group who might have saved the situation but failed utterly in both understanding and judgment.

Brought up in an isolated, anachronistic society, with a point of view that throughout much of the world would have seemed normal only a few centuries back, the Muslims of Hyderabad sincerely believed that their group's portion was to rule, the Hindus' portion to learn to be content. The Muslims reposed, too, a remarkably blind faith in the legal validity of their position, and it will be generally conceded that in the dispute with India, Hyderabad's case was on the whole considerably the

stronger in law. Along with their false sense of traditional and legalistic security went perhaps the opposite — a subconscious fear. They were frightened by what, in the explosive weeks following partition, had happened to millions of their coreligionists in northern India; frightened, perhaps, by the awareness of what would happen to them, once they lost supremacy at home. Such a dread, growing more intense and irrational, may have inhibited them from facing facts, as well as driven them to aggression. Or, more rationally, there were those who felt that any concession to Hindu India would in any case eventuate in their doom; and that therefore resistance, at whatever cost, could not be wrong. Also, there was present that curious confusion between the moral and material strength of Islam which besets many Muslims.

However it may have arisen, the Muslims' *hybris*, the overweening pride that led them to extravagant folly, brought them, as in a Greek drama, to disaster. That their fate was to some degree deserved, their suffering therefore self-inflicted, is integral to the tragedy.

TVA'S IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Feliks Bochenski and William Diamond

THE MIDDLE EAST is above all an agricultural area. The bulk of its population lives on the land, and agricultural activities provide the main occupations and sources of income. With the exception of oil in Iran and the Arab lands; coal, lignite, and chrome in Turkey; phosphates in Egypt; and cement generally, there are no known mineral deposits of outstanding significance. While these and other minerals provide the basis for small local industrial developments, the Middle East is unlikely to witness any great development in the realm of industry, except in those fields devoted to the processing of agricultural commodities, both foodstuffs and textiles. The growth of such industries is undoubtedly a condition for improvement of the standard of living of the region; but their development must be considered ancillary to the basic objective of improving agriculture and expanding farm production. The increasing pressure on the land, resulting from a high rate of population growth in an area in which the system of cultivation produces (in general) only on subsistence levels, gives to agriculture a first priority for development and makes the need for its development urgent.

A variety of factors inhibits the improvement and expansion of Middle East agriculture. Basic among them are the physical limitations created by soil and climate; of these limitations the most fundamental and most difficult to overcome is the lack of water. Except for parts of Turkey, the Ethiopian highlands, southern Sudan, and the Caspian border of Iran, "water is the principal factor limiting human activity in all parts of the Middle East. . . . Even where water appears to be in super-

◆ FELIKS BOCHENSKI is a member of the Economic Department of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In 1948 and 1949 he visited Egypt and Lebanon as a member of Bank missions to study general economic conditions in those countries; he has also visited Syria. WILLIAM DIAMOND, also a member of the International Bank, contributed "Activities of the International Bank in the Middle East" to the October 1949 issue of the *Journal*.

abundance, such as near the great rivers, there is not much surplus over present requirements to cater to the increases in population which are certain to take place during the next half century."¹ E. B. Worthington, writing thus in his *Middle East Science*, put the matter even more bluntly when he noted that in the Middle East "there are two underground resources of very great importance, namely water and oil. Of these water takes first place."² Its importance to the individual was aptly illustrated when Mr. Worthington told a conference of regional agricultural experts that "in the Middle East nearly as many murders take place on account of water as on account of women, which is saying a good deal."³ It may be said that water, not oil, is the liquid gold of the Middle East.

✓ The Middle East is a dry region. It has extensive deserts in which the annual rainfall approaches zero. It is in general characterized by a long dry season and a short period of rain which is insufficient for effective cultivation. Only about four percent of the entire Middle East is under crops.⁴ In the area as a whole, population is sparse but is concentrated around the wells, the wadis, and the rivers which tap underground water supplies or drain the rainfed highlands on the peripheries of the Middle East. The result is that while portions of the Middle East suffer from serious overpopulation, large areas of fertile land — as well as desert area — are uninhabited. There is, in fact, more potentially useful land than could now be put to work, either by the existing manpower or by the waters that could be made available if all the rivers and known ground-water resources were fully utilized.

The water problem is not a new one for the Middle East. The recorded history of Egypt is the story of the Nile, and the archeological and historical records of the entire Middle East show the extent to which water resources were tapped, controlled, and

¹ E. B. Worthington, *Middle East Science* (London, 1946), p. 38.

² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³ Middle East Supply Centre [MESC], *Agricultural Report No. 6: The Proceedings of the Conference on Middle East Agricultural Development, Cairo, February 7th-10th 1944* (Cairo, 1944), p. 190.

⁴ Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], *Report of the 4th Session of the Conference, Held in Washington, D. C., U. S. A., 15-29 November 1948* (Washington, 1949), p. 17.

used. A considerable body of expert opinion finds that in ancient times these efforts gave some portions of the Middle East the means of sustaining a much greater population than they now have, even though there has been no known significant change in climate or decrease in rainfall. It is also the consensus of opinion that man's misuse of his water and his land (by permitting deforestation, uncontrolled grazing, erosion, and other forms of destruction and decay, as well as by his methods of ownership and tenure) has been the determining factor in bringing about the transformation of many areas into desert and the fall in acreage under cultivation. For centuries these developments and their consequences have been accepted as part of the "Middle Eastern way of life." In recent years, however, technological progress in other parts of the world and increasing self-consciousness in the Middle East have resulted in the growing conviction that an attempt should be made to improve the living standards of the region, and that this can be done by using human effort to press back the water barrier and to reverse the process by which man's abuses of the soil have reduced the productivity of the Middle East. Considerable study has already been devoted to the subject, although there still remain broad gaps in the technical information necessary for the full and efficient use of the waters of the Middle East.⁵

From the relatively meager water resources must be drawn the needs of about 90 million people. Those needs are varied. Though human and animal consumption requires the smallest quantity of water, it obviously must have first priority. The use of water for irrigation is a close second in importance, for the livelihood of 60 to 85 percent of the population comes from the land.⁶ For most agricultural purposes, water must be retained at a high level and released as needed, while its use for power requires a quick and, if possible, steady drop. The demands of power and agriculture are thus not always consistent, and where inconsistency exists, power enjoys only a secondary importance

⁵ See Worthington, *op. cit.*, and bibliography contained therein.

⁶ The waters stored for irrigation may also be used for fisheries, a use of water often neglected. A fish industry would be an important contribution to the population of the Middle East, whose protein consumption is inadequate.

among Middle East water requirements.⁷ Fortunately, the region has plentiful supplies of oil and fair coal deposits, which could, under appropriate conditions, yield cheap power. The fourth basic function of water — transport — has little relevance in the interior of the Middle East. Except for a very few rivers, such as the Nile and the lower Tigris and Euphrates, inland water transport is insignificant, and no reasonable development of other rivers would make large-scale navigation practicable. The problem of balancing the needs of water for consumption, agriculture, and power against the limited supplies from rainfall, rivers, and wells is basic to the development of the Middle East. The welfare of the present population and the future needs of the rapidly growing population of the region make it essential to utilize water supplies in the most economical manner.⁸

In the past two decades, the popular imagination has been captured by the idea of the development of entire river systems, with the result that great hopes have been attached to the control of the rivers of the Middle East as the means of increasing production and productivity, relieving population pressure, absorbing new population, and generally improving economic conditions. The Tennessee Valley Authority has become, not simply the name of a specific development in the United States, but a symbol of what can be done to raise the standard of living of an entire region by taming and using water efficiently. TVA has sparked new hopes for "the full development and utilization of the natural resources of an entire river valley," for recognizing a river, not simply as a narrow band of water which must be held in its place, but "as a great system of potentially beneficent power that can be harnessed for a multitude of human uses."⁹ The need for water and the popularity of the TVA idea have given new impetus to the regional study of the rivers of the Middle East. Investigation is underway of the possibilities of

⁷ Keith A. H. Murray, "Some Regional Economic Problems of the Middle East," *International Affairs*, XXIII (1947), p. 12: "It must be emphasized that the prior demands of water in the area must always be for human purposes and the growing of food; the use of water for power must remain a tertiary consideration."

⁸ See FAO, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁹ See Ward Shepard, *Food or Famine: The Challenge of Erosion* (New York, 1940), Chaps. 9, 10. The TVA model for the Middle East was given added point in August 1949 when Mr. Gordon Clapp, Chairman of the Board of TVA, was appointed head of a UN economic survey mission to the Middle East.

the long-term development of entire river basins for the purpose of controlling floods, expanding the acreage under cultivation by irrigation, and developing hydroelectric power. The study of land-use control, which must go hand in hand with water control for effective basin development, is still in its infancy; but a beginning has been made.

It is worth noting that although these projects have been and will continue to be studied, there are serious obstacles to regional water developments additional to those deriving from the physical facts. The latter can, after all, by appropriate study in time be solved by science and technology. The more enduring limitations seem to be those imposed by man himself and by the economic condition of the area. The most obvious is, of course, the national boundaries which divide the Middle East. There are few geophysical political divisions in the Middle East, and the major rivers all concern two or more countries. The development of an entire river basin thus faces the obstacles created by national rivalry.¹⁰ More pervasive even than this obstacle are the backward and uneconomic social organization and system of land tenure which perpetuate an impoverished and heavily indebted peasantry, with neither the means nor the incentive to improve its small, fragmented, and insecure holdings. Nor is the absentee landlord who dominates most of the region concerned with measures which will improve the lot of his tenants, who make up the majority of the population of the Middle East. Furthermore, under present conditions there are inadequate means of creating the local capital necessary to bear the great costs of the projects; nor, in general, is foreign exchange available through ordinary channels. Lack of technical knowledge and skill is also a fundamental obstacle.¹¹ The limitations created

¹⁰ This fact was recognized by FAO at its Fourth Conference, when it urged the Middle Eastern "governments to acknowledge the regional significance of certain streams and rivers in an effort to reach permanent agreements concerning these water resources," and asked them to "cooperate in the development and utilization of common water resources." FAO, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹¹ On these general problems, see Doreen Warriner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (London, 1948); B. A. Keen, *The Agricultural Development of the Middle East* (London, 1946); FAO, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-29. One interesting aspect of the tenure question is the complex system of water rights which characterizes the Middle East. See Warriner, *op. cit.*; Keen, *op. cit.*; and R. F. Jardine, "The Regional Control of Water Resources in the Middle East with Special Reference to the Legal Aspect," MESC, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-90.

by these facts, rather than physical difficulties, are the more likely to hold back basic water development in the Middle East.

The following discussion is not a comprehensive survey of the water development potential of the Middle East. It is concerned only with those TVA-like projects which involve entire river basins and offer large-scale opportunities for agricultural development. Nor can it be complete even in this narrower field, for with the growth of knowledge of the Middle East's water resources and the increasing scientific study of the habits and vagaries of its rivers, other possibilities might be found. What follows, therefore, is a brief account of the dozen large-scale multipurpose hydrodevelopment projects which are at the moment the subject of serious discussion in the Middle East, and some of which are already under way.

THE NILE BASIN

The basin of the Nile covers an area of more than one million square miles and includes a greater variety of climates than that of any other river in the world.¹² It embraces Uganda, parts of Tanganyika, the Belgian Congo, Kenya and Ethiopia, most of the Sudan, and the cultivated land of Egypt. But the degree to which these countries depend on the Nile is very different. The uplands of Ethiopia around Lake Tana have abundant though highly concentrated rainfall, averaging around 60 inches per annum. The countries in the lake area of the equatorial Nile receive a similar amount of rain, more evenly distributed throughout the year. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan has a varying degree of precipitation, which decreases gradually toward the north, but as far as Khartoum and the 15th parallel still amounts to some 8 inches per year. Further north, between Atbara and the Delta, there is practically no rain at all. The inhabitants of this region, almost 20 million people, or two-thirds of the whole population of the Nile Basin, depend entirely on the river for their water supply. It is only natural, therefore, that in all decisions concerning the regulation of the river-flow the interests of Egypt should be given a certain priority.

¹² For a fuller description of the Nile Basin see Douglas D. Crary, "Geography and Politics in the Nile Valley," *Middle East Journal*, III (1949), pp. 260-76.

It is a commonly held fallacy that Egyptian agriculture still follows most of its antique patterns. In fact an agricultural revolution has occurred in the last century which has affected both the choice of crops and the methods and intensity of irrigation. Cotton has partly replaced cereals, to become the most valuable crop; the cultivation of rice grows in area and economic importance; and there is the prospect of a substantial increase in vegetable and fruit production. Even more important is the transition from "basin" to "perennial" irrigation. The traditional basin method, which permitted but one crop a year and did not provide sufficient means of existence for the rapidly growing population, has been replaced by the system of perennial irrigation which actually staves off the flood from the fields and supplies water throughout the year, thus making it possible to have several crops during one year. To bring the water into the fields, it must be pumped from the river or the level of the stream has to be raised by barrages. Apart from these barrages, several of which have been constructed at intervals on the Nile and in the Delta, there are now three dams for storing water during the annual flood season: the Aswan Dam, sometimes called the "neck of Egypt," with a storage capacity of 5 billion cubic meters; and the Jebel Awliya and Sennar dams which, although situated in the Sudan, are under Egyptian administration and have storage capacities of 2.5 and .6 billion cubic meters respectively.

These reservoirs and the system of perennial irrigation have made possible a tremendous increase in Egypt's agricultural productivity (and population), but they have not eliminated the danger of excessive floods, nor do they permit full use of the Nile's water. To harness the Nile more completely, the construction of additional storage facilities has been studied and planned for some time. Some of the new constructions, like the Main Nile Reservoir, are to augment the existing capacity for annual storage provided by the Aswan Dam in Egypt and Jebel Awliya and Sennar dams in the Sudan. Otherwise reservoirs, created in the lakes at the sources of the White and Blue Niles, are to retain the excess of water during high flood years for use during years of meager floods and thus provide for long-term

storage. While cycles of good and bad years cannot be predicted, a century has been adopted as the basis of calculation, and storage for such cycles has been named "century" storage. Finally, the Sudd Diversion Canal is designed to avoid the present waste of 50 percent of the White Nile water in the marshes of the Sudd.

At present the average Nile water supply available between the beginning of February and the end of July as measured at Aswan consists of over 15 billion cubic meters from the normal flow of the river, supplemented by some 8 billion cubic meters from storage in the existing three reservoirs. This total supply falls short of the expected requirements of Egypt and the Sudan between February and July (outside the flood period), which are approximately 30 billion cubic meters.¹³ The Nile scheme promises to satisfy these additional requirements by adding to the present total of over 23 billion cubic meters some 3 billion cu. m. from the Main Nile Reservoir, over 5 billion cu. m. from Lake Albert or Lake Victoria, and over 2 billion cu. m. from Lake Tana. It is estimated that storage in the lakes and in the Main Nile Reservoir would make possible the cultivation of an additional 3 million acres in Egypt and the Sudan. In addition, the power to be produced near these reservoirs and at Aswan would provide one of the bases for industrial development.

The main beneficiaries of the scheme will be Egypt and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which will be able to increase considerably their agricultural production. Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and the Belgian Congo may benefit from the creation of hydroelectric power stations at the lake reservoirs.¹⁴ The international character of the scheme assumes the conclusion of treaties which will have to precede its execution. Some progress in this respect has been made in negotiations between Great Britain, Egypt, and the Sudan, including agreements on technical problems and on financial participation. On the Owen Falls (Uganda) dam, a

¹³ With anticipated extension of cultivation, these requirements are calculated for a crop area of some 12.5 million acres, more than three-fourths of which are in Egypt. The area of cultivated land would actually be some 37 percent smaller than the crop area, which exceeds the former owing to the practice of double cropping under perennial irrigation.

¹⁴ Because of the distances involved, Egypt could hardly use this power but intends to increase its own power production by constructing a hydroelectric power station at the already existing Aswan Dam.

formal agreement was signed in 1949 between the countries concerned. Accord with the Belgian and Ethiopian governments has still to be sought on projects involving their territories.

✓ The Main Nile Reservoir is to be constructed somewhere between the junction of the river Atbara, the last tributary of the Nile, and the Egyptian-Sudanese border at Wadi Halfa. Two sites, one near Merowe and one near the Dal Cataract, are under consideration. This reservoir would increase the supply of water available for irrigation between floods, but — in itself — would not ensure the future of Egypt, for like the existing dams it would provide storage only from flood seasons for low flow seasons. In a year of exceptionally low flood, there would be no water to store.¹⁵

✓ To provide for long-term storage a series of projects is envisaged in the lakes of Central Africa — Victoria, Albert, Kioga — and Lake Tana in Ethiopia. A major step in the accomplishment of this plan was taken in September 1949, when a contract was let for the construction of a dam above Owen Falls at the outlet of Lake Victoria, which will permit the accumulation of an additional 200 billion cubic meters of water. The construction will include an electric power station. It is also proposed to convert Lake Albert into a reservoir for "century" storage by the building of a dam at Nimule, about 230 kms. below the lake and just inside the Sudan, or higher up at Mutir in Uganda. The final capacity planned for Lake Albert is 140 billion cubic meters. Aside from the great storage potential of these lakes, the 1700-foot drop between them has obvious hydroelectric possibilities in addition to the plan already projected at Owen Falls.

✓ The creation of such large reservoirs makes it essential that their water be carried without excessive loss. The White Nile loses 50 percent of its volume through evaporation and plant transpiration in the swamps of the Sudd, below Nimule. To prevent this loss, it is planned to build a diversion channel (named the Jonglei By-pass, after a village it crosses) which would carry about 55 million cubic meters a day, while the old river bed would continue to carry a minimum of 40 million,

¹⁵ For details see H. E. Hurst, R. P. Black, and Y. M. Simaika, *The Nile Basin*, Ministry of Public Works of Egypt (Cairo, 1946), Vol. VII.

outside the flood season, sufficient to permit navigation to continue.¹⁶ Alternative projects have been submitted for pumping water from the Sudd marshes, instead of constructing a diversion canal.

✓The Lake Albert and Lake Victoria projects and the Jonglei By-pass affect primarily the White Nile, which represents about two-sevenths of the total Nile water supply, has a comparatively even discharge throughout the year, and is at present not used for large-scale irrigation in the Sudan. A comparable "century" storage project is planned at Lake Tana on the Blue Nile, which carries about four-sevenths of all the Nile water (the remaining one-seventh coming from the Atbara) and is primarily responsible for the Nile flood. The Blue Nile serves not only Egypt but also the Sudan, particularly the greatest Sudanese irrigation development in the Jezira, south of Khartoum. Lake Tana is situated in a basin on the Ethiopian Plateau and here, as in the lakes of the White Nile, rainfall and evaporation are practically equal. A reservoir on Lake Tana would harness the discharge of the Blue Nile and supplement the storage at Lakes Albert and Victoria. In addition there are hydroelectric possibilities, for the Blue Nile has a considerable drop; the Tis Esat Falls, some distance below Lake Tana, seems particularly suitable as a site for power production. Unfortunately, power production on the Blue Nile may conflict with "century" storage and may have to be limited to the period from December to June.

The Qattara Depression Scheme. Quite separate from the Nile regulation projects is a purely Egyptian hydroelectric power scheme which aims at the utilization of the difference in level between the Mediterranean and the great Qattara depression, situated roughly half way between the valley of the Nile and the border of Cyrenaica. The salt marshes of this depression played a role as pivot of the Allied defense of the strip of land between the depression and the sea coast during World War II. Apart from its possible strategic value, this area is at present complete wasteland. If sea water were led from the Mediterranean in canals and tunnels to the depression, the re-

¹⁶ For details see *Upper Nile Projects: The Jonglei Canal Scheme*, Ministry of Public Works of Egypt (Cairo, 1936).

maining head of over 200 feet would allow the production of power sufficient to supply a large part of Egypt. The evaporation of the sea water accumulated in the depression would make possible an extensive salt industry.¹⁷

THE RIFT VALLEY

Parallel to the eastern Mediterranean coastline, from Turkey to the Gulf of Aqaba, runs a geological trench, a rift valley, the highest point of which is in Lebanon near ancient Baalbek and the lowest in the deep depression of the Dead Sea. The three rivers — the Orontes, the Litani, and the Jordan — which flow for most of their length through the valley, and their tributaries provide the main water supply of Lebanon and Palestine as well as of parts of Syria and the Kingdom of Jordan. Although they carry a much smaller volume of water than the Nile or the great rivers of Mesopotamia, their importance is enhanced by the fact that they flow through countries which are relatively highly developed and heavily populated.¹⁸

Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the region around this rift valley is its great diversity of climate, resulting from the large differences of elevation, and the variety of cultures which have emerged among its inhabitants, who still represent a considerable mixture of races, nations, and religions. Palm trees, bananas, and sugar cane grow in some parts of this area, and citrus fruit can be found along the entire seaboard. Olives, grapes, and apples ripen on the mountain slopes, and the cultivation of field crops ranges from cereals to sugar beet and potatoes in the higher parts of the Baqaa. Varieties of Christians, Jews, Druses, and Moslem Sunnites and Shiites live among the remnants of pagan temples. Cultivators of modern citrus fruit plantations and terrace-farming vine- and olive-growers work in the immediate vicinity of nomadic shepherds, whose goats and sheep, by destroying shrubs and trees, accelerate the process of soil erosion, thus counteracting the laborious efforts of their settled neighbors. Under such conditions, it is understandable that while elaborate and sometimes conflicting ideas for a fuller utilization

¹⁷ Worthington, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

of even the smallest of the existing watercourses are numerous, very little has been done toward their coordinated, combined exploitation. The situation is not made any easier by the fact that this area is divided among a number of independent, sovereign states; and it has been aggravated by the partition of Palestine and the tensions following the recent Jewish-Arab war. All this applies, of course, in a higher degree to the Jordan basin than to the two more northern rivers of the valley.

Orontes. The Orontes rises in northern Lebanon, in the fertile and partly irrigated valley of the Baqaa, which lies between the ranges of the Lebanon and the Antilebanon. Its flow varies between 6 and 17 cubic meters per second. The river runs northward over Lebanese territory for some 30 miles. In this sector it is planned to divert some of its water for irrigation and to use its fall for a small power station. The value of the latter project would be enhanced if the station were tied into a national grid with the proposed larger Litani power station in the south; for while the discharge of the Litani drops during the summer to about 10 percent of its winter flow, the Orontes, which is partly snow-fed, is more steady.

Passing into Syria, the river enters Lake Homs, which is in fact an artificial reservoir formed by a barrage on the site of an old Roman dam, and thence flows northward into Turkey and the Mediterranean. Several projects are possible along the main course of the Orontes in Syria, and are now being studied by the Syrian Government. The most important of them are the drainage and irrigation of the Ghab swamp, containing rich soil, at the foot of the Alawite range of hills, and the drainage of the Ruj basin, further north. Each of these projects could be combined with a small power production. The Orontes projects, like those on the Litani, require a considerable amount of earthwork, which, under Middle Eastern conditions, is particularly adapted to manual labor. They may, therefore, seem especially attractive now when both countries have a large, unemployed labor force of Palestinian Arab refugees.

Litani. The Litani, like the Orontes, originates in the Baalbek watershed but pursues an opposite southerly course through the Baqaa Valley, then turns due west to empty into the Mediter-

anean near the ancient Phœnician town of Tyre. The river's source is at an altitude of about 3,000 feet. For some 50 miles downstream from its source and for the last 25 miles before the estuary, the river bed has a mild gradient. These portions, and particularly the upper basin, are well suited for irrigation. The middle sector is fairly precipitous and has been suggested as a site for the development of hydroelectric power.¹⁹ The river's discharge measured near the source, at Mansurah, ranges from 32 cubic meters per second in January to 3 cubic meters in August; even less would be available for power production during the summer months once additional irrigation projects were provided for. This difficulty could be overcome only by large-scale winter storage. More detailed geological surveys are required to determine the most suitable choice for the sites of one or two dams, so located as to avoid interference with the irrigation system upstream. It has been calculated that a plant based on this water power could have a capacity of at least 50,000 kw.

✓ A possible third link in the interconnected Orontes-Litani power grid might be a power station making use of the considerable drop from Lake Yammunah, one of the Litani's subsidiaries, to the river itself. The total annual output of the three plants would then be around 480 million kwh., which would exceed the Lebanon's present power consumption by more than eight times. These projects are thus usually associated with other large-scale developments which would substantially increase the internal power consumption, or with the prospects of power exports to neighboring countries.

✓ *Jordan.* The main sources of the Jordan are the spring-fed streams of the Lidani, Hasbani, Baniyas, and Barrighit rivers which issue from the foothills of Mount Hermon in the Lebanon and converge in the papyrus swamps of Lake Hulah, whence they flow as the Upper Jordan to Lake Tiberias. In the nine miles between those lakes, the Jordan falls 900 feet. Just below Lake Tiberias, the Yarmuk River, which rises in Syria and for some distance forms the frontier between Syria and Jordan, joins the river Jordan. In its gently declining, but widely meandering

¹⁹ See I. Abd-El-Al, *Le Litani, Étude Hydrologique* (Beirut, 1948).

65-mile course to the Dead Sea, almost 1,300 feet below sea level, the Jordan covers 200 miles.

The development of water supply from the Jordan is at present dominated by the concession of the Palestine Electric Corporation, which has the right to prevent the use of water for any other purpose, but exercises this right with discretion.²⁰ At the confluence of the Jordan and the Yarmuk, the waters are retained by a dam and then dropped about 80 feet to produce electric power, about nine-tenths of all Palestine's consumption. In the gorge below this dam, the depth of the river level below that of the valley floor makes its use for irrigation uneconomic at present. South to the Dead Sea, the use of Jordan water is limited to a few private pumps, most of which operate at high cost due to the high lift to valley level.²¹

The most ambitious of the multipurpose projects for the utilization of the Jordan's waters is the one usually associated with W. C. Lowdermilk, who did not originate the suggestion but who has contributed detail and a name (Jordan Valley Authority) to the idea. The main aims of the project are to divert the waters of the Jordan at about the level of the Palestine Electric Corporation's reservoir below Lake Tiberias into a high level canal, or two canals, one on either side of the valley, to provide water flowing by gravity to irrigable land in the valley and on its slopes. Since this scheme would provide more water than is needed in the Jordan Valley, part of the river might be diverted even earlier, above Lake Hulah, to provide irrigation in the Plain of Esdraelen and other nearby valleys. In order to maintain the level of the Dead Sea and to continue and further develop power production on the way, the present flow of the Jordan would be replaced by sea water carried from the Mediterranean to the river bed through canals and tunnels, preferably from Haifa Bay, only 25 miles away. Mr. Lowdermilk expects that the effective fall for the development of hydroelectric power in a number of power plants in the valley would provide a minimum capacity of 76,000 to 110,000 kw. Associated with these

²⁰ This concession does not extend to the Jordan headwaters, which largely come from outside Palestine; Syria, for instance, already has a small power station on the Yarmuk.

²¹ See Worthington, *op. cit.*, p. 53, and Walter Clay Lowdermilk, *Palestine, Land of Promise* (New York and London, 1944), Chap. III.

schemes for irrigation and power production are plans for water conservation, flood control, drainage, control of grazing, and reforestation.²²

✓ Although much study has been given to the various elements of the Jordan Valley Authority, much still remains to be done. The entire scheme is already the subject of an extensive bibliography, much of it polemical owing to the many conflicting interests involved. Aside from the physical problems and such minor obstacles as the necessity of settlement with the present concessionaires, this spectacular scheme faces two main difficulties. The cost of the investment would be very high, not only because the sea water must be led through tunnels cut in porous rock, but also because of the numerous wadis which the lateral irrigation canals would have to cross on the slopes of the valley. The economic utility of the plan as a whole needs still to be demonstrated. Perhaps more important is the man-made difficulty created by the fact that the Jordan is par excellence an international river. Its sources are in Lebanon and in Syria. Until recently, the river itself formed the frontier between Palestine and Jordan; it now flows partly through lands controlled by Jordan and partly through Israel. An investment of this order of magnitude can be undertaken and effectively operated only with the full cooperation of the inhabitants and governments of the entire surrounding area, and perhaps, too, only after at least a measure of economic integration of the region has been achieved.

✓ *Other Schemes.* Apart from the schemes related to these three rivers, there are a great number of more or less clearly defined smaller projects. The more important ones are power production on the Ibrahim, Barid, and other small rivers on the western slope of the Lebanon; a diversion of some of the Yarmuk into a southward canal irrigating parts of the Kingdom of Jordan (a plan possibly conflicting with the Jordan scheme); the drainage and subsequent irrigation of the Hulah swamps in northern Palestine; the irrigation of the Negev with water diverted from springs and from the Awja River which flows into the sea near Tel Aviv.

²² Lowdermilk, *op. cit.*, Chap. XI.

TURKEY

Turkey's coastal belts, particularly the Black Sea littoral, and its eastern highlands receive adequate rainfall. But the sprawling central plateau, cut off from the seas by high mountain ranges, receives less than 20 inches of rainfall per year; the major part, less than 15 inches; a portion, in the salty heart of the plateau, less than 8 inches. It is typical of central Anatolia that cultivated land consists of discontinuous circles whose centers are wells and whose radii are the distance an ox can travel in one working day. Even the coasts on the west and south have the long dry season typical of the Mediterranean climate. Thus, while most of Turkey is not faced with a critical water shortage, it is essential to find means of conserving and utilizing fully the water supplies that are available so as to make possible more extensive cultivation, more frequent crops, better yields, and a better supply for human and animal consumption.

There are excellent possibilities for water development in Turkey. There is reason to believe that the country has large ground-water resources, but these need still to be studied systematically. The already obvious sources of water are the rivers, virtually all of which rise either in the central plateau or on the windward sides of its mountain barriers and flow down to the Black, Aegean, or Mediterranean seas. Many of Turkey's rivers maintain a continuous flow; but even those which shrink or dry up in the summer carry (in certain seasons) a volume of water large enough to make conservation and agricultural use possible. So great is the volume of water carried by some of these rivers that regulation rather than better utilization is the major problem they pose to Turkey; for in their swift descent from the mountains to the sea, they regularly flood and frequently devastate some of Turkey's richest agricultural land, and keep portions of it in constant need of drainage. In many cases, the steep fall from the highlands makes hydroelectric power a definite possibility. In a country starved for power, this prospect offers great promise. Although only a few regions of Turkey have a ready market for power, there are, aside from the Istanbul, Izmit, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana areas, a large number of smaller centers of population and industry which could use any

power that might become available; and all could use water power to advantage in place of the present expensive and often inefficient thermal power.

The urgent need for flood control, power, and additional irrigation, has resulted, in the past twenty years, in a profusion of technical studies and projects. Many of these projects are under way; a few, already completed. There is every indication that the Turkish Government intends to proceed with its plans. Few of these plans, however, have yet been adequately engineered, and their economic and agronomic implications have not yet been fully assessed. Moreover, they lack coordination. Projects are sometimes undertaken without reference to the over-all potential or needs of the area; in some cases the work already under way may well be inconsistent with comprehensive river basin development. In only one case has a development survey of an entire basin been made, although a second such survey is now being planned. Reforestation and other varieties of erosion control, which would limit or prevent floods at their sources, seem generally to have been omitted from river-control plans. Virtually no effective measures have ever been taken in Turkey to combat erosion. Thus, while the TVA idea is popular in Turkey, it seems that the full implications of its conception of total basin development have only just begun to be appreciated.

Following are brief statements of the possibilities of several of the rivers which, aside from the flood control measures they make necessary, promise widespread benefits from systematic and rational use.²³ It should be noted that all but the easternmost of these rivers (the Euphrates) flow exclusively in Turkey, thereby virtually eliminating one of the obstacles to hydrodevelopment among its Middle Eastern neighbors.

Çukurova. The Seyhan Valley scheme is the farthest advanced of all Turkey's hydrodevelopment projects. The Seyhan is one of three rivers (with the Berdan and the Ceyhan) flowing southward from the Taurus Mountains through the rich alluvial Çukurova, one of Turkey's richest agricultural regions,

²³ For a brief statement of the Government's plans, see N. Taner, "Grands Travaux d'Hydraulique en Turquie," *Travaux: Organe de la Technique Française des Travaux Publics et du Ciment Armé*, Dec. 1948, pp. 611-18; and Turkish Information Office, "Projected Hydroelectric Development in Turkey," *Turkey Today*, No. 2 (New York, 1949).

which forms an inverted triangle pointing into the northeast corner of the Mediterranean. Although all three rivers overflow frequently, the Seyhan creates the most serious and far-reaching floods, annually devastating large areas of agricultural land on both banks of the river and taking many lives. The prevention of floods alone is sufficient reason for an effort to control the Seyhan. But in addition considerable benefits may be derived from irrigation of the plains on either side of the river. There are already on the Seyhan a weir, six kilometers above Adana, and two main irrigation canals; but the small system of secondary and tertiary canals thus far constructed services only a portion of the right bank and provides water for the irrigation of only 17,000 hectares. Given the means of storing water, it would be possible to irrigate a total of 156,000 hectares, or virtually the entire Adana plain.

Although agriculture is of first importance in the Çukurova, the area also has opportunities for the expansion and development of small industries, particularly textiles and food processing. Lack of power is a major factor inhibiting industrial growth. The entire area now suffers from an acute shortage of power, virtually all of which is produced by small thermal plants which use every variety of fuel. The large volume of water available on the Seyhan could be harnessed to supply not only the current needs but the anticipated requirements of many years to come.

To meet the needs of the Çukurova, a multipurpose dam has been projected for construction at a bend in the Seyhan about 8 kilometers above Adana. The plans call for a dam high enough to reconcile the conflicting requirements of irrigation and power. It would create a reservoir capable of controlling all floods above 1,000 c.m.s., for the regulation of which levees would have to be built along the river below the dam. The full irrigation potential of the region would be achieved, and an installed capacity of 67,500 kva. would yield about 210 kwh. of primary power per year. The International Bank has already indicated an interest in this project and in the fall of 1949 sent a consultant to study the plans on the spot.

No comparable schemes have yet been worked out for the

Berdan and Ceyhan rivers, on the right and left flanks of the Çukurova. On the former, a dam and a system of canals already provide irrigation for about 20,000 hectares of land on the plain of Tarsus. Hydroelectric installations may one day be erected at or above this dam. On the Ceyhan, construction is now in process of a 45-kilometer dike to prevent floods. However, no unified plan for the Çukurova, combining the resources of all three rivers, has yet been made.

Sakarya-Porsuk Valleys. The Sakarya River rises in the western portion of the Anatolian plateau and flows west and north to the Black Sea, which it meets about 75 miles east of the Bosphorus. Its major tributary, the Porsuk, flows eastward through Kutahya and Eskişehir, two important towns, before meeting the Sakarya. One of its western tributaries flows by Ankara. The basin of this river system includes some of Turkey's best cereal-growing areas. Multipurpose hydrodevelopments are projected on the Sakarya-Porsuk system, but with power as the primary objective, rather than agricultural improvement. Located almost half-way between Ankara and Istanbul, the rivers offer favorable sites for strategically located hydroelectric sources which might supply Turkey's most highly industrialized regions. These sites have, in fact, become key-points in a projected electric grid which would tie together and provide power for the whole of northwest Anatolia. Drainage, irrigation, and flood control are of only secondary significance in the light of the power potential of the area.

Turkey's most modern and elaborate dam has already been built on this river system, on the Çubuk River near Ankara, most of whose water supply it provides. A second dam is now under construction at Eskişehir on the Porsuk River. With a reservoir capable of holding 155 million cubic meters, the dam will both prevent periodic flooding and permit the irrigation of the plains of Eskişehir. On the Sakarya River itself, only modest efforts thus far have been made to provide for irrigation and drainage in its upper reaches. Two major projects have, however, been planned for this river.—

The first, at Sarıyer, provides for a dam and hydroelectric plant of about 75,000 kw. capable of yielding some 400 million

kwh. per year. The second, at Çağlazık, consists of two dams servicing a single plant of 36,000 kw. and yielding 120-150 million kwh. per year. The plans of the Turkish Government call for linking these power plants with others based on coal and lignite in a grid covering northwest Turkey, thus providing power to the great coal fields at Zonguldak, the industrial area between Istanbul and Izmit, and the industrial centers of Ankara and Kırıkkale. Two major by-products are expected from these projects. Construction of the dams would protect the lower Sakarya Valley from floods, and it is hoped that the river for about 60 to 100 miles from its mouth may be made navigable for small vessels of 200 to 500 tons.

Gediz Valley. The Gediz River flows westerly into the Aegean Sea just north of Izmir; its valley is a major source of Turkey's cotton, tobacco, fruit, nuts, and olive oil. Irrigation, drainage, flood-control and water-power all figure prominently in the plans for the basin.

Several diversion dams and canals have already been built on this river. Dams at Adala on the Gediz and at Cemleka on the Kumçay help regulate the overflows of the lower Gediz, which endanger the rich plains of Menemen and Manisa. Waters held back by these dams are channelled into Lake Marmara, around which a retaining wall is being built to create a reservoir capable of storing 350 million cubic meters of water. Another weir is being built on the Gediz immediately south of the lake, which will also be tied by canal to the lake. Lower down the Gediz, a larger diversion dam has been built at Emiralem, together with a series of levees and an irrigation system which waters the entire plain of Menemen. Aside from the completion of these works, the major construction projected on the Gediz basin is a new large dam near Adala. Flood control remains the major objective, but the new dam will also contain hydroelectric installations which will produce 150 million kwh. per year. The power will be used for pump irrigation in the vicinity of Manisa and for the Izmir industrial area.

The projects thus far completed and planned in the Gediz basin were undertaken individually, without any plan of coordinated development. In this the Gediz is similar to all other

developments in Turkey. The Gediz is, however, unique in that it is the first river basin in which an effort is now being made to establish an integrated development plan. The American firm retained for the job started work in 1949 and expects to complete its reports early in 1950.

Büyük Menderes Valley. Like the Gediz, the Büyük Menderes River flows from the western plateau into the Aegean Sea through lands which provide much of Turkey's agricultural produce, but also passes an important industrial center, Nazilli. The entire area needs protection from floods; drainage and irrigation would greatly increase the assets of the region. Its hydroelectric potential could be linked to that of the Gediz, in a single grid to service the Aegean district. Projects envisaged for the basin include not only the Büyük Menderes itself, but also its tributaries, the Kufçay, Dandalas, Akçay, and Çineçay.

A start has been made on this basin by the drainage of the vicinity of İçikli, and levees are now under construction around Lake İçikli. A dam several miles above Nazilli diverts water into two canals on either side of the river to irrigate the plain of Nazilli; another small system has been built higher up the river to water the plain of Denizli; and protective levees are being built across the plain of Sokay, where the river meets the sea.

The Turkish Government plans the protection and irrigation of the entire basin, but the portions of the work already accomplished represent only isolated and sporadic projects. The Government has recently indicated its intention to survey the entire basin in terms of a single, integrated development; a preliminary survey for this purpose has already been made.

Other Schemes. At least four other river basins have been the subject of discussion within the Turkish Government. Although no one of these has been submitted to systematic and scientific study, individual projects have been undertaken and in some cases completed — to become parts, later, of more generalized development schemes.

The Susurlu drainage basin, directly south of the Sea of Marmara, includes the waters of Lakes Manyas and Ulubat, and the Susurlu, Nilifur, Kocaçay, and Kemalpaşa rivers and their trib-

utaries. Drainage and flood control are the primary needs in this area, and some work has already been done or started in the building of dikes and overflow dams along the Susurlu and Kemalpaşa rivers and around Lake Manyas. Although this is one of the more plentifully watered parts of Turkey, some irrigation works are already operating and others are projected. It is also hoped to produce power and to make navigation possible on the lower portion of the Susurlu.

The Kızılırmak and Yeşilırmak rivers flow from the central plateau, through rocky gorges across the Pontic barrier, into the Black Sea on either side of the important harbor of Samsun. Rich deltas have been formed at their mouths, but they are marshy and subject to flood. Minor drainage and irrigation works have already been started, but considerably more are in prospect. The hydroelectric possibilities have been judged significant, but no detailed plans have yet been made.

The Euphrates and its tributaries, in eastern Anatolia, make up Turkey's longest river system. Rising among the country's highest mountains, it falls rapidly into the plains of southwest Turkey and the lowlands of Syria. Its hydroelectric potential is undoubtedly great, but remains still unstudied. The only projects thus far undertaken are those providing for drainage and irrigation in the plain of Erzincan.

THE IRANIAN PLATEAU

✓ Iran's water deficiency is an outcome not only of climatic conditions but also of the country's physical structure. Within the "V" formed by the Elborz Mountains on the north and the Zagros Range on the west, lies the Iranian plateau, at an average of 4,000 feet above sea level. At first rugged, it levels off gradually into great deserts, which cover about one-fourth of the country. In the desert region annual rainfall is less than five inches; over most of the plateau it does not exceed 12 inches and is confined to the winter months. The coastal regions of the Caspian Sea receive, however, abundant rainfall throughout the year, averaging around 50 inches, and western Iran has a rather high fall of snow and rain during the winter months. The latter precipitation, caused by weatherfronts moving from south and

west, usually exhausts itself on the great mountain barriers. Thus there is not only less rain further inland, but most of the water flows back from the mountains into external drainage systems and can be used only on a comparatively small area before it crosses the land frontiers or passes directly into the seas (a situation not dissimilar to that on the eastern Mediterranean seaboard, where the Lebanon and Antilebanon ranges stop most of the humid air flow before it reaches Syria).

The scarcity of precipitation in Iran is not alleviated by rivers flowing from abroad. Only small quantities of water flow in by surface streams from Afghanistan. Nor are natural conditions very favorable for the use of groundwater. Over most of the country's area, except in its southwestern corner, the underground water table is too deep to permit pumping by bullock power from wells, as is done in India or in the Nile Valley. Due to the difficulties involved in the import, operation, and maintenance of machinery in an undeveloped country, the number of engine-driven pumps is still very limited. The ingenuity and experience of the peasantry has resulted in the development of the *kanat*, by which more land is irrigated in Iran than by any other method. A *kanat* consists of a horizontal underground shaft, driven to the comparatively shallow water-bearing strata at the base of the mountains, which carries the water by gravity to the lower ground, where it serves for human and animal consumption as well as for irrigation. The existence of many centers of habitation and cultivation in Iran depends completely on such *kanats*. It is calculated, however, that only some 10 percent of the underground water is extracted by this method.

Iran's water supply could be substantially increased by modern waterworks. Investment for that purpose is a major prerequisite to any improvement of the existing standards of health and hygiene as well as to the development of agriculture, which is the mainstay of the country's economy. The storage of surface water and the fuller tapping of subsoil sources require considerable capital outlay and broad coordinated planning. In the past few years such planning has started, partly with the assistance of foreign technicians, and has recently taken specific shape in a

Seven Year Development Plan.²⁴ The purpose of the Seven Year Development Plan is "to increase production and the volume of exports, produce people's requirements at home, reform agriculture and industry, exploit mineral resources particularly oil, develop transport, improve public health, and generally do everything necessary for the development of the country, raise the standard of living of the people, advance public welfare and lower the cost of living."²⁵ Of the total expenditure of 21 billion rials (\$650 million at the official rate of exchange), 25 percent is earmarked for agriculture. About 8 percent of the total (1.850 billion rials) is to be spent on irrigation and the construction of dams.

From the data available,²⁶ it seems that the total average annual intake of water by Iran exceeds 450 billion cubic meters, of which, at present, some three-fourths are lost by surface flow-off and evaporation. To improve this situation, it will be necessary to utilize the waste flow-off river water, to open "new" sources by intercepting underground water more fully and adequately than is now done by *kanats*, and to "re-use" some of the water, particularly in the form of return seepage from irrigation schemes at high levels for irrigation in lower areas. In this way it is hoped to cover the annual requirements, estimated at some 500 billion cubic meters per annum. Over 97 percent of this supply would be absorbed by agricultural demands. Of the rest, some 1 billion cubic meters would cover urban and industrial requirements and some 8 billion cubic meters would maintain navigation on the Karun River, which now "exports" about 24 billion cubic meters per year. The high allocation of water resources for agriculture is justified by the latter's large potential productive capacity. According to the best available statistics, in addition to the 11 million acres of land in crops and to the 29 million acres

²⁴ It is probably safer not to put too much emphasis on the number of years associated with the name of the Plan. While the Plan was first announced early in 1947 and enacted into legal form by the Iranian parliament on February 15, 1949, it would not be surprising if the execution of this large-scale endeavour spreads over a somewhat longer period.

²⁵ Bank Melli Iran, *Bulletin*, No. 98 (February-March 1949), Vol. XVI, p. 280.

²⁶ The authors wish to express their thanks to the Embassy of Iran in Washington for permission to use the *Report on Seven Year Development Plan for the Plan Organisation of the Imperial Government of Iran*, Overseas Consultants, Inc., (New York, 1949), on which most of the following information is based.

of crop land fallow, another 82 million acres are potentially cultivable.

Following is a summary of the most important possibilities of harnessing and developing Iran's water resources, as laid out in the Seven Year Plan.

✓ *Karun.* The Karun, Iran's most important river, originates in the mountains west of Isfahan, and in its lower course winds southward over the plain of Khuzistan. The Karun flows for its whole length in Iran but is geographically a part of the system of the Tigris and Euphrates, whose estuary (the Shatt al-Arab) it shares. At the present time insufficient use is made of the Karun for irrigation of its alluvial plains, which are nevertheless periodically threatened by floods. The construction of a protective dam near Shustar, where the river issues from the mountains, was recommended in 1944 by a British engineer. With a storage capacity of around 4 billion cubic meters, this reservoir would not only reduce the flood danger for the plain of Khuzistan but, by removing the obstruction caused in the Shatt al-Arab by the unregulated discharge of the Karun, would contribute to a reduction of the area annually flooded by the Tigris and Euphrates. The dam would have a hydroelectric power potential estimated at 30,000 kilowatts. In addition to this reservoir several irrigation projects in Khuzistan are under consideration. It has been also suggested that a part of the river could be diverted into the swamp lands below Ahwaz so that its silt would be deposited and its water used to make new rice-lands.²⁷ The proposed reduction of the flow of the river would not affect its navigability and would reduce the quantities of silt deposited in the Iraqi delta, which at present must be continuously reduced by expensive dredging operations.

✓ *Zayandeh Rud.* A completely separate, much smaller, project involving some of the headwaters of the Karun is already under construction. About 45 miles west of Isfahan, a narrow ridge divides two catchment basins; west of the ridge is one of the headwaters of the Karun River and east of it is the Zayandeh Rud which ultimately loses itself in the desert of the interior, but not before having supplied a rich agricultural area around

²⁷ Worthington, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

Isfahan. Through this watershed a tunnel is being driven now which will divert some of the Karun water to increase the inadequate supplies of the Zayandeh Rud. This scheme increases the importance of projects for the better conservation and utilization of the waters of the Zayandeh Rud itself. These include several reservoirs for irrigation and the production of power. High priority has been recommended within the Seven Year Plan budget for studies and investigations preparatory to these investments.

Drainage basin of the Darya y Namak. Several smaller rivers lose themselves wastefully in this salt marsh and lake south of Tehran. The most important are those which, like the Karaj and Jajirud, flow from the Elborz Mountains north of Tehran and, despite their modest discharge, are of interest for multipurpose development, including the supply of potable water and power for the capital and irrigation of nearby agricultural land. The Karaj, being snow-fed during spring and early summer, has a comparatively high dry weather flow and is relatively free from silt by comparison with most Iranian rivers. A descent of nearly 1,000 feet in a distance of 16 miles makes power production promising. It already supplies most of Tehran's water which, however, at present flows in an open, unlined ditch; apart from the undesirability of this method, the supply is and will remain insufficient during a part of the year until storage is provided. The smaller Jajirud River has been studied from the point of view of power production and increased water supplies for the irrigation of the Veramin Plain, an area of about a quarter of a million acres of valuable crop land close to Tehran. These possibilities are tied in with similar schemes on the Lar River, which has its source near the Jajirud but flows to the Caspian Sea.

Many other projects in various parts of Iran are under active consideration. They include such water basins as that of the Kur and Mund rivers and are primarily concerned with irrigation.

TIGRIS-EUPHRATES VALLEY

✓ The eastern half of the historic Fertile Crescent is in effect a single great valley drained by two rivers, the Tigris and the

Euphrates. In their long course from Turkey to the Persian Gulf, these rivers and the lands they cross provide one of the greatest unused agricultural potentials in the Middle East. Both rivers find their main sources in Turkey, but they drain also part of Syria, the western border of Iran, and the entire settled area of Iraq. The Euphrates, after flowing 420 miles in Syria and 750 miles in Iraq, and the Tigris, after 770 miles in Iraq, finally converge at Qurna to form the Shatt al-Arab. Through a large part of this course, they cross some of the world's hottest and driest areas.

There are undoubtedly opportunities for the use of the rivers (particularly the Euphrates) in Turkey, both for agriculture and for power. Thus far, however, plans for the development of the Tigris and Euphrates in Turkey have not gone beyond the discussion stage; indeed, relatively little is known of that sector of the rivers. Any future regulation or storage of the rivers in Turkey, or of the headwaters of the four great tributaries of the Tigris in western Iran, would seriously affect the flow of the rivers in their middle and lower reaches in Syria and Iraq. Their full utilization, therefore, requires prior international agreement among the four countries concerned.²⁸ Meanwhile, however, much study has been given to the development possibilities of the Tigris and the Euphrates in Iraq and northeastern Syria,²⁹ to which areas the following discussion relates.

The alluvial plain of the two rivers bears a resemblance to the Nile Valley of Egypt. Here too, rainfall is insufficient for cultivation, which, from prehistoric times, has depended on irrigation from the rivers. In both valleys, the water supply fluctuates enormously between seasons. There are, however, important differences between the two areas which affect the problem of utilizing the river waters. The Tigris and Euphrates together carry less water than the Nile, and provide their greatest supply at an inconvenient time — at the sowing of summer crops. This situation stems from the fact that the Nile flows from equa-

²⁸ Mr. Abdul Amir al-Uzri, Assistant Director of Irrigation in Iraq, suggested in 1944 that "any large-scale development of cultivation outside Iraq which may draw water from the [Euphrates] river during the low season would seriously affect the country's interests." "Regional Control of Water Supplies," MESC, *op cit.*, p. 180.

²⁹ Jezira Province and the eastern portion of Euphrates Province.

torial mountains northward, while the twin rivers flow south from temperate climates. Moreover, it is more difficult to raise the water level by barrages in the flatlands of Mesopotamia than it is in the narrow Nile Valley. Consequently, irrigation in Iraq in the past several decades has been based primarily on lifting water by pumps, and new flood prevention projects are often based on the utilization of existing depressions near the rivers. While the scarcity of cultivable land in Egypt, combined with the great density of population, has led to ever more *intensive* farming, the great quantity of unused cultivable land and the more favorable ratio of people to land in Iraq have been reflected in *extensive* cultivation even on irrigated lands. Large tracts of lands near the rivers have become saline through lack of drainage and have been abandoned.³⁰

Despite these disadvantages, Iraq possesses one of the greatest reserves of agricultural productive capacity in the Middle East. About 30 million acres of Iraq are potentially cultivable. Of that total, 19.8 million acres are in the irrigation zone, in which only 7 million are now cultivated and only 4.3 million actually cropped.³¹ In Syria, it is estimated that 2 million acres could be put under cultivation by appropriate use of the Euphrates and its tributaries.³² These figures indicate the maximum potential of the areas around the Tigris and Euphrates; the amount realizable will be less, due to the lack of water. But even to approach these goals, requires extensive work in storage, drainage, flood control, and irrigation.

The Euphrates flows in Syria through a broad valley which affords large-scale irrigation possibilities (as does its major tributary, the Khabur). Unless storage is provided for these waters, their diversion in Syria would interfere with their use in Iraq. A major project on the Euphrates in Syria is therefore the construction of a dam and reservoir at Yusuf Pasha which would store about 1.5 billion cubic meters of water and permit

³⁰ See Warriner, *op. cit.*, p. 102; Worthington, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-50; and (particularly on the subject of salinity) Frank M. Eaton, "Irrigation Agriculture along the Nile and the Euphrates," *Scientific American*, LXIX (1949), pp. 34-42.

³¹ Warriner, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-102. There are additionally 10 million acres in Iraq's rainfed zone, of which only 1.5 million are now cropped.

³² *Report of the United States—Syria Agricultural Mission* (Washington, 1947), p. 13.

the irrigation of some 300,000 hectares. The dam would also provide at least 30,000 kw. capacity for the production of power. Another project provides for the irrigation of the Jezira by the fuller utilization of the Khabur.

In Iraq, most of the waters of the Euphrates are now taken off for irrigation above the Hindiyah Barrage, below which the river bed is unstable and floods occur regularly. In this section, floods serve the purpose of basin irrigation; but both here and in other areas they cause extensive damage to crops and even threaten Baghdad. The major construction planned for the Euphrates in Iraq is the Habbaniyah project, begun before World War I but held in suspense for over 20 years. It is a flood control and storage scheme based on the utilization of Habbaniyah Lake, a desert depression near the right bank of the river, west of Baghdad. Work on the project, when finished, will include a diversion dam on the Euphrates and a channel to and outlet from the lake. Two other depressions, south of Habbaniyah would allow further storage. The finished reservoir would have a storage capacity of almost 3 billion cubic meters, and would permit the control of floods on the Euphrates, extension of irrigation to a further 1.5 million acres, and additions to the Euphrates during low flow.

The headwaters of the Tigris are higher and have both more precipitation and more rapid run-off than those of the Euphrates. The Tigris has, moreover, four great tributaries in Iraq which fall precipitously to its valley. The floods of the Tigris are thus more serious and more unpredictable than those of the Euphrates and constantly endanger Baghdad. Fortunately, however, as its largest tributaries flow mainly within Iraq, there are better opportunities for complete control of the waters of the Tigris at an early stage by projects located within one country. There is now only one major construction on the Tigris, the Kut barrage on the lower river, completed in 1939, which raises the water level to serve the irrigation needs of a large area. Like the Euphrates below Hindiyah, the Tigris below Kut is also unstable and not always definable.

The most important control scheme on the Tigris, the Wadi Tharthar project, is comparable to the Habbaniyah project on

the Euphrates, but on a much larger scale. The Wadi, which runs parallel to the Tigris on the west and has water only during a short period of the year, ends in a long depression which can be used as a natural reservoir to retain the flood waters of the Tigris and return them to the river in periods of low water flow. The project requires the construction of a diversion dam on the river and of canals leading in and out of the Wadi. Such a development would also permit production of hydroelectric power and an extension of irrigation in the vicinity. By providing for an outlet to the Euphrates, the Tharthar reservoir could be used to supplement either the Tigris or the Euphrates in low flow.

✓ To provide for more effective control of the Tigris, as well as to increase water storage capacity, storage dams are also planned on the upper Tigris and on its tributaries. Thus the Gibraltar Dam on the Diyala would relieve the flow of the Tigris near Baghdad and save its own valley from flood. It would permit extension of cultivation along the Diyala and a power installation of 30,000 kw. only 65 miles from Baghdad. Under consideration also are the Fatha Dam on the Tigris, 65 miles above Samarra, which would create a reservoir as large as the Tharthar; the Bekhme Dam on the Greater Zab river; the Damir Dam on the Adhaim River; and the Dokan Dam on the Lesser Zab River. The major function of all these projects on the Tigris system is flood control. But the storage they provide and the related irrigation systems that are envisaged will help put to use a large proportion of Iraq's land potential. The effective utilization of the newly available water will depend also, of course, on adequate drainage works, the lack of which has resulted in the salinity of a large part of Iraq's alluvium and has helped produce its peculiar system of extensive irrigation farming.

A glance at a map of the Tigris and the projected developments on its tributaries and on the river itself, suggests striking similarities to the layout of the Tennessee River and its regulatory devices. The full harnessing of the Tigris and the neighboring Euphrates would produce no less a revolution in the life of the region than the TVA has produced in the area it affects. The same is true of the other multipurpose hydrodevelopment

schemes that have been cited here. Only by such comprehensive land-water conservation and utilization programs as these, can the Middle East progress toward the achievement of its economic potential and assure its peoples an adequate standard of living. The varied obstacles that impede these programs will not easily be removed, and it may take decades to accomplish many of them. But with adequate study and relatively modest means, slow but effective first steps can now be made toward their realization.

D
T
1949,
under
to op
Israel
the P
the M
the i
put 1
of th
ment
derta
ment
to re
desir
gove
that
of s
tivity
in n
gove
ning
D
Octo
tion
min
sever
duct
field
tion,
geog
dan
the
Egy
fort
Com
to t
T
to a
for
imm
and
spor
ever
men

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

THE UNITED NATIONS Economic Survey Mission, appointed late in August 1949, proceeded to Beirut early in September under the chairmanship of Mr. Gordon Clapp to open talks with the Arab governments and Israel on types of constructive assistance for the Palestine refugees. The reception accorded the Mission was at first cool. In addition to the immediate Arab suspicion of any project put forward by the UN upon the initiative of the United States, was the Arab governments' unwillingness to cooperate in any undertaking which would prejudice their argument that the Palestine refugees had the right to return to their former homes if they so desired. When, however, the Mission and the governments concerned reached agreement that discussion would be limited to methods of substituting short-range constructive activity for economically sterile relief, and would in no way entail resettlement plans, the Arab governments cooperated actively in the planning of a works program.

During the latter part of September and October the Mission first analyzed the situation of the refugees, and with this picture in mind then studied various projects — including several already in progress — suitable for productive occupation. These lay largely in the fields of soil conservation, highway construction, and the utilization of water resources; geographically they were divided among Jordan and Arab Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza strip of southern Palestine under Egyptian occupation. An interim report setting forth these findings was submitted to the UN Conciliation Commission on November 6 and to the General Assembly on November 17.

The remainder of November was devoted to a consideration of longer range projects for economic rehabilitation which have the immediate needs of the refugees less in mind and involve political problems to a correspondingly greater extent. Such plans, however, await future action. The net accomplishment of the Mission's effort was thus to direct

thinking toward constructive activity insofar as it was divorced from political considerations. The Mission had little or no direct effect, nor did it attempt to have any, on the political problems which had to be solved before full attention could be turned toward economic development.

On these basic political problems, primarily the problem of Israel-Arab relations, little advance in any field was to be noted. Among the Arab states themselves trends which had been present before the Palestine war — such as renewed talk of an Iraqi-Syrian union — tentatively reappeared, arousing once more old tensions among the members of the Arab League. The League Council itself met in Cairo for the first time since before open hostilities in Palestine, and proceeded to a discussion without final result of organization for common defense. The particular political question on which attention centered most was that of the disposition of Jerusalem. When the UN General Assembly opened debate on it the last week in November, lines were quickly formed. On the one side was Israel, which requested that it be permitted to incorporate the city within its boundaries; and on the other the Arab states (with the exception of Jordan), which urged internationalization, primarily as a means of halting further Israel expansion. With the support of a Latin American bloc, an Asiatic bloc, and the Soviet Union, in addition to the Arab bloc, the General Assembly on December 9 passed a recommendation for internationalization in accordance with the original partition recommendation of November 1947.

Solution for the Italian Colonies

On September 18 Cyrenaica assumed control of its internal affairs with the enactment by the Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi of a British-sponsored constitution. However, the final disposition of Cyrenaica, together with the other former Italian Colonies, still rested with

the UN General Assembly. Efforts to find an acceptable compromise among the variety of particular interests continued throughout October and the first weeks of November, with a solution being reached and finally passed on November 21.

In dealing with the Italian colony question, the General Assembly had a clearer mandate than it had ever acted under with respect to Palestine. By Annex XI of the Italian Peace Treaty, the four major powers specifically undertook to accept a General Assembly recommendation and to take appropriate measures for giving it effect, provided they previously had been unable to reach a solution among themselves, as was the case. And yet although the General Assembly was able to reach an agreement, and it was unlikely that this agreement would have to be backed at once by force as had been the case with the Palestine recommendations, serious problems still remained before the Italian Colony question could be considered settled.

A united Libya was granted independence by 1952, yet there was question as to whether Libya would be prepared to stand on its own feet, either politically or economically, by that time. Somaliland was placed under Italian trusteeship for ten years, after which it too would become independent. The preparation of Somaliland for independence in this length of time promises to be a major task even under the most favorable of conditions. The Italians expressed every intention of treating their trusteeship with responsibility, but the strong animosity toward them among the Somalis boded ill for the Italians even if they were possessed of the best intentions. As regards Eritrea, a final decision was postponed for another year pending further investigation of the wishes of its inhabitants, the interests of peace and security in East Africa, and the rights and claims of Ethiopia. The task of resolving these three factors through an acceptable compromise raised many problems and the danger of considerable international friction. The United Nations, by its success in reaching any decision at all, acquired an interim prestige; but the real test of UN virtue lay in demonstrating whether its recommendation would now prove to be workable.

The Year in North Africa¹

A reporter stationed in North Africa would have had few occasions during 1949 to rush cables to his home office. Late in April storms, destroying hundreds of native huts, flooding mines, and damaging crops and installations, cost French Morocco a dozen lives and more than 2 million francs. A month earlier American businessmen charged that French syndicates in Algeria, aided by French Government regulations, were "freezing out" U.S. traders. Americans in Morocco declared that they found it difficult to obtain import licenses, while customs officials, alleging that Americans were buying goods with black market francs, imposed duties many times higher than the 12½% permitted by treaty. As the year ended, charges and counter-charges were still being made. In Spanish Morocco, the Arabian Nights were re-enacted for three weeks ending June 6, when the ruling Khalifa climaxed the celebration with his wedding to Princess Lalla Fatima, daughter of the late Sultan Abdul Aziz. From Franco came a check for one million pesetas; from the Spanish Government, an antique clock.

While these were the only items which might have made the front page, a careful reporter, summing up at year's end, would have found more significant news elsewhere, especially in the silence that had come over the political scene in North Africa. Economic affairs monopolized everyone's attention. Poverty continued to be the most decisive fact in the lives of most inhabitants of the Maghreb; nonetheless, French recovery, plentiful rains, and some ERP aid had made 1949 North Africa's most prosperous postwar year. In Algeria, where 97% of the arable land is devoted to cereals and three-quarters of the native population depends on cereal production for its livelihood, the harvest was 25% better (208,500 tons) than in 1948. Tunisia had its first good harvest in five years. Everywhere in the French possessions, the production of phosphate and iron ores rose higher than 1938 levels; that of electricity was at least doubled. Rationing was being ended.

This prosperity helped to restrain political activity. It was not, however, the chief cause

¹ Based on a report by Manfred Halpern.

of the pause in Muslim agitation against French rule. The explanation was rather to be sought in the recognition by nationalist groups that peaceful action could find few channels for effective expression, most of the apparatus of government and information being a creation of French energy. Violent action could have found little support from allies abroad at a time when the Arab League reeled from its defeat in Palestine, Egypt marked time in its quest for the Sudan, and native nationalists in Indochina had yet to achieve victory over France.

After a news blackout in Spanish Morocco which followed widespread arrests on July 11 upon the discovery of arms caches, Franco thought it safer to blame the plot on Arab nationalists (and imprison some of them), than on the former Spanish Loyalists who had in fact been responsible. In French Morocco, where the Arab press remained severely censored, the Sultan continued to receive Arab nationalist delegations but refrained from making any public appeals in their behalf. His eldest son, Prince Moulay Hassan, joined the cruise of the training-ship *Jeanne d'Arc*. When the Prince arrived at Tunis, the Bey received him with more show of affection for the house of his father than the power of his sponsor, but such gestures were rare. In October, Habib Bourguiba, leader of the Neo-Destour Party, returned to Tunisia after four years of exile in Egypt. The French Government, which during 1949 had assisted thousands of pilgrims to go from North Africa to Mecca and had been gratified to note the year's unusual calm among its Muslim subjects, had no objection even to this traveler's return.

By late fall, however, the political detente of 1949 began to look as if it had been an interlude rather than a prelude. In November, the UN voted to return the Fezzan, which France had wished to annex to Algeria, to a united Libya that was soon to be independent. France thought it best to abstain from voting on this decision. But it was doubtful that Arab nationalists west of Libya would now also abstain from voicing their approval of this action by the United Nations, or that they would react with equal reserve on the issue of freedom in the Maghreb when a Muslim

country which they regarded as less advanced than their own was to gain complete independence by 1952.

Passing of the Mixed Courts of Egypt

The Mixed Courts of Egypt came to an end on October 14. During their life they had not only solved the problem which had led to their creation, but, in the sequel, had given proof of an unsuspected vitality that had enabled them to exercise, throughout three quarters of a century, a marked influence on the development of an entire nation.

The task which faced the founders of the Mixed Courts in 1876 was challenging. Justice in Egypt was in a state of chaos, with fifteen sovereign consular authorities claiming the sole right to exercise jurisdiction where their nationals were concerned. The problem was first to secure a surrender of these established rights, and then to formulate a new system which would furnish adequate guarantees of justice. To the furnishing of such guarantees, the ablest statesman of modern Egypt, Nubar Pasha, with the steady support of the Khedive, devoted ten years of unremitting effort. Practically all the capitals of Europe had to be approached and convinced. The success which crowned these efforts marked one of the diplomatic triumphs of the century. Begun for a trial period of five years, the life of the Courts was renewed on twenty different occasions for short periods, until an indeterminate renewal was transformed into a definite period of 12 years by the Treaty of Montreux in 1937.

The guarantee evolved consisted in the creation of an institution which, while forming an integral part of the judicial system of the country and rendering justice in the name of the Egyptian ruler, was composed of a majority of foreign judges selected by the Egyptian Government with the approval of their several governments. These Courts were to exercise jurisdiction in all civil matters involving foreign interests. The Powers were unwilling at first to go so far as to confer criminal jurisdiction on the untried institution, and it was not until the last period of its existence that the rejected proposal became a reality.

From the beginning the Mixed Courts were an unquestioned success. The conditions offered attracted the best type of foreign judges; and their high character and the independence which surrounded their office gave to the Courts an authority and standing in the country comparable to that of the most advanced European judicial system. Sure of their position, the Courts interpreted their authority broadly, so much so that such great administrators as Lord Cromer and Lord Milner found occasion to resent what they chose to believe was the usurpation of judicial function. The Courts were proof, however, against all attempts at the limitation of their powers, and proved equally immune to the various attempts at reform, some of which would have had the effect of anglicizing the institution.

The immense amount of litigation which developed in Egypt with the rise of its commercial prosperity led naturally to the creation of a strong bar drawn very largely from foreign elements and educated in the traditions of the French judicial system, the law administered by the courts being essentially the French codes with slight adaptations to the particular needs of the country. In the work thus carried on, Egyptian judges stood on an equal footing with their European colleagues, except that the latter received a special allowance to cover the increased cost of living abroad.

While the system, as a purely judicial machine, worked admirably, it had two points of weakness. One was that it had necessarily little essential contact with the purely National Courts, which, while administering the same codes, did so entirely in the Arabic language and were confined to cases involving no foreign interests. The second point of weakness was the imposition on the Courts of legislative responsibilities. The power of approving police regulations applicable to foreigners, granted in 1889, was much enlarged by the creation, twelve years later, of a Legislative Assembly, with power to approve legislation generally. The existence of this latter power contributed largely to the demand which took definite form at the Montreux Convention for the

complete abolition of the Mixed Court system in a fixed period. At Montreux all legislative powers were immediately abolished and the criminal jurisdiction of the consular courts was transferred to the Mixed Courts. To the various capitulatory Powers was reserved the option, which they with but one exception proceeded to exercise, of maintaining their consular jurisdiction in matters of personal status. Finally, the proportion of Egyptian judges sitting in the lower courts was raised from one to two-thirds.

Such was the situation of the Courts throughout the so-called transition period, during which they functioned essentially as before, carrying on their work as always in the French language. No plans were made—perhaps none were possible—for a gradual transformation of the French system into an Arabic one. The change brought about on October 15th was necessarily, therefore, a brusque one, but fortunately, owing to the availability of practically all of the former Egyptian judges for the liquidation of the five to ten thousand pending cases, which had been already prepared in the French language, and to the existence of a well-trained bar, including many former members of the Mixed Courts bar, the transfer was not as difficult as it might have been. Added to these circumstances was the fortunate fact that the Court Houses of the Mixed Courts were singularly commodious and well-adapted to their needs, the Court House at Cairo being one of the most magnificent of its kind in the world. The Egyptian courts have, therefore, taken over their duties in these same buildings with a minimum of attendant confusion.

Generally speaking, it is obvious that the system of the Mixed Courts was an anachronism which could not have been expected to continue. Yet throughout all the celebrations marking the end of their days, the Courts received a unanimous tribute to their public service. Their legacy to Egypt lay in the high tradition of judicial administration which they developed, and in the formation of a large body of able jurists who were ready to carry on their work.

Chronology¹

SEPTEMBER 1—NOVEMBER 30, 1949

General

1949

Nov. 21: Delegates of four major opium producing countries, forming a special committee of the Narcotic Drugs Administration of the UN Economic and Social Council, met in Ankara. Turkey, India, Iran, and Yugoslavia participated, with the U. S., China, Egypt, the Netherlands, and France represented by observers. The purpose of the meeting was to formulate a resolution on the restriction of opium production.

Nov. 26: A 5-day conference of U. S. diplomats from 11 Middle Eastern countries with Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee, began in Istanbul.

Nov. 27: The first international Islamic conference was opened in Karachi by Pakistan Premier Liaquat Ali Khan. The sixty delegates and observers present came from Pakistan, Iraq, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, North Africa, Saudi Arabia, Muscat and Oman, the Maldives Islands, Spanish Morocco, the Transvaal, and the Arab League. (*Economist*, Records and Statistics, Dec. 10, p. 545.)

Afghanistan

1949

Oct. 20: It was reported that a "National Assembly of Pushtunistan," the disputed frontier area between Afghanistan and Pakistan, held its first session. A special committee was set up to "constitute the Provisional Government of Pushtunistan."

Nov. 20: Pathan tribes were reported to have established an "independent nation" of Pushtunistan on Afghanistan's eastern border. Representatives of Afridi Pathans met at a mosque in Tirah Bagh, south of the Khyber Pass, and elected a Parliament to act as the government of the new country. Afghan reports stated that the constitution included six articles: 1.) The country to be a Muslim state and operate under Shariah law. 2.) The official language to be Pushtu. 3.) The country to be internally and externally independent. 4.) The Parliament to be the official executive body. 5.) A regular time of meeting to be fixed. 6.) All laws to require a two-thirds majority.

Nov. 24: The Export-Import Bank announced that it had authorized a loan of \$21,000,000 to Afghanistan to aid in the financing of a dam, a

canal, an irrigation system, and supplemental additional river development projects. Herbert E. Gaston, president of the Bank, told reporters that the main objective of the project was "to increase the food production of Afghanistan, not only for itself, but for export," and so enable the country to improve its international financial position. The main part of the loan would be used in constructing the Kajakai Dam and in completing the Boghra Canal system in the Helmand River Valley.

Arab League

1949

Oct. 22: The Arab League's Political Committee, meeting in Cairo, adopted the principle of collective security. It was reported that a project would be considered calling for the establishment of a common defense council.

Oct. 27: With reference to Arab Palestine refugees, the Arab League Council adopted a resolution urging that the rights of citizenship be given to any Arab asking for them, and that those not wishing to change their citizenship have the right to indefinite residence.

Oct. 29: The Arab League's Political Committee approved the general terms of a proposed collective security pact for Arab nations. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Oct. 29.)

Egypt

(See also Palestine Problem.)

1949

Sept. 18: Egypt announced the devaluation of the pound to the rate of \$2.871, to be effective immediately.

Sept. 22: The Egyptian Government voted LE 4,500,000 toward the project of a dam and power station at Owen Falls, Uganda, which would create the world's largest reservoir at the headwaters of the White Nile in Central Africa.

Oct. 14: The Mixed and consular courts closed in accordance with the Montreux Convention. Their jurisdiction was assumed by the Egyptian national courts, conducted in Arabic before Egyptian judges. (*London Times*, October 15, 1949.)

Oct. 16: Minister of State, Mustafa Mara'i Bey, resigned from the Coalition Cabinet.

Nov. 3: The Coalition Cabinet was dissolved. Prime Minister Husayn Sirri Pasha formed a caretaker Cabinet of Independents without party

¹ In general, items in the Chronology are drawn from the *New York Times* unless otherwise indicated.

support to prepare for the election. The new Cabinet was as follows:

Husayn Sirri Pasha — Prime Minister, Interior, Foreign Affairs
 Gen. Muhammad Haydar Pasha — War and Marine
 Sayyid Mustafa Pasha — Justice
 Mufti al-Gaza'irli — Waqfs
 'Abd al-Khaliq Hassunah — Social Affairs
 Muhammad 'Ali Namazi Pasha — Communications
 Mustafa Fahmi Pasha — Public Works
 Dr. Ibrahim Shawki — Health
 Salib Sami Pasha — Commerce and Industry
 Muhammad 'Ali Ratib — Supply
 'Abd al-Shafi' 'Abd al-Muta'al — Finance
 Dr. Muhammad Hashim — Minister of State
 Muhammad al-Ashmawi — Education

Nov. 6: The Cabinet dissolved Parliament in preparation for elections. The present Cabinet would settle by royal decree the remaining outstanding issues.

Nov. 15: An Egyptian purchasing mission placed an order for jet fighter planes with the De Havilland Aircraft Company, Ltd. The order was part of a \$178,000,000 rearmament program authorized by the Egyptian Parliament.

Nov. 20: The Government announced that general elections for a new Parliament would be held on January 3, 1950.

Ethiopia

1949

Sept. 1: The Ethiopian Legation in London denied that Emperor Haile Selassie had ordered the hanging of the leaders of the group involved in the railway dispute of August 1949.

Sept. 14: Ethiopia and Iraq established diplomatic relations.

India

(See also Kashmir Problem.)

1949

Sept. 14: The Hindu language, written in Devabagari (Sanskrit), would eventually become the official language of the Indian Union, under an article in the Indian Constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly. For fifteen years English would continue to be used for all official purposes, and the future Parliament was empowered to extend the use of English after that period if such was found necessary.

Sept. 18: The Indian Government announced that the rupee would be devalued the same rate as sterling.

The Indian General Assembly passed a bill abolishing Indian appeals and petitions to the

British Privy Council. The bill was to come into force on Jan. 7, 1950, after which time all appeals would be transferred to the Indian courts. (*Economist*, Records and Statistics, Sept. 24, p. 275.)

Sept. 26: The Indian State of Madras banned the Communist Party on the ground that it interfered with the maintenance of law and order. The ban also affected nineteen labor organizations controlled by Communists.

Sept. 29: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development extended a loan of \$10,000,000 to India for agricultural machinery needed to clear jungle lands for food and reclaim other lands infested with kans grass.

Oct. 11: Prime Minister Nehru arrived in Washington by air from London for a three-week visit in the United States.

Oct. 13: India's chief controller of imports announced that no imports from Pakistan would henceforth be permitted except fish, milk and milk products, eggs, poultry, and fresh vegetables. India halted jute imports and planned to increase its own jute output.

Prime Minister Nehru, speaking before the U. S. House of Representatives, said that his Government would not stay neutral "where freedom is menaced or justice threatened."

Oct. 14: Nehru dismissed as "premature" suggestions that the Asiatic nations form a defense alliance similar to the North Atlantic pact.

Oct. 20: India was admitted to membership in the UN Security Council, effective Jan. 7, 1950.

Oct. 25: The U. S. and India agreed to work out an \$80 million barter agreement under which India would get 1 million tons of U. S. wheat in return for strategic raw materials.

Nov. 7: Governor-General Chakravarty Rajagopalachari rejected mercy petitions on behalf of N. V. Godse, slayer of Mahatma Gandhi, and Narayan Apte.

Nov. 11: At the invitation of India and Pakistan, Lord Justice Algot Bagge, judge of the Supreme Court of Sweden, agreed to serve as Chairman of the Inter-Dominion Boundary Commission that was to arbitrate boundary disputes that arose out of the Radcliffe award affecting East and West Bengal and East Bengal and Assam.

Nov. 15: N. V. Godse and Narayan Apte were hanged.

Nov. 16: An agreement between the World Health Organization and the Government of India was signed in New Delhi.

Nov. 25: About 50,000 peasants marched through Lucknow demanding "equality in our social and economic life," in the biggest political demonstration in India since the days of British rule.

Nov. 26: The Indian Constituent Assembly adopted a new constitution making the country a "sovereign democratic government" under a president. The constitution was to become effective on Jan. 26, 1950.

Iran

1949

Sept. 2: Foreign Minister Ali Asghar Hikmat disclosed that the Soviet Union had agreed to sell Iran 100,000 tons of wheat.

Sept. 3: Prince Abdul Reza Pahlavi, a younger brother of the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, was made honorary head of the Supreme Planning Board of Iran's Seven Year Plan, aimed at increasing the general standard of living in Iran. The plan would involve the expenditure of about \$656,000,000 to improve farm methods, set up new factories, increase farm and factory output, exploit natural resources such as oil, build new roads, and improve health and education.

Sept. 25: Eleven Iranian soldiers captured by the Russians in border incidents on the Gorgan frontier area in August were returned to Iran.

Oct. 5: Russia agreed to supply Iranian merchants with 100,000 tons of wheat at \$97 a ton. Iran had recently bought 250,000 tons of wheat from Russia, Canada, the U. S., Pakistan, and Iraq.

Nov. 4: Former Prime Minister Abdul Hussein Hazhir was wounded by a pistol shot. The Government immediately imposed martial law in Tehran, and police arrested the assailant.

Nov. 5: Abdul Hussein Hazhir died from the assassin's bullet.

A Government informant reported that two Iranian soldiers were killed and several wounded in the second foray by Russians into Iran within a week. The incident occurred in Baghchen Sara, north of Astara on the Caspian Sea.

Nov. 13: A Royal Council to rule Iran during the Shah's visit to the United States was announced as follows: Princes Ali Reza, Gholam Reza, and Abdul Reza; Prime Minister Mohammad Marmaghei Said; former Prime Minister Ibrahim Hakimi; Sadegh Tabatabai, President of the Fourteenth Majlis.

Nov. 16: Jordan and Iran signed a friendship treaty.

The Shah arrived in Washington, D. C., for a goodwill tour of the U. S. at the invitation of President Truman.

Nov. 17: The Shah appealed to the U. S. for military and economic aid.

Nov. 30: Between 4,000 and 5,000 Iranians were reported to have moved into Tehran within the past few days to escape a threatened famine in Azerbaijan.

Iraq

(See also Palestine Problem.)

1949

Sept. 14: Iraq and Ethiopia established diplomatic relations.

Oct. 15: Prime Minister Nuri al-Said proposed to the UN economic mission to the Middle East

that 100,000 Iraqi Jews out of some 160,000 to 180,000 be sent to Israel in exchange for 100,000 Palestine refugees.

Oct. 22: The World Jewish Congress charged that the Government of Iraq was systematically terrorizing the Jews within Iraq's borders, and urged Secretary-General Trygve Lie and other UN officials to take action.

Oct. 24: Dr. Fadhil Jamali, Iraqi's delegate to the UN, denied charges that the Government of Iraq was organizing a "reign of terror" against its Jewish subjects.

Oct. 26: According to a British inquiry, 36 Jews, including four women, had been arrested in Iraq in the past ten days.

Oct. 28: An Iraqi Government spokesman stated that Tel Aviv broadcasts charging that Jews were being persecuted in Iraq were "totally unfounded."

Nov. 1: The U. S. State Department reported that investigations conducted by the U. S. Ambassador to Iraq had not substantiated the charges made by the Israel Government that 2,000 Jews had been imprisoned in Iraq.

Nov. 3: Leaders of seven Jewish organizations appealed to the U. S. Department of State to send a "commission of neutral observers" to Iraq to investigate the alleged persecution of Jews.

Israel

(See also Palestine Problem.)

1949

Sept. 1: The Knesset approved the first annual budget of LI 95 million (\$285 million). (*Palestine Affairs*, Aug.-Oct., p. 99.)

Sept. 2: The Knesset appropriated \$165 million for a government development program, an important part of which would be the construction of a network of canals and pipes forming regional irrigation projects, ultimately to be linked with an over-all program. This was to be the first step in effecting a plan elaborated by the American engineer, James B. Hayes.

Sept. 8: The Knesset unanimously approved a bill providing for the conscription of men between the ages of 18 and 49 and national service for women between the ages of 18 and 34.

Sept. 18: The Government announced an appropriation of \$16 million for the rehabilitation of Arab and Jewish citrus groves. The Government had already made long-term loans totaling \$5 million to grove owners, and another \$5 million had been allocated by the American Export-Import Bank for the purchase of trucks, tractors, packing plants, and other machinery.

The Israel pound was devalued from \$4.03 to \$2.80 in accordance with the devaluation of sterling.

Oct. 4: Jaffa and Tel Aviv were united by a decree of the Israel Cabinet, and would henceforth be known as Jaffa-Tel Aviv.

- Oct. 14:* Haifa's oil refineries began operation after more than a year of inactivity, with a limited supply of crude oil shipped by tankers from Venezuela.
- Oct. 24:* David Horowitz, director general of the Finance Ministry, disclosed that investments in Israel during 1949 would total \$240 million. The figure included both foreign and local investments.
- Oct. 26:* The left-wing Mapam Party and Communist sympathizers in Jaffa-Tel Aviv demonstrated against the impending cut in cost-of-living allowances, and against the Government's austerity program in general.
- Oct. 27:* The Export-Import Bank authorized a \$20 million credit for industrial development. This amount brought the total credit authorized up to \$73,350,000 under the \$100 million earmarked for Israel by the Bank in January 1949.
- Oct. 28:* Prime Minister Ben-Gurion announced that Israel's deficit was mounting at the rate of £1 7 million (\$19,600,000) a month.
- Oct. 29:* The International Refugee Organization announced that it would pay the Israel Government \$2,500,000 to provide permanent care for aged, sick, and handicapped Jewish refugees. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Oct. 30.)
- Nov. 7:* The second session of the Knesset opened. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion placed internal development of Israel above all other projects for the year ahead.
- Nov. 21:* All property in Israel to which the Russian Church or Czarist Government had held title was transferred to the Soviet Union, except for that registered in the name of Grand Duke Sergie, assassinated in 1905.
- Oct. 4:* Faris al-Khuri, the Syrian representative to the UN General Assembly, and Kamil Abd al-Rahim Bey, the Egyptian representative, endorsed the Soviet proposal for the immediate independence of Libya.
- Oct. 10:* The U. S. delegation to the UN General Assembly introduced a resolution calling for the independence of Libya in 1952, or three years from the adoption of the proposal. The resolution also called for Italian administration of Italian Somaliland under a UN trusteeship, the cession of the western province of Eritrea to the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and the cession of the remainder to Ethiopia.
- Oct. 12:* A special subcommittee of the UN General Assembly, in a vote of 18 to 3, recommended Libyan independence as soon as possible and no later than the first day of 1952.
- Oct. 22:* The U. S., India, Liberia, Iraq, and Brazil proposed to combine Eritrea in a federated union with Ethiopia for ten years. The resolution suggested that plebiscites be held in all Eritrean provinces to see whether the people wanted to continue the relationship with Ethiopia beyond that time.
- Oct. 27:* A subcommittee of the Political and Security Committee of the UN General Assembly approved the establishment of a 5-man commission to submit recommendations on the future government of Eritrea to the 1950 Assembly.
- Nov. 5:* Ethiopia protested that the UN would present "the most terrible of threats" to her national security if it gave a 10-year trusteeship over former Italian Somaliland to Italy and left open the status of Eritrea.
- Nov. 8:* Delegates to the UN from Pakistan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen told the Political and Security Committee that they would not support the granting of a 10-year trusteeship over Somaliland to Italy.
- Nov. 9:* The Political and Security Committee recommended independence for Libya by the first day of 1952, in accordance with the October 12 subcommittee recommendation.
- Nov. 10:* A 10-year Italian trusteeship over Somaliland was approved by the UN Political and Security Committee in a 48 to 7 vote, with 4 abstentions. It was agreed to appoint a 3-nation advisory council to assist Italy in consideration of the opposition of the Muslim nations to a solely Italian trusteeship.
- Nov. 11:* The Political and Security Committee recommended the creation of a 5-member UN commission to investigate the desires of the Eritrean people regarding their national future.
- Nov. 12:* The Political and Security Committee approved by a 49-1 vote the disposal of the former Italian Colonies. The resolution created a united and independent Libya in two years; an independent Somaliland in ten years; and granted the people of Eritrea the privilege of electing their own form of government and suggesting

Italian Colonies

1949

- Sept. 18:* Cyrenaica became an independent state when Amir Sayyid Idris al-Sanusi formally proclaimed the constitution in force. This action did not supersede the right of the UN General Assembly, under Article 23 of the Italian Peace Treaty, to recommend on the ultimate disposal of Cyrenaica. (*London Times*, Sept. 19.)
- Sept. 30:* The Soviet Union proposed that the UN General Assembly grant Libya immediate independence and that "within three months all foreign troops and all military personnel shall be withdrawn from Libyan territory."
- Oct. 1:* Count Sforza, Italian Foreign Minister, urged the UN to give immediate independence to the former Italian colonies of Libya and Eritrea, and allow Italy to administer Italian Somaliland until it was ready for freedom.
- Oct. 3:* Sir Benegal N. Rau, Indian delegate to the UN, proposed that the UN General Assembly grant Libya "almost immediate" independence and that its constitution be drafted by an Assembly set up with the help of a UN Commission.

their own political future. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Nov. 13.)

Nov. 21: The General Assembly approved the creation of two new sovereign states in Africa: Libya, to become independent by 1952, and Italian Somaliland probably by 1960. A UN Commissioner and a 10-member International Council would help Libya's 1,200,000 inhabitants work out the details of their government. Somaliland would become an Italian-UN trusteeship for 10 years and then become independent. An advisory council of delegates from Colombia, Egypt, and the Philippines would help Italy administer the territory. Eritrea would remain under temporary British occupation, while a 5-nation committee from Burma, Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan, and South Africa could ascertain the wishes of the people. (Text in *New York Times*, Nov. 22.)

Jordan

(See also Palestine Problem.)

1949

Sept. 5: King Abdallah arrived at La Coruna, Spain, for an 11-day visit.

Sept. 22: Jordan devalued its pound to correspond with the devaluation of sterling.

Nov. 16: Iran and Jordan signed a treaty of friendship.

Kashmir Problem

1949

Sept. 2: The UN Commission for India and Pakistan recommended that both countries accept arbitration of their differences standing in the way of a truce in Kashmir.

Sept. 6: Pakistan accepted the proposal that the Kashmir truce dispute be settled by arbitration.

Sept. 20: The UN Commission reported that India had refused to accept arbitration as a means of arriving at a truce in Kashmir.

Oct. 17: The Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir was specifically exempted by the Indian Constituent Assembly from the articles in the Indian Constitution that put other states on a par with the provinces. For the time being, the local autonomy of that state would be preserved.

Nov. 16: Prime Minister Nehru of India stated that mediation in the Kashmir dispute should be carried on through the UN; that arbitration was "out of the question"; and that an independent status for Kashmir, with both India and Pakistan guaranteeing the state's integrity, was "impractical."

Lebanon

(See also Palestine Problem.)

1949

Sept. 21: President Bashara al-Khuri was sworn into office for a further term of 6 years. Prime

Minister Riad al-Sulh and Cabinet resigned. (*London Times*, Sept. 22.)

Sept. 27: Former president Emile Edde, pro-French politician and chief proponent of Lebanon's complete independence from Pan-Arab ties, died. (*Palestine Affairs*, Aug.-Oct., p. 99.)

Oct. 1: A new Cabinet was announced as follows:

Riyad al-Sulh — Prime Minister, Interior
Philip Taqla — Foreign Affairs
Husayn al-Uwayni — Finance
Majid Arslan — Defense
Jibran al-Nahhas — National Economy, Posts & Telegraph, Vice Prime Minister
Ahmad al-As'ad — Public Works
Ra'if Abu al-Lam' — Education
Ilyas al-Khuri — Health and Public Welfare
Bahij Taqi al-Din — Agriculture

Pakistan

(See also Afghanistan, Kashmir Problem.)

1949

Sept. 20: The Government decided not to devalue the Pakistan rupee in relation to the U. S. dollar, thus becoming the only member of the Commonwealth that did not follow the British pound's lead.

Sept. 22: The Government announced that its decision not to devalue the rupee had been made to protect producers of exportable raw materials, to reduce the general cost of living, and to maintain conditions favorable to industrializing the country.

The Government abolished the 20% export duty on jute and cotton to compete with India's raw materials in dollar markets.

Nov. 27: Exiled ministers of the Nizam of Hyderabad formed a "Government of Hyderabad in Exile" at Karachi. Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung, former Foreign Minister of the Nizam's government, was expected to be named Regent.

Palestine Problem

1949

Sept. 5: Amir Fawaz Sha'alan, chief of the Ruwalah tribes, the largest and most powerful tribal federation in Syria, came out against the resettlement of Palestinian Arabs in newly-developed lands, particularly lands which might be brought under irrigation, because all new land was urgently needed by some 800,000 nomads in Syria.

Sept. 6: The UN Palestine Conciliation Commission asked Israel for an explanation of newspaper reports that Israel Government offices were being moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Any transfer to Jerusalem, a spokesman said, would be contrary to the UN General Assembly resolution of Dec. 4, 1948, which provided for the internationalization of the city.

Sept. 11: The UN economic survey mission for the Middle East under the chairmanship of Gordon Clapp, arrived in Beirut.

Sept. 12: The Conciliation Commission asked both the Arab and Israel delegations to reconsider their territorial demands.

Sept. 13: The Conciliation Commission published a draft statute establishing a regime for the exercise of the "full and permanent authority" of the UN over Jerusalem and environs. It provided for a UN Commissioner, an inter-party elective council, an international tribunal, and a mixed tribunal of one Arab, one Israeli, and one neutral judge to handle cases of civil and ordinary law involving residents of the different zones.

Sept. 17: The UN economic survey mission announced that it would not discuss resettlement at this time, works programs and relief being the immediate items on its agenda.

Sept. 24: Prime Minister Husayn Sirri Pasha of Egypt officially informed Gordon Clapp, head of the Middle East economic survey mission, that Egypt could not find room for any additional Palestinian Arab refugees. (*London Times*, Sept. 26.)

UN relief officials for Palestine Arab refugees were instructed to cut relief rolls by 120,000 persons before Oct. 1, and by 190,000 before Nov. 1.

Oct. 6: UN authorities withdrew their instructions to reduce by Oct. 1 the number of refugees on the roles of the relief agencies from 940,000 to 820,000.

Oct. 11: The UN economic survey mission flew back to Beirut to prepare its report, thus ending its survey in Israel.

Oct. 13: The International Refugee Organization announced a grant of \$500,000 worth of supplies from its stocks to the UN Relief for Palestine Refugees.

Oct. 22: The Conciliation Commission resumed its meetings in New York. Its discussion centered around the future of the city of Jerusalem.

Oct. 28: Israel spokesmen informed the Conciliation Commission that further indirect negotiations with Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon "can be of no further value and can even make the situation more difficult."

Oct. 31: Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Prime Minister of Jordan, and Nazim al-Qudsi, Syrian Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Arab League Council session recently adjourned, stated at a conference for the Arab press that none of the Arab states would negotiate directly with Israel.

Nov. 4: The appointment of Ely Eliot Palmer to succeed Paul Porter as U. S. representative on the Conciliation Commission was approved by President Truman.

Nov. 15: Israel rejected the draft statute of the Conciliation Commission for international control of the Arab and Jewish sectors of Jerusalem.

Talks between Israel and Jordan opened in Jerusalem concerning an agreement under which the Arabs would permit the Israelis access to Mount Scopus and Latrun in exchange for Israel's permitting Arabs to travel over the Jerusalem-Bethlehem road and supply the Arab part of the Old City with electricity.

Nov. 17: The UN economic survey mission recommended that the General Assembly approve a \$48 million relief and public works program to provide for the support of 652,000 Arab refugees from Israel during the eighteen months beginning January 1, 1950. An additional \$6 million in the form of materials, tools, and equipment was to come from the Arab governments concerned.

Nov. 18: The Jordan Government complained to the UN Mixed Armistice Commission of the recent expulsion of Arabs from Israel.

Nov. 21: The Azazme tribe, an Arab bedouin tribe which refused to pledge loyalty to the state of Israel and join in a verbal peace pact, was expelled from the state, Israel Army authorities reported. The Government of Jordan entered a protest with the Mixed Armistice Commission. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Nov. 22.)

Nov. 24: The UN opened debate on Israel's request for permanent title to modern Jerusalem. The proposal was opposed by the U. S., France, Turkey, and Australia.

Nov. 25: Moshe Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel, rejected the Conciliation Commission compromise for the establishment of an international regime in Jerusalem. Sharett offered to conclude an agreement with the UN which would guarantee protection to the Holy Places in Jerusalem and right of access to them by members of all faiths.

Nov. 26: The Government of Jordan informed the UN that it would not take its troops out of Jerusalem nor agree to any change in the present status.

Nov. 29: The UN General Assembly appointed a 17-country subcommittee and gave it three days to formulate a proposal on Jerusalem. The countries represented in the subcommittee were Australia, El Salvador, Israel, Cuba, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Canada, Iraq, Uruguay, Egypt, India, Sweden, the Ukraine, Greece, Mexico, Peru, and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union demanded that the UN proceed with the plan for an international administration of the Jerusalem area as contained in the Palestine partition resolution of November 29, 1947.

Nov. 30: John C. Ross, U. S. representative, announced that the U. S. would contribute a "fair share" toward a proposed \$54,900,000 fund under which a new UN agency would provide jobs on public works projects and direct relief for Arabs who had fled from Israel territory.

Syria

(See also Palestine Problem.)

1949

Sept. 12: The Cabinet ratified the new electoral law allowing Syrian women to vote. The age limit was reduced from 20 to 18, but voters must have an elementary school certificate.

Sept. 20: The U. S., Great Britain, and France formally recognized the new Syrian Government.

Sept. 29: The Syrian National Bloc indicated in a manifesto that it now favored unity with Iraq, after years of opposition.

Oct. 6: 'Abd al-illah, the Regent of Iraq, arrived at Damascus en route from London to Baghdad, after conferences with the British.

Nov. 15-16: Elections were held for a Constituent Assembly, 10,000 Syrian women voting for the first time in the history of any Arab country.

Nov. 17: The moderately progressive People's Party won a plurality of votes (40 to 49 seats out of 114) in the Constituent Assembly.

Turkey

1949

Sept. 21: The Government announced that the new rate of exchange with sterling would be TL 7.84 for purchases and TL 7.91 for sales, instead of TL 11.28 and TL 11.35 respectively, as before the devaluation of sterling. Turkey decided not to devalue the Turkish pound. (*London Times*, Sept. 22.)

Yemen

1949

Sept. 11: Acting Foreign Minister Muhammad Ibn Abdallah Amri stated that Yemen would protest to the UN Security Council unless Britain apologized and paid reparations for the bombing by 14 Royal Air Force planes of the Hereib district on Sept. 2.

DOCUMENTS

Legislation on the Sea Bed and Territorial Waters of the Persian Gulf

Herbert J. Liebesny

IN LATE MAY and early June 1949, Saudi Arabia and a number of the small principalities in the Persian Gulf issued proclamations by which they asserted their jurisdiction and control over the sea bed and subsoil of the sea adjacent to their coasts in the Persian Gulf. In addition, Saudi Arabia issued a decree defining the territorial waters of the Kingdom.¹ In Iran a bill establishing control over the sea bed was introduced in the Majlis (Parliament) and is still pending. It is not surprising that the states of the Persian Gulf have followed the lead of the United States and other nations in the Americas in stating their claims to control of the potential riches of the subsea off their coasts.² The Persian Gulf region is rich in oil, and it is likely that deposits extend beyond the land masses of the Arabian Peninsula and of Iran which can be exploited efficiently with modern methods of offshore drilling.

The Saudi Arabian proclamation on the control of the sea bed, issued on May 28, 1949, was patterned closely after the American proclamation on the continental shelf of Septem-

ber 28, 1945. Since the Persian Gulf is comparatively shallow and there is no shelf formation similar to that off the coasts of the Americas, no reference is made to a continental shelf, the Saudi proclamation merely referring to the sea bed and the subsoil of the sea of the Persian Gulf.³ In the American proclamation the claim to control was limited to the "natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf. . . ." The Saudi proclamation claims control over the sea bed and the subsoil of the sea as such. From a practical point of view the difference between the two versions appears to be slight since any control of the submarine resources will necessarily involve control of the subsea area as such.

The Saudi proclamation follows the American prototype in declaring that the sea bed and subsoil of the sea "appertain" to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It likewise states explicitly that the character of the high seas above the sea bed shall not be affected. This declaration is in line with the American and British position on this issue but contrasts with the attitude of the Latin American states, which tend to claim control over the waters covering the continental shelf as well as over the sea bed. Because of local circumstances the "traditional freedom of pearling" is specifically safeguarded. This safeguard may possibly be of considerable practical importance since it would appear to make it incumbent upon oil concessionaires to locate their drillings in such a way as not to interfere with the pearl banks. A related question of practical importance may be possible disturbance of the oyster beds by oil waste. In the absence of a marked continental shelf

¹ For a brief discussion of the Saudi enactments, see Richard Young, "Saudi Arabian Offshore Legislation," *American Journal of International Law*, XLIII (1949), pp. 530-32. English translations of the Saudi Arabian documents were published in *ibid.*, Documents Section, pp. 154-57. For a brief discussion of other Persian Gulf legislation, see Richard Young, "Further Claims to Areas beneath the High Seas," *ibid.*, XLIII (1949), pp. 790-92. The text of the Bahrein proclamation is published in *ibid.*, Documents Section, pp. 185-86.

² The U.S. proclamation may be found in *American Journal of International Law*, XL (1946), Documents Section, pp. 45-46. A recent survey of legislation for the subsea region was given by Richard Young, *op. cit.*, XLII (1948), pp. 849-57, under the title "Recent Developments with Respect to the Continental Shelf."

³ By contrast, the Iranian proclamation uses the term "continental shelf," possibly because it is not restricted to the Persian Gulf but applies to all the coasts of Iran.

there is no natural boundary anywhere to the sea bed area claimed by Saudi Arabia and no attempt is made to define the boundaries of the region claimed. Instead it is provided that the boundaries shall be determined in agreements with the neighboring states "in accordance with equitable principles."

Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, and the sheikhdoms of the Trucial Coast (Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Dubai, Ras al-Khaimah, 'Ajman, and Umm al-Qaiwain) issued proclamations on the sea bed and subsoil of the sea a few days after publication of the Saudi proclamation. The proclamations of Bahrein, Qatar, and the Trucial states are identical except for very minor variations, some of which at least appear to be due to clerical oversights rather than to intentional changes. In substance the decrees of all these principalities are very similar to that of Saudi Arabia, the main difference being that they state that the dominion over islands and the status of the sea bed and subsoil of the sea under territorial waters shall not be affected. This would mean that an island and the territorial belt surrounding it, including the sea bed and the subsoil of the sea under such a belt, could be under the control of one sovereign while the sea bed outside the territorial belt is subject to another sovereign. It is obvious that such a situation may give rise to complicated practical problems, especially in connection with oil operations.

One difference between the proclamation of Kuwait and those of the other Gulf principalities may be worth noting. In claiming jurisdiction and control over the sea bed and subsoil of the sea, all proclamations except the Kuwaiti one state that these regions "belong (*khass*)" to the riparian state. The Kuwaiti proclamation decrees that the submarine regions shall "become (*'ada*) part of the Sheikdom of Kuwait." Thus the Kuwaiti proclamation appears to emphasize more the constitutive element whereas the proclamations of the other principalities and of Saudi Arabia can be construed as being either declarative or constitutive. Though this may seem to be a minor legal distinction, it is conceivable that the question of whether the various sea bed proclamations should be construed as merely stat-

ing specifically a situation already existing or as creating a new situation could be of practical importance.

It is to be expected that these proclamations of the states of the Arabian Peninsula will be followed in the not distant future by a proclamation by Iran, for which a draft already exists, and perhaps by a proclamation by Iraq. All these proclamations, however, merely stake the claims of the various states. In narrow and shallow waters, such as those of the Persian Gulf, definite boundaries will have to be drawn between the sea bed areas of the riparian states if disputes are to be avoided. In view of the many conflicting claims to islands and parts of the shore, especially on the Arabian side of the Gulf, the task of finding a solution which is satisfactory to all parties will not be an easy one. However, if conflicts are to be avoided such a task cannot be postponed too long, especially if oil rights should be granted to offshore areas.

Another prerequisite for a peaceful development of the exploitation of the submarine resources in the Persian Gulf is a definition of the territorial waters of the riparian states, since all the sea bed proclamations explicitly deal only with the region of the high seas outside territorial waters. It is therefore gratifying that Saudi Arabia issued a decree defining its territorial waters at the same time it enacted a sea bed proclamation. The Saudi decree on territorial waters is a very carefully drawn document which is more detailed than many similar decrees and embodies modern theories of international law on the subject. In contrast to the sea bed proclamation, the decree on territorial waters is not limited to the Persian Gulf but applies to all the coasts of Saudi Arabia. The limits of territorial waters as established by this decree are six miles, thus following the example of other states in the area, especially Iran, which established a six mile limit for all purposes by a law of July 1934. Through its detailed provisions the Saudi decree should be of much help in creating an unequivocal legal situation off the coasts of the Kingdom. The smaller principalities of the Arabian Peninsula have not yet defined the limits of their territorial waters. It cannot be predicted whether they will fol-

low the lead of Saudi Arabia and Iran and fix the limits of their territory at six miles or whether they will adhere to the three mile limit which is prevalent throughout the British Empire and which has been adhered to and advocated consistently by the United States.

ROYAL PRONOUNCEMENT CONCERNING THE POLICY OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA WITH RESPECT TO THE SUBSOIL AND SEA BED OF AREAS IN THE PERSIAN GULF CONTIGUOUS TO THE COASTS OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA.⁴

WE, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Al Faisal Al Sa'ud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,

AFTER reliance on God Almighty, being aware of the need for the greater utilization of the world's natural resources which are the bounty of God, and of the desirability of giving encouragement to efforts to discover and make available such resources,

RECOGNIZING that by God's providence valuable resources may underlie parts of the Persian Gulf off the coasts of Saudi Arabia, and that modern technology by the grace of God makes it increasingly practicable to utilize these resources,

APPRECIATING that recognized jurisdiction over such resources is required in the interest of their conservation and prudent utilization when and as development is undertaken;

DEEMING that the exercise of jurisdiction over such resources by the contiguous nation is reasonable and just, since the effectiveness of measures to utilize or conserve these resources would be contingent upon cooperation and protection from the shore and since self-protection compels the coastal nation to keep close watch over activities off its shores which are of a nature necessary for the utilization of these resources; and

CONSIDERING that various other nations now exercise jurisdiction over the subsoil and sea bed of areas contiguous to their coasts,⁵

⁴ The official Arabic text was published in *Umm al-Qura* (Mecca), Supplement No. 1263, 2 Sha'ban 1368/May 29, 1949.

⁵ In the proclamations of the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms (Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar, and the Trucial Coast), reference is made to the exercise of authority over sea bed and subsoil on the basis of international practice.

DECLARE the following policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with respect to the subsoil and sea bed of areas of the Persian Gulf contiguous to the coasts of Our Kingdom:

The subsoil and sea bed of those areas of the Persian Gulf seaward from the coastal sea of Saudi Arabia but contiguous to its coasts, are declared to appertain to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to be subject to its jurisdiction and control. The boundaries of such areas will be determined in accordance with equitable principles by Our Government in agreements with other States having jurisdiction and control over the subsoil and sea bed of adjoining areas. The character as high seas of the waters of such areas, the right to the free and unimpeded navigation of such waters and the air space above those waters, fishing rights in such waters, and the traditional freedom of pearling by the peoples of the Gulf, are in no way affected.⁶

This Pronouncement is made for the information and guidance of all whom it may concern.

May the Faithful always put their trust in God!

PROMULGATED in our Palace at Riyadh on the first day of the month of Sha'ban of the year of the Hegira 1368, corresponding to the twenty-eighth day of the month of May in the year 1949.⁷

DECREE REGARDING TERRITORIAL WATERS OF SAUDI ARABIA

No. 6/4/5/3711, May 28, 1949⁸

WE, 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd al-Rahman Al Faisal Al Sa'ud, King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, after reliance on God Almighty and in view of our desire to define the terri-

⁶ The proclamations of the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms state explicitly that nothing in these proclamations shall affect the status of islands or of the sea bed and subsoil of the sea under their territorial waters.

⁷ The proclamations of the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms do not contain a formal clause at the end. The Bahrein proclamation is dated June 5, 1949; that of Kuwait June 12, 1949. The available copies of the other proclamations do not bear a date, but were issued at about the same time.

⁸ The official Arabic text was published in *Umm al-Qura* (Mecca), Supplement No. 1263, 2 Sha'ban 1368/May 29, 1949.

torial waters of the Kingdom, have decreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1. For the purposes of this Decree,

- (a) The term "nautical mile" is the equivalent of 1852 meters;
- (b) The term "bay" includes any inlet, lagoon or other arm of the sea;
- (c) The term "island" includes any islet, reef, rock, bar or permanent artificial structure not submerged at lowest low tide;
- (d) The term "shoal" denotes an area covered by shallow water, a part of which is not submerged at lowest low tide; and
- (e) The term "coast" refers to the coasts of the Gulf of Aqaba, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

ARTICLE 2. The territorial waters of Saudi Arabia, as well as the air space above and the soil and subsoil beneath them, are under the sovereignty of the Kingdom, subject to the provisions of international law as to the innocent passage of vessels of other nations through the coastal sea.

ARTICLE 3. The territorial waters of Saudi Arabia embrace both the inland waters and the coastal sea of the Kingdom.

ARTICLE 4. The inland waters of the Kingdom include:

- (a) the waters of the bays along the coasts of Saudi Arabia;
- (b) the waters above and landward from any shoal not more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland or from a Saudi Arabian island;
- (c) the waters between the mainland and a Saudi Arabian island not more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland; and
- (d) the waters between Saudi Arabian islands not farther apart than twelve nautical miles.

ARTICLE 5. The coastal sea of Saudi Arabia lies outside the inland waters of the Kingdom and extends seaward for a distance of six nautical miles.

ARTICLE 6. The following are established as the base-lines from which the coastal sea of Saudi Arabia is measured:

- (a) where the shore of the mainland or an island is fully exposed to the open

sea, the lowest low-water mark on the shore;

- (b) where a bay confronts the open sea, lines drawn from headland to headland across the mouth of the bay;
- (c) where a shoal is situated not more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland or from a Saudi Arabian island, lines drawn from the mainland or the island and along the outer edge of the shoal;
- (d) where a port or harbor confronts the open sea, lines drawn along the seaward side of the outermost works of the port or harbor and between such works;
- (e) where an island is not more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland, lines drawn from the mainland and along the outer shores of the island;
- (f) where there is an island group which may be connected by lines not more than twelve nautical miles long, of which the island nearest to the mainland is not more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland, lines drawn from the mainland and along the outer shores of all the islands of the group if the islands form a chain, or along the outer shores of the outermost islands of the group if the islands do not form a chain; and
- (g) where there is an island group which may be connected by lines not more than twelve nautical miles long, of which the island nearest to the mainland is more than twelve nautical miles from the mainland, lines drawn along the outer shores of all the islands of the group if the islands form a chain, or along the outer shores of the outermost islands of the group if the islands do not form a chain.

ARTICLE 7. If the measurement of the territorial waters in accordance with the provisions of this Decree leaves an area of high sea wholly surrounded by territorial waters and extending not more than twelve nautical miles in any direction, such area shall form part of the territorial waters. The same rule shall apply to a pronounced pocket of high sea which may be wholly enclosed by drawing a

single straight line not more than twelve nautical miles long.

ARTICLE 8. If the inland waters described in Article 4, or if the coastal sea measured from the base-lines fixed by Article 6, should be overlapped by the waters of another State, boundaries will be determined by Saudi Arabia in agreement with the State concerned in accordance with equitable principles.

ARTICLE 9. With a view to assuring compliance with the laws of the Kingdom relating to security, navigation, and fiscal matters, maritime surveillance may be exercised in a contiguous zone outside the coastal sea, extending for a further distance of six nautical miles and measured from the base-lines of the coastal sea, provided however that nothing in this Article shall be deemed to apply to the rights of the Kingdom with respect to fishing.

ARTICLE 10. Our Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Finance are charged with the execution of this Decree.

ARTICLE 11. This Decree will come into effect as from the date of its publication in the official gazette.

PROMULGATED in our Palace at Riyadh, on the first day of the month of Sha'ban of the year of the Hegira 1368, corresponding to the twenty-eighth day of the month of May in the year 1949.

DOCUMENTS AND SITUATION REPORTS

(A Selected Listing)

General

Annual Report, April 30, 1949. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C.

Fourth Annual Report, 1948-1949. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Washington, D. C. Contains a section on loan activities in Africa and the Middle East.

International Financial Statistics. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D. C. September 1949, vol. 2, #9.

State of Food and Agriculture, 1949. FAO Annual Report, Washington, D. C.

Egypt

Economic Review of Egypt, 1948. International Reference Service, vol. 6, September 1949. 12 pages. International Trade Office, U. S. Department of Commerce.

Egypt: A Summary of Basic Economic Information. International Reference Service, vol. 6, July 1949. 8 pages. International Trade Office, U. S. Department of Commerce.

India

Constitution of the Indian Republic. Passed by the Indian Constituent Assembly, November 26, 1949.

Loan Agreement Between Dominion of India and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (Agricultural Machinery Project). Loan Number 19 IN. September 29, 1949, Washington, D. C.

Loan Agreement Between Dominion of India and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Railway Project). August 18, 1949, Washington, D. C.

Review of Education in India during 1948-1949, by Humayan Kabir. New Delhi: Ministry of Education, Government of India, 1949. 23 pages.

Summary of Important Educational Developments in India. Report to the 12th International Conference on Public Education in Geneva, July 1949.

Iran

Economic Review of Iran, 1948. International Reference Service, vol. 6, July 1949. 8 pages. International Trade Office, U. S. Department of Commerce.

Establishing a Business in Iran. International Reference Service, July 1949. 7 pages. Item 207, #17539. International Trade Office, U. S. Department of Commerce.

Public Finance Survey 1937-1948. UN Economic and Social Council, Fiscal Commission. Document E/CN.8/31 Rev. 1. January 4, 1949. 4 pages and Annexes. Iran, Annex 14.*

Iraq

Economic Review of Iraq, 1948 (Based on reports from U. S. Embassy in Baghdad). Middle East Branch, U. S. Department of Commerce, June 1949. 7 pages. Item 207, #17546.

Italian Colonies

The question of the disposal of the former Italian Colonies. Final Report. UN General Assembly. UN Document A/C.1/445. May 2, 1949.*

Resolution regarding the disposal of the former Italian Colonies. Political Committee of the UN General Assembly. UN Document A/1124. November 12, 1949.*

Tripolitania: A Summary of Basic Economic Information. Prepared by the Foreign Service of the U. S. 7 pages. Item 207. April 1949.

Kashmir

Documents regarding Kashmir. Government of India Information Services. Washington, D. C. 17 pages.

Pakistan

Economic Review of Pakistan, 1948. International Reference Service, vol. 6, August 1949. 11 pages. International Trade Office, U. S. Department of Commerce.

Palestine

Assistance to Palestine Refugees. UN Security Council. UN Document A/1060. November 4, 1949.*

Conciliation Commission for Palestine. First Progress Report, March 15, 1949. UN Document A/819. *Second Progress Report,* April 19, 1949. UN Document A/838. *Third Progress Report,* June 21, 1949. UN Document A/927. *Fourth Progress Report,* September 15, 1949. UN Document A/992.*

Final Report to Security Council of Acting Mediator on Palestine. UN Security Council. UN Document S/1357. July 26, 1949.*

First Interim Report of the UN Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East. UN Document A/1106. November 16, 1949.*

Israel Armistice Agreements: Egypt, UN Document S/1264/corr. 1, February 24, 1949; Lebanon, UN Document S/1296, March 23, 1949; Syria, UN Document S/1353/add. 1, July 26, 1949; Transjordan, UN Document S/1302, April 3, 1949.*

Turkey

Economic Review of Turkey, 1948. International Reference Service, July 1949, 11 pages. International Trade Office, U. S. Department of Commerce.

Establishing a Business in Turkey. International Reference Service, June 1949, 4 pages. International Trade Office, U. S. Department of Commerce.

Turkey: Country Study. Organization of European Economic Cooperation, February 1949. 90 pages. European Recovery Program, Washington, D. C.

* UN Documents may be purchased at: International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City, New York.

ECONOMIC REVIEW

The Iranian Seven Year Development Plan

Background and Organization

S. Rezazadeh Shafaq

THE CONCEPTION and initiation of a Seven Year Plan is a positive indication of Iran's awareness of world conditions and of the urgent necessity for it to raise the standard of living of its people. Realization of the need for economic revival has been present in Iran since the national awakening at the beginning of the 20th century, and in particular since the institution of a constitution and parliamentary government in 1906. A part of the aspirations for improvement expressed at that time was put into effect during the reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-41), the father of HIM Mohammad Reza Shah, the present sovereign of Iran. Industrialization along modern lines was undertaken, and a railway was constructed from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, with branch lines extending toward Tabriz and Meshed. But the advent of World War II and the abdication of Reza Shah in favor of his son brought an abrupt termination to these projects.

During the critical years of World War II, when economic problems pressed heavily upon the country, again was urgently felt the need of an adequate long-range plan to set Iran's economic affairs aright. The credit for sponsoring a postwar plan along these lines must be given to the young Shah himself, for he repeatedly called upon the deputies of the Majlis (Parliament) as well as the members of the Government to take action. The first Government to introduce a permanent plan for improvement was that of Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam in 1946. In the fall of that year he called a conference of about 50 Iranian notables and experts and put before them His

Majesty's earnest desire for the drafting of a Seven Year Development Plan. Shortly a Seven Year Plan Commission was created by government decree, with Dr. A. Amini as the temporary secretary.

In the course of three months a preliminary sketch of the Plan was prepared setting forth the existing state of affairs in Iran, outlining its needs, and presenting a number of recommendations. This sketch went through numerous revisions to become the foundation of the final plan. The expenditure estimated in the original proposal amounted to approximately 60 billion rials (nearly \$1,900 million). Considered extravagant and impractical, this sum was later reduced by two-thirds.

The next step was the appointment of a permanent commission entitled the Supreme Plan Board, with the following objectives assigned to it: (1) to determine the financial capacity of the country during the execution of the Plan; (2) to study and make proposals regarding the financing of the Plan; (3) with the state of public finances in mind, to study the necessity of an internal or international loan; (4) to prepare a draft proposal for legislation. The Board was directed to treat the Seven Year Plan as independent of direct government administrative activity.

Meanwhile, on December 17, 1946, the Iranian Government signed a contract with the American Morrison-Knudson International Company providing for the sending of engineers to Iran to make a thorough study of the country's resources and facilities, and to make recommendations for a practical procedure toward development. On August 2, 1947, the

♦ S. REZAZADEH SHAFQAQ, Professor of Philosophy and Persian literature at the University of Tehran, was a deputy to the 15th Majlis (Parliament). A strong supporter of the Seven Year Plan, he served as a member of the original board of plan organization.

Company submitted its report, consisting of 320 pages plus exhibits.

The Iranian Government signed a second contract with the American Overseas Consultants, Inc. (OCI) on February 1, 1949, this being the renewal of a former contract dated October 7, 1948. By the terms of the contract OCI undertook (1) to make a thorough analysis of industrial plants, both governmental and private; (2) to make a thorough study of agricultural and irrigation conditions; (3) to consider ways and means of increasing the production of minerals; (4) to study social institutions and services, including education; (5) to review the previously proposed allocation of appropriations by categories to the Seven Year Plan. The extensive report of OCI was submitted to the Iranian Government on August 22, 1949.

While these reports were in progress, the necessary legislation to support the Plan was being enacted by the Majlis. On February 15, 1949, it approved Report No. 1 of the Plan Commission and charged the Government to put it into effect. The following is an outline of the adopted report:

With the object of increasing production; expanding exports; providing the prime necessities of the people; developing agriculture and industry; discovering and exploiting mine and underground resources, particularly petroleum; reorganizing and perfecting means of communication; improving public health; and executing any kind of operation for the development of the country and improving the living conditions of the people, the Government is charged with carrying out and bringing to completion within a period of seven years from the date of the approval of this law, measures which shall collectively be known as the Seven Year Development Plan.

The funds assigned to each of the branches of the plan shall be as follows: (in millions of rials; 1 rial = \$0.31)

Agriculture	5,250
Roads, Railways, Harbors, Air-fields	5,000
Industries and Mines	3,000
Petroleum (creation of an Iranian company)	1,000
Posts, Telegraph, and Telephone	750
Social and municipal reforms	6,000
Total	21,000

The funds assigned above are to be apportioned among the seven years as follows: (in millions of rials)

1327 (half year, Sept. 21, 1949 — Mar. 20, 1950)	1,000
1328 (Mar. 21, 1950 — Mar. 20, 1951)	2,000
1329 (" " 1951 — " " 1952)	2,800
1330 (" " 1952 — " " 1953)	3,300
1331 (" " 1953 — " " 1954)	3,500
1332 (" " 1954 — " " 1955)	3,600
1333 (" " 1955 — " " 1956)	3,600
1334 (half year, Mar. 21 — Sept. 20, 1956)	1,200
Total	21,000

These sums shall be suitably apportioned among the various districts of the country.

In the second half year of 1327 (Sept. 21, 1949 — Mar. 20, 1950), 600 million rials, and in the following years the entire revenue derived from Anglo-Iranian Oil Company royalty payments shall be specifically assigned to the execution of the Seven Year Plan.

After the expiration of the seven year period these revenues shall be assigned to service the interest and amortization of any loans obtained for the execution of the Plan.

If at the commencement of each year available funds are insufficient to make up the sum required, the Government may under specific provisions borrow from the Bank Melli or the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or from local nongovernmental institutions, any such agreement being subject to the approval of the Majlis.

All income derived from operations included in the Plan shall be initially credited to the Plan execution account.

Supervision of the execution of the Plan shall be in the hands of the Plan Organization; any activity concerning the Government shall be taken up through the appropriate ministries or other official agencies.

The investment of private capital, under specific provisions, is to be encouraged in cases considered to be in the best interests of the country.

The Plan Organization shall be composed of a Supreme Council, a Board of Control, and a Managing Director. The Supreme Council, consisting of seven members, is to be appointed for the period of the Plan by royal

decree, upon nomination by the Government. Its main duty will be the approval of projects and budgets passed by the Plan Commission of the Majlis. The Board of Control has the right to report its findings directly to the Council of Ministers. The Managing Director shall be appointed for a period of three years by royal decree, upon nomination by the Government. In case of death, resignation, or proved incapacity of the Managing Director before the expiration of his term of office, a successor shall be appointed by royal decree upon nomination of the Government. The Managing Director shall head the technical office, represent the Plan Organization vis-à-vis the Government, and in general be responsible for the proper execution of the duties of the Plan Organization.

Provisions regarding rules and regulations

as to accounting, conclusion of contracts, relationships with the Government, quarterly and annual reports, the employing of foreign experts, dealings with cooperative societies, notes, and amendments form the remainder of the Report.

The Seven Year Development Plan is Iran's first attempt at an economic and social program drawn up as a result of scientific investigation, ratified by the legislature, and effective for a continuous period of time uninterrupted by changes in the government. There is no basic reason why it cannot succeed. Of all the evils in Iran, poverty is certainly the greatest. Yet the country, with proper planning of its resources and potentialities, should be able not only to feed and clothe its 17 million people but produce quantities of products for the world market.

Problems and Proposals

J. D. Lotz

The Iranian Seven Year Development Plan, although initiated by the Iranian Government and not by Americans, offers a striking example of the type of technical assistance which private American engineering organizations can render to friendly, underdeveloped countries. It is appropriate that Iran should be a leader among the countries of the Middle East in undertaking a project of this kind because of its cultural background and long independent national existence.

The difficulties confronting the Plan Organization are great. The population of Iran is composed of a small ruling class of wealthy families, a relatively small and uninfluential middle class, and a large proportion of peasants, city dwellers, and nomads who are poor and ill-educated. Housing and living conditions, even in the larger cities, are far below modern Western standards; in rural areas, they are extremely primitive.

Nowhere in the country are modern sanitary and water supply systems to be found, and in most areas the standard of public health is extremely low. Facilities for the prevention

and treatment of disease are inadequate; in some areas, they are nonexistent. It is estimated that 70 percent of the population is without medical service. The infant death rate is estimated at about 50 percent of live births—in comparison with the 1946 United States rate of 3.4 percent—and the absence of obstetrical and midwifery service throughout most of the country results in many maternal deaths. Epidemics are common and widespread, and a large proportion of the population suffers from diseases such as tuberculosis, malaria, dysentery, and typhoid fever, which can be greatly minimized by modern control methods.

Educational standards are low, and a large proportion of the population is illiterate. The school system, while greatly improved over that of half a century ago, is inefficient both from an economic and an educational point of view. The curricula are over-standardized and overcrowded with subjects, and are not suited to meet the current needs of the society. Pupils of secondary schools are not suitably prepared for gainful employment, and there is a lack of training in technical subjects. In particular,

♦ J. D. Lotz is Chairman of the Board of Overseas Consultants, Inc.

there is great need to raise educational standards and to increase the number of schools in rural areas, to train the rural population in modern agricultural methods, and to provide technical education for the development of supervisors and skilled workers in manufacturing industries.

Agricultural methods are primitive and wasteful. As modern farm machinery is but little used, individual farms are small. The problem is not one of insufficient arable land; an area of about 50 million hectares might be farmed if adequate water supplies and farm machinery were made available, but only about 4.6 million hectares are cropped annually. Farm yields are low. Most of the farms are worked by tenants. Landlords as a general rule are reluctant to reinvest the incomes of their properties in improvements, and many of them prefer to spend their time and incomes in the cities and towns where they reside. The scale of living of tenants is not far above a bare subsistence level, and there is little or no opportunity for them to become owners of the land.

Largely because of inadequate feed, the output of animal products is low. Little has been done to increase the production or improve the quality of meat, milk, wool, or eggs, nor have attempts been made to improve livestock by scientific selection of native breeds or the introduction of suitable foreign stock. The losses among livestock due to parasites and diseases are unusually high. Campaigns for control of diseases through vaccination have been ineffective largely because of poor administration.

Irrigation is needed in many areas. The supply of water in some regions is inadequate, and available supplies are wasted extensively by primitive methods of distribution.

The topographical features of the country, which make transportation and communication difficult, have hampered distribution of both manufactured and agricultural products. It is not unusual for shortages to exist in some localities while surpluses are available in others. Because of lack of an efficient system of distribution, and despite the progress which has been made in transportation within the past twenty years, farmers in distant areas are still largely at the mercy of so-called brokers in the sale or barter of their surpluses. As information as to

market prices and conditions is not widespread, farmers are forced to accept whatever price the broker chooses to offer or to take goods in exchange at exorbitant values.

The need for an adequate distribution system is especially apparent in the matter of fuel for domestic use. The country has very large petroleum deposits and several coal mines in active operation, but the cost of distribution is so high that these fuels are not widely used for domestic purposes. Charcoal and brushwood are used instead. This results not only in uneconomical use of good timber but denudes the land of ground cover needed for retaining moisture in the soil.

Under the program initiated by Reza Shah Pahlavi, a railroad was constructed from the Persian Gulf to Tehran and the Caspian Sea, with branches reaching toward Tabriz in the northwest and Meshed in the northeast; however, these branches have not been completed. A road building program was begun, and telephone and telegraph systems established. Thus, a start toward a modern communications system was made but progress was stopped by the war. Several industrial plants were built, including beet sugar refineries, textile mills, and a cement mill — the only one in the country. Mining was developed to some extent, particularly in coal and iron, and plans were made, but only partially carried out, for the construction of a steel mill. Most of the equipment purchased for these plants was of European manufacture and European technicians were engaged to advise and train Iranians in its use.

Considerable progress was made, but on the outbreak of World War II most of the technicians returned to their own countries and industry was deprived not only of their expert services but of the repair parts necessary to keep the plants in good operating condition. During and subsequent to the war, large profits were made by private industries and in many instances most, if not all, profits were paid out as dividends, working capital was depleted, and funds for rehabilitation were not accumulated. As a result of these policies and of the tremendous demand for production caused by shortages of goods of all kinds, most of the government and privately-owned industrial plants and mines, as well as the railroads and

the communications systems, are in deplorable condition.

The productive capacity of the country's industrial plants, even when in good repair, is far too small to produce the goods necessary for a viable economy. This condition is accentuated by a shortage of electric power, not only for industrial use but for the normal domestic needs of the people. A large program of power development, therefore, must be undertaken coincident with other developments.

It is an unfortunate circumstance that most of the more important industrial enterprises in Iran are owned and managed by government agencies, particularly those erected under the program begun during the reign of Reza Shah. These government-owned properties are not efficiently operated. Politics has entered extensively into management and in almost every instance a far greater number of persons are employed than would be found in Western establishments of similar size and type; per capita production is very low. As a result, healthy competition is absent, production costs and selling prices of manufactured goods are far too high, and the great majority of people are unable to buy them. The quality of goods produced is generally poor.

The reason for the preponderance of government ownership of the country's larger enterprises is not far to seek. For generations, Iranians have been trained as traders and merchants and have been accustomed to engage in enterprises in which large profits and a quick return of capital can be realized. The investments of the wealthy are largely in land, revenue producing real estate, and relatively small privately controlled industries. Joint stock enterprises such as are universal in Western countries are almost unknown; as a result, that sense of responsibility which is normal to management answerable for the safety and gainful employment of the investments of others has not been developed.

Overseas Consultants, Inc. (OCI), a corporation composed of eleven leading American engineering concerns, was engaged by the Government of Iran to survey the entire situation and make recommendations as to the work to be carried out, the methods to be followed, and the appropriations to be set aside for the vari-

ous projects recommended. Under date of August 22, 1949, Overseas Consultants, Inc. rendered its report to the Plan Organization and implementation of the Plan is now under way.

The report covered practically all phases of the Iranian economy. One of the strongest general recommendations of OCI was that the Iranian Government adopt as its long-term policy the transfer of government-owned industrial and mining enterprises to private ownership. But this will not be easy. The idea of long-term investments either in government loans or privately issued securities is virtually unknown in Iran. A large proportion of business loans, especially to smaller businesses, is made in the bazaars. The legal rate of interest is 12 percent per annum but the actual rate charged on bazaar loans is generally far in excess of this. A campaign will be necessary to educate both the very wealthy and those of more moderate means in the advantages to be gained by participation in industrial and other enterprises financed along modern lines. It may be necessary to exercise ingenuity in finding forms of financing enterprises which will really enlist the interest of prospective private investors. It may be found desirable for the Government or the Plan Organization to make loans to new enterprises at moderate interest rates or to purchase preferred stock in them. It may also be necessary to enact new laws which, among other things, will provide incentive for private investment in industry.

The statute books of Iran contain many excellent laws but some of them are honored more in the breach than in the observance. There is laxness in the fulfillment of legal obligations, such as the payment of income and other taxes, and there are many evidences of venality among government officials. Failure to collect taxes from those best able to pay places an unfair burden upon the remainder of the community. If the standard of living in Iran is to be raised, the administration of laws must be reformed.

The low per capita productivity of both industry and agriculture tends to keep wages so low as seriously to impede development of widespread mass purchasing power upon which an expanding economy will so largely depend.

Wage
indivi

De
might
to t
favor
spirit
and t
the i
throu

Ha
finan
and t
Not
of fo
nue i
trole
the A
that
suffi
need
Plan
duct
mee
goo
Pen
larg
unle
goo
infl
nec
imp

T
is n
tha
not
of
wh
eith
all,
agr
sho
tica
ind
bal

zat
Pl
ass

Wages must be raised and, to meet the raises, individual productivity must be increased.

Despite all these unfavorable factors which might seem to set almost insuperable obstacles to the success of the Plan, there are many favorable ones, not the least of which is the spirit and intelligence of the Iranian people and the determination of those charged with the implementation of the Plan to see it through.

Happily, the Government is in a sound financial position. Its external debts are small, and the internal debt is relatively unimportant. Not only has it a substantial favorable balance of foreign exchange, but a large annual revenue in foreign exchange from its extensive petroleum deposits developed and operated by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. It is believed that revenues from its oil properties will be sufficient to furnish in large part the money needed for carrying out the Plan. But until the Plan has progressed to a point where production, both industrial and agricultural, can meet substantially the demand for consumer goods, the problem of inflation must be faced. Pending the establishment of new enterprises, large sums must be expended in wages, and unless there is an adequate supply of consumer goods upon which these wages can be spent, inflation is bound to occur. Thus it may be necessary during this period greatly to increase imports of consumer goods.

The extent of the country's mineral deposits is not accurately determined, but it is known that many minerals exist of which full use has not been made. Also, there are large deposits of such materials as salt and sulphur, for which an export market could be developed either in raw or processed form. And above all, there are great possibilities of increasing agricultural production to an extent which should eventually render the country practically self-sufficient in the matter of food and industrial crops and provide a substantial balance for export.

OCI has been engaged by the Plan Organization to assist in the implementation of the Plan, and is now getting started on this new assignment. Its services are to be of a consult-

ing nature only — the actual carrying out of the work will be done by the Organization. Specifically, the functions of Overseas Consultants will comprise the following: (1) to investigate and make recommendations as to the technical and economic soundness of various projects to be undertaken; (2) to advise and assist in the creation of organizations and procedures necessary for the work, with a minimum of foreign assistance; (3) to furnish advice concerning laws and regulations important to the success of the Plan and the procedures and practices involved in their administration; (4) consulting services in connection with manufacturing, mining, engineering, construction, maintenance, agriculture, public health, communications and related activities, economic studies, and management.

OCI will provide a staff of consultants resident in Iran to collaborate closely and continuously with the Plan Organization. It will assist in procuring experts in various fields who will work directly for the Plan Organization, and in the purchase of materials and equipment in foreign countries. It is to be hoped that as work under the Plan progresses the need for foreign consultants will diminish, and that eventually their services may be dispensed with.

The goal which the Plan Organization has set for itself is ambitious, and it may well be that a longer time will be necessary to complete it than has been set forth in the law. Indeed, it is probable that the program as now envisaged may have to be modified as future circumstances dictate. How the separate undertakings will interact upon one another and upon the people, and how these interactions will cause modifications in the Plan cannot be mapped out in advance. But these matters are of relative unimportance. What is important is that the mere conception of the Plan and the determination of the Government to carry it out indicate the awareness of the Government of world conditions and of the necessity for any nation which wishes to retain its independence and way of life to raise the standard of living of its people. The Plan is a courageous and constructive step toward this end.

BOOK REVIEWS

Recent Books on Iran

T. Cuyler Young

AS MIGHT be expected, Iranians themselves have published more books about Iran during the last decade than anyone else; but these are in Persian, and this review is concerned only with publications in Western languages. Nor is it concerned with numerous publications in the fields of Persian language, history, and culture.

Books of the last decade which deal primarily with some aspect of modern Iran — its life, problems, and outlook — are grouped largely at the beginning and the close of the period. Everyone was so absorbed in the middle years with the war that there was little time for reflection, much less for recording any experience or data concerning the country. Yet because of Iran's part in the struggle for the peace, or as it has become, the cold war, it is not surprising to find almost a dozen volumes devoted to the contemporary Iranian scene or some aspect of it.

Published in 1939-40, but belonging spiritually to the prewar era, are several titles that deal with travel — both professional and amateur — and autobiography. Most notable of these is Sir Arnold Wilson, *S.W. Persia: A Political Officer's Diary, 1907-1914* (Oxford 1941). Although it deals with years antecedent to the recent Iranian scene, any such account by the author of the most useful single volume of this century — *Persia* (London, 1932) — is worthy of note. Speaking of things Persian from that distant world prior to 1914, it is an excellent contrast to recommend as a backdrop for appreciation of the books dealing with the more stirring events of the last decade.

In the category of travel, without question the outstanding publication is Alfons Gabriel, *Aus den Einsamkeiten Irans* (Stuttgart, 1939). It is a detailed, well documented, ex-

cellently illustrated account of the author's third journey of exploration during 1937 in the Dasht-i-Lut, that desert in southeastern Iran which is probably the world's worst. Gabriel's first two explorations in 1928 and 1933, which included the Dasht-i-Kavir, were published earlier. His books are the definitive descriptions of these little known and rarely traversed sections of Iran. Also in the professional class is the small volume by Laurence Lockhart, *Famous Cities of Iran* (Brentford, Middlesex, 1939) in which the scholarly historian of Nadir Shah affords the Iranian student and traveller the salient facts about sixteen of the leading cities of modern Iran, spiced with historical anecdotes and garnished with 65 admirably chosen illustrations.

Of the amateur, casual variety of travelogue is W. V. Emanuel, *The Wild Asses* (London, 1939), heartily recommended to any prospective traveler in Iran, despite the changes in communications since the young English author took his journey through Azerbaijan, Tehran, Isphahan, Shiraz, Yazd, Tabas, Herat, Meshed, Rasht, and out by Baku. One could wish it were more critical politically; but chatty, sympathetic, accurate, and historically allusive, it is packed with useful information, a much better than average travel account. A contribution to the considerable number of missionary accounts of Iran is F. G. Coan's autobiography, *Yesterdays in Persia and Kurdistan* (Claremont, Calif., 1939). The author, born in Urumiah almost a century ago and returning there in 1885 for forty years of service, gives an interesting account of life and times in the old Persia that now stands in such contrast to modern Iran.

Belonging in time to the group of books

♦ T. CUYLER YOUNG, Associate Professor of Persian Language and History at Princeton University, contributed "The Problem of Westernization in Modern Iran" to the January 1948 issue of the *Journal*.

published in the early part of the war, but in character a forerunner of those since, is L. P. Elwell-Sutton, *Modern Iran* (London, 1941), which appeared at the turn of an epoch for Iran, just following the British-Soviet "occupation" in August 1941. This was the first attempt to describe and evaluate the achievements of Reza Shah Pahlavi, and it set a good standard for this endeavor. It is still, in spite of subsequent similar efforts, worthy of perusal; indeed, is indispensable for certain types of information concerning the interwar era, especially facts and statistics involved in the reforms of the Reza Shah regime. Its value is due in no small measure to the author's use of Persian sources. Perhaps, for all its British vantage point, most important is its lucid discussion of Iran's foreign relations and intimation at that date of the character of Iran's place in the postwar world. Of practical reference use are the appendices containing the constitution, the Sa'adabad Pact, and the law of 1936 governing factories and industries.

In this connection it may be well to observe that the constitution, or fundamental laws of 1906-07, and Sa'adabad Pact are to be found also in Helen Miller Davis, *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East* (Durham, N. C., 1947). There also will be found the Treaty of Friendship between Persia and Russia of Feb. 26, 1921; the Tripartite Treaty of Jan. 29, 1942; and the Declaration of the Three Powers regarding Iran of Dec. 1, 1943. Here may be noted the very useful reference volume published by R. Aghababian, *Legislation Iranienne Actuelle Interressant les Étrangers et les Iraniens à l'Étranger*.¹

Not unlike Elwell-Sutton's work is Alexander Tehrani, *Iran* (Berlin, 1943), the twenty-first in the German series *Kleine Auslands-kunde*. It contains brief but comprehensive, fact-packed discussions of the country, people, government, politics, culture, economics, and military forces, and constitutes an excellent handbook filled with generally reliable information, much of it unavailable in English. Unfortunately there is no index, but at the end of each section except the last is an excel-

lently selected bibliography for background historical study of the subject. The appended map shows the ten *ustan*, or administrative divisions, of the country.

Only one reporter's story of the war effort on the Iranian "Bridge to Victory" — Joel Sayre, *Persian Gulf Command: Some Marvels on the Road to Kazvin* (New York, 1945) — found its way into book form, but this is of superior quality, as the *New Yorker* medium of original publication testifies. Filled with fascinating characters and lively anecdotes, jovial and humorous, yet suggestive of epic overtones, this excellent piece of reporting manages to convey not a little local Iranian color as well as historical and cultural information. Highly readable and entertaining, it can be recommended for sharing at a fireside evening.

Speaking of the Persian Gulf Command, it is regrettable that the U. S. Army's history of this phase of the war effort has not yet reached the public, although it has long been under preparation. The British, however, more modest but therefore more timely, have given us an authoritative account of their military and transportation activities in *Paiforce: The Official Story of the Persian and Iraq Command, 1941-46* (London, 1948). The latter half of the book is devoted to the unsung, lonely soldiers and sweating workmen, toiling in the Gulf heat and mountain cold of Iraq and Iran to help send northward the five million tons of supplies which turned the Battle of Russia.

In lighter vein is the unique little volume published after the war by Cecil Keeling of Paiforce, *Pictures from Persia* (London, 1947). Pen and brush set forth impressions typical of the memories of Iran retained by thousands of British Tommies and American GI's who had neither time nor taste to see beneath the depressing exteriors. This does not mean that the author is lacking in sensitivity or perception; only that he did not tarry long enough to let the deeper life of the people mellow his first reactions.

The first of the postwar books was William Haas, *Iran* (New York, 1946). In view of the number of errors in the early historical material and the recent war period — a fault

¹ For a discussion of this title, see H. J. Liebesny, *Middle East Journal*, III (1949), p. 468.

which could have been avoided by patient checking — one is tempted to think the book was rushed to the public to take advantage of popular interest in Iran, whose case against Soviet Russia had been aired in the first United Nations session in London the month previous. This is regrettable since it detracts from what is in many respects a valuable book.

At its center is the best chapter, that on Persian psychology; showing keen analysis and penetrating insight, nothing better of its kind is in print. Nor is its application in the Middle East limited to Iran. This section is preceded by fruitful discussions of Persian religion, society and government, and is followed by good chapters on the Reza Shah reforms and cultural situation. This last, however, and especially the one on the economic situation, are marred by the impression given that they represent the current situation in 1946, whereas they really pertain to the period at the beginning of the war. As an educational adviser to the Reza Shah government, Haas had excellent opportunities of observing the prewar scene; but of the significant changes that occurred in Iran in the half decade following the British-Soviet "occupation" he had no personal experience and too little accurate information.

Soon to follow and likewise stimulated in its publication by the focus of world attention on the case of Iran before the Security Council of the United Nations was the little book *Persia and the Powers* (London, 1941), by A. H. Hamzavi, the press attaché of the Iranian Embassy in London. This is a semi-official account of Iran's diplomatic relations during 1941-46, with appendices carrying all the relative documents and treaties, including the speeches made by the Iranian and Soviet delegates before the first session of the United Nations in London. Written just after the Soviets had violated the Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942, by failing to withdraw their troops on March 2, 1946, and instead were pouring offensive troops into the country while they negotiated unilaterally with Tehran, this little book presents plainly and forcefully the salient arguments in Iran's case against Russia. Though not a balanced, critical appraisal of the total situation, it is an important Iranian document for any such attempt of the future.

Doubtless the most controversial of recent books is Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Americans in Persia* (Washington, 1946). Introduced by some material on the first two American Financial Missions to Iran in 1911 and 1922-27, this is primarily an account of the second Millspaugh Financial and Economic Mission of 1943-45, its eventual failure and withdrawal. The mission had much to show on the credit side of its ledger and this the book records; but the final balance, struck at the end of two years instead of the originally contracted five, proved the enterprise a failure in the light of original plans and hopes. The causes of this failure are the subject of this account by the head of the mission, and since the pattern involved was so complicated it is only natural that both the analysis and conclusions of the work are still the subject of heated discussion.

When someone someday attempts the thankless task of writing a calm and detached history of this episode in Irano-American relations, *Americans in Persia* will be a primary document of consideration; but it is safe to predict that, however indebted such an historian may be to much of Dr. Millspaugh's own documentation and analysis, his findings will scarcely be the same. The book has too much bitterness and too many marks of a personal apologia to have its analysis or conclusions accepted as presented.

In view of subsequent events much of the concluding part of the book, especially its arguments for a three-power trusteeship to establish Iran in its independence and to develop its economy, is out of date. But there is valuable source material and comment on the different policies and programs of the three big powers involved in the country.

The next full-dress presentation of Iran, in the succession of Elwell-Sutton, Tehrani, and Haas, was Elgin Groseclose, *Introduction to Iran* (New York, 1947). The conception of the book and the subjects chosen for treatment, together with the author's personal though limited experience in Iran, gave promise of something worthy of the title and certainly much needed. But the execution is too uneven, too often blurred in perspective, and marred by inaccuracies and inadequacies, to serve this

purpose
excellen
mixed

For
critical
and
almost
sympat
former
bility
to wh
traditi
tribut
centur
the N
monar
parlia
dictul
for I
freedo
facilit
to par
virilit
crises
the t
tary
is. Li
grate

In
the li
hand
be re
ated.
techn
Sinc
howe
the t
are d

In
to N
merc
the
nom
Cou
It c
mat
imp
mur
tion
inte
Sev

purpose. It contains valuable information and excellent writing, but unfortunately too much mixed with mediocre or misleading treatment.

For example, it is hard to reconcile the uncritical appreciation of ancient Zoroastrianism and recent Christian evangelicism with the almost invariable lack of understanding and sympathy for Islam. The author ascribes to the former the Iranian "sense of moral responsibility and of accountability of man to God," to which, together with "the ancient Aryan tradition of human dignity . . . may be attributed in part the fact that in the twentieth century Iran was the first of the lands east of the Nile to rise in democratic fervor, depose its monarch, and establish a constitutional and parliamentary system." (p. 18). *Mirabile dictu!* Elsewhere he gives the tribesmen credit for Iran's "tenacious tradition of personal freedom and independence" and "the relative facility with which [Iran] became accustomed to parliamentary government, and the relative virility which it has manifested in succeeding crises." (p. 61). This leaves one who follows the tortuous twistings of Iranian parliamentary politics gasping and wondering where he is. Like instances of the uncritical and unintegrated nature of the work could be cited.

In short, the book is a useful addition to the literature on the country for those who can handle it critically, but unfortunately it cannot be recommended for the beginner or uninitiated. There is a good index and about a dozen technically superior photographic illustrations. Since the author is a professional economist, however, more than usual significance attends the too few passages where economic matters are discussed.

In this connection attention should be called to N. S. Roberts, *Iran: Economic and Commercial Conditions* (London, 1948), one of the British Board of Trade's *Overseas Economic Surveys*, compiled by the Commercial Counsellor of the British Embassy in Tehran. It consists primarily of factual and statistical material regarding Iranian finance, export and import trade, exchange control, industry, communications, agriculture, petroleum production, labor, and social conditions. Of special interest is the section describing the Iranian Seven-Year Plan, which, although now rather

out of date, is useful in view of the unavailability to the general public of the recently completed five-volume report submitted to the Iranian government by Overseas Consultants, Inc.

Together with the Roberts report should be mentioned a small monograph by Husayn Pirnia, *A Short Survey of the Economic Conditions of Iran* (Tehran, 1945). It suffers in appearance from the stringent limitations of paper and typography of wartime Tehran, but contains much useful information. The preface by Dr. Millspauigh cordially recommends it. A useful economic map of Iran, indicating agricultural products, factories, mineral deposits, and communications, is appended.

Donald N. Wilber, *Iran: Past and Present* (Princeton, 1948), is almost in the handbook class, largely factual and unusually sound and accurate. Unfortunately it lacks vitality and buoyancy, but perhaps that is expecting too much of such a volume. Be that as it may, the book provides a comprehensive and reliable account of Iran's heritage in less than a hundred pages, the most valuable and penetrating of which are the concluding few devoted to an analysis of the character of Iranian culture. This much good interpretation of the material set forth leads one to wish the author had more often allowed himself that privilege. The slightly larger half of the book deals with the modern scene, furnishing in addition to the usual minimum much information from Persian sources about the country's economy, resources, communications, government, and social constitution. Seventeen excellent illustrations and a good index complete this useful volume.

The latest contribution to the field, and the only one of serious proportions devoted to international relations — especially those with Russia — is George Lenczowski, *Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948* (Ithaca, N. Y., 1949). The author is a trained political scientist teaching at Hamilton College, but during the war was for three years Press Attaché at the Polish Legation in Tehran. His work is an excellent addition to modern Persiana and a good sample of the type of specialized, yet generally relevant, studies which are needed to advance the understanding of modern Iran

in the West. We could welcome similar studies of Iran's relations with Great Britain and the United States.

Lenczowski's first three chapters deal with the rather confused setting of the stage in the first years following 1917, until the pattern of the twenties was determined by the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship signed on February 26, 1921. Then follow the shifts in Soviet policy with the sixth and seventh Comintern Congresses, the latter reacting to the rise of Hitler Germany. The chapter dealing with the history of German propaganda and influence in Iran is extremely useful and competent. Russian and German sources have been tapped for much of this first half of the book. The second half, concerned with World War II and its aftermath, is enhanced by the use of many Persian sources; these could have been increased with corresponding profit, but to find this much good Persian documentation is encouraging.

Nowhere else can be found as detailed an analysis and description of Soviet policies in Iran during the war and after, as well as Iran's reaction to them. Chapter Ten is the fullest and best discussion of the American role in Iran during the war, and the few judicious pages devoted to the controversial Mills-paugh Financial Mission are worth reading along with Dr. Millspaugh's own apologia. In addition to an adequate index, much relevant documentary material is included in the appendices; the most important of these is the seventh, consisting of the "Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies and Semi-colonies, adopted at the Sixth Congress

of the Communist International, Moscow, 1928."

This is perhaps the appropriate place to mention Stanislas Kosciatkowski, *L'Iran et la Pologne à travers les Siècles* (Tehran, 1943), which, though it deals with Iranian-Polish relations of the past, is the symbolic reminder of closer relations attained during the war by the hospitality afforded tens of thousands of Polish refugees by Iran. The bibliographical material it affords is especially valuable.

Although treating of four Middle East countries, Maurice Hindus, *In Search of a Future* (New York, 1949), deserves mention since almost half of it is given to a report on Iran. And excellent reporting it is, too. As the author describes Tehran, enters into the poetic spirit of literary Shiraz, rides the hills with the powerful Qashqais, appreciates the timeless values and present problems of a Gilan rice village, ferrets out facts and feelings among the people of that "storm center in Asia"—Azerbaijan—and finally with perception poses some of the deeper questions facing Iran and its future, one gets the impression that here is the type of reporting of which we need much more.

"In search of a future" accurately describes the ancient people of Iran in the midst of the twentieth century. To help them find that future, there is need of more interpreters to the West. But those of the next decade need to give us some deeper probing on limited but relevant subjects. Introductions and surveys are useful, but now there is a call for more detailed studies. Iran speaks eloquently in its matchless miniatures; impressionistic modern sketches fail to do it justice.

The Middle East Journal will order on behalf of its subscribers any book reviewed or listed in the Book Review section. *Books published in the United States:* Supplied at list price, postpaid. Mail check with order or request invoice. *Books published abroad:* Supplied at list price at current rate of exchange, plus cost of handling. Payment due upon receipt of invoice; all payments to be made in dollars. Service guaranteed on books published in the United States only. Address all orders to Book Service, The Middle East Institute, 1830 Nineteenth Street, N.W., Washington 9, D. C.

State
Soci
Lon
£
Acc
attem
civiliz
of the
under
difficu
proble
the un
of soc
accur
ject.
theref
we n
shoul
of th
Jewis
diffic
preju
proble
lems,
ment
the M
factu
num
are g
T
respe
Tran
Mid
the
Cha
two
stati
tion
ten
publ
outl
In
stati
in p
Thi
ever
abo
edu
Syr

GENERAL

State and Economics in the Middle East: A Society in Transition, by Alfred Bonn  , London: Kegan Paul, 1948. 427 pages. £1 10s.

According to the author this work is an attempt to discover "the impact of modern civilization on the social and economic fabric of the [Middle] East." It is a very ambitious undertaking when we realize, as he does, "the difficulties in the way of an analysis of the problems and their interrelations," in view of the undeveloped instruments of measurements of social changes and the deficiency and inaccuracy of statistical data bearing on the subject. His interpretations and conclusions must, therefore, be regarded as opinions with which we may agree or disagree. The reader also should be aware of the fact that as Director of the Economic Research Institute of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, it is extremely difficult for Dr. Bonn   to free himself from prejudices when analyzing conditions and problems bearing on Zionist aims and problems, and when comparing Jewish achievements in Palestine with Arab achievements in the Middle East. Furthermore, there are many factual errors, exaggerations, and questionable numerical data for which no source references are given.

The book is divided into four parts, entitled respectively: The Middle Eastern State in Transition; The Agrarian Society of the Middle East; The Industrial Revolution in the Middle East; Problems and Aspects of a Changing Society. Each part is subdivided into two sections, of which the first deals with the static features and the second with the transition and its problems. Since the book was written in the early part of World War II but published in 1948, a postscript is added which outlines the postwar trends.

In discussing traditionalism as a cause of stationary agriculture, the author attributes it in part to physiological qualities (p. 154). This is not borne out by the facts; for whenever the peasant was an owner-cultivator, and above all when he had the privilege of some education (e.g. most Lebanese and many Syrian agriculturists), he showed a high work-

ing mentality and ability to adjustment. The few events cited to illustrate reluctance to adjustment could take place anywhere under similar circumstances. In this connection it is strange that Dr. Bonn   does not mention ignorance as a decisive factor in stationary agriculture.

Under agriculture in transition, the author says, "without the development of truly democratic forms of government, or intervention from without, no radical changes in conditions of land tenure can be expected." He seems to forget that most of the Arab countries of the Middle East were placed under mandate of first class powers, and yet these powers undertook no substantial changes in this respect. On the contrary, they allied themselves with the big landlords to further their own interests.

Under "the problem of capitalism in Oriental countries" (p. 217) Bonn   attributes the wide stagnation in this area — when in the West the industrial revolution was at full swing — to the absence "of a class of citizens endowed with specific virtues as organizers and entrepreneurs." "When eventually young national states replaced the Ottoman Empire, these States, realizing that they alone could fulfill this important function, assumed the role of industrial initiators, and in part even that of actual entrepreneurs." (p. 218). This interpretation is largely erroneous, for as soon as hindrances to developed economic activity were removed, a class with entrepreneurial qualifications appeared in all Middle East countries; the only states which really assumed the function of an entrepreneur were Turkey and Iran, where the object was to expedite industrialization.

The chief hindrances to industrial development during the Ottoman Regime were the inadequate administration — despotic, pervaded with theocracy, and almost completely indifferent to national economy —, lack of security, inadequate means of transportation, and the capitulations which prevented the adoption of a tariff policy favorable to industry. Furthermore, to say (p. 219) "In the case of the individual producer, scarcely a trace can as yet be found of the rationalist, capitalist spirit" is excessive exaggeration, and is contradicted by the author himself. Speaking of the industrial

revolution in Syria and Lebanon (p. 290), he says, "in view of the dilatory attitude of the mandatory authorities the development to be seen in Lebanese-Syrian industry is a creditable achievement on the part of the entrepreneurs. . . ." Before World War II and since, a number of large factories were established in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq; while some of the largest industrial undertakings in Brazil and elsewhere have been established by the Lebanese. On the same page the author attributes the dominant role of the foreign entrepreneur and foreign capital "to the extremely few native entrepreneur personalities to its [Middle Eastern Society's] credit." In fact, with the exception of banking establishments, foreign entrepreneurship and capital, in order to escape native competition, went mainly to concessionary undertakings where they received full protection from their governments.

In discussing the present-day problems of industrialization in the Middle East, the author stresses (p. 308) the large scope of industrialization and its need for increasing the national income. He forgets, however, that industrialization depends very largely upon the purchasing power of the masses, and that this in turn is dependent upon reform of the backward land systems.

Under the problems and aspects of a changing society Bonné speaks (p. 348) of the social ethics of Islam as being instrumental in hindering the accumulation of capital, since according to him it makes no demand on the conduct of its followers. The reviewer does not know to what extent this is true, but he remembers the saying of Omar ibn al-Khattab, one of the companions of Mohammed: "Work for your earthly affairs as if you were to live forever and work for your heavenly rewards as if you were to die tomorrow." In another place (p. 352) the author claims that the practice of Muslim life is sufficient evidence of his theses, saying that "the lack of initiative, the absence of creative ideas among native merchants and entrepreneurs is a phenomenon soon apparent to all who have lived for any length of time in Oriental countries." To anyone who has followed out the worldwide ramifications of the gold trade centered on Beirut and run entirely by Lebanese Muslims and

Christians, such a statement must appear fantastic.

Prejudiced statements are found in many places, but owing to limitation of space, only a few will be mentioned here. Comparing the industrial achievements of Palestine with those of the other Middle East countries, the author says (p. 311): "thus, in the Oriental territories the necessity arose for the State to take over the functions of industrialization, if it did not wish to leave the initiative in the hands of foreign capitalist groups and to bear the brunt of the resultant political consequences. The case of Palestine, where the new industry was established without aid or intervention either of the State or of foreign interests is unique. . . ." But in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, the governments neither established public industries, nor — with the exception of concessionary companies granted by the Mandatory Power itself — was industrialization left to foreign capitalist groups. Besides, industry in Palestine received greater aid from the government in the form of exemption from duty on imported machines and raw materials, and in the form of a protective tariff (the tariff wall on dutiable imports reaching, before the war, about 30%). Because of excessive duplication of industry, the establishment of new undertakings was guided by the Industrial Department of the Jewish Agency, the Manufacturer's Association, and the American Economic Committee for Palestine. Commenting upon Jewish industry in 1936, the Palestine Royal Commission said in its Report, "few, if any, of the protected industries can, at present [1936], compete with imported articles as regards price and quality." The more or less free trade agreement of 1929 between Palestine and Syria and Lebanon was considerably revised in 1939, chiefly in response to the demands of Jewish industrialists for protection against the competition of Syrian and Lebanese industries.

The most prejudiced of the author's statements is made in his summary of changes in agrarian society (p. 377), where he says, "nowhere in the Old World is such an accumulation of unexploited agrarian possibilities to be found as in the vast plains and irrigation zones of the Orient, which are settled today to but a

fraction of their agricultural absorptive capacity. Nowhere is such a grand chance offered for the solution of complicated settlement questions as here. The remarkable spadework done by the Jewish settlers in Palestine indicates that millions of people in these parts of the globe might find work and bread at a decent standard of living and bring to the rest of the world also the fruits of these richly blessed lands."

We know of no better way of contesting this statement than to give quotations from unbiased scientists who studied the Middle East during the war. As Dr. Warriner points out in the introduction to her book *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (covering Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq), "when the prospects of development are considered, it is important to bear in mind that, empty as the deserts are, the cultivated land is densely settled already." "Even if agricultural advance were to double, it would still live in great poverty. To discuss the Middle East in terms of 'absorptive capacity' is indeed to prejudice the whole issue. The first essential is not to put more on the land, but to raise the living standard of the population already there; not to bring in new population, but to provide better conditions of existence for the increase in population which is now occurring." As Dr. K. H. Murray (formerly Director of Food in the Middle East Supply Center) pointed out in his article in *International Affairs* of January 1947, "it is fair to state that, with notable exceptions, these [the natural resources] are poor, actually and potentially, as compared with most other parts of the world." "It would be wiser to recognize the limitations [of the Middle East] and to prepare to help in whatever ways are most needed by the governments concerned, rather than to intensify their problems by, say, increasing the number of people in this already overcrowded area. . . ." As regards Jewish agricultural achievements in Palestine, it is a well known fact that they were made possible only by heavy subsidies.

Errors of fact and exaggeration are many; only one will be cited. On page 330 the author says, "it is remarkable that though the abolition of slavery became, as much as a hundred

years ago, the watchword of the European powers, the custom has continued to flourish in the Arab and African countries practically up to the present day." The error is obvious here, for in none of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon is slavery flourishing or even existing.

S. B. HIMADEH

American University of Beirut

The Life and Time of Jehudah Halevi, by Rudolf Kayser. Translated from the German by Frank Gaynor. New York: Philosophical Library, 1949. 176 pages. \$3.75.

Dr. Kayser's *The Life and Time of Jehudah Halevi* is a welcome addition to the study of this great Jewish poet and philosopher, the 800th anniversary of whose death was commemorated in Jewish communities a few years ago.

The author states his aim in writing this book in his introductory remarks: "This book does not claim to be a learned tome. It presents no new facts. . . . It attempts to present to the reader of our age a vista of a great, albeit little known era, of an epoch which, more than any other period of history, stands forth as the symbol of a historical conflict of universal scope and portent: The conflict between east and west," which stands primarily "for two different views and philosophies of life, two opposite tendencies of the spirit of man, two opposite poles in the sky of civilization." The present conflict between East and West, perhaps in a more restricted sense, comes to mind.

With this aim, Dr. Kayser begins his study with a brief historical survey since the Arab invasion of Spain in 711 A. D. Unlike previous invasions, the Arabs were driven by intense faith in their mission to spread the teaching of Islam. Their impact on the Occident was tremendous, for their Oriental philosophy of life was entirely different from that of the Occident, which resorted to brute force to conquer the souls of men. In glowing terms the author describes the rise and development of Arab civilization in Spain, and especially in the city of Cordoba, "Baghdad of the West," the great center of Arab culture in the 10th century — during the reign of the caliphs Abd al-Rahman III and his son al-Hakam II, whose financial

adviser was the eminent Jewish statesman Hasdai ibn Shaprut. The latter invited to Cordoba the well-known scholars Menahem ben Saruq, author of a dictionary of Biblical Hebrew, and Dunash ben Labrat, his painstaking critic.

Cordoba thus became also a great center of Jewish culture. There lived the illustrious two Hebrew grammarians: Judah Hayyuj and Abu'l-Walid Merwan ibn Janah, the fathers of scientific Hebrew philology. There Jehudah Halevi spent the greater part of his life and Moses Maimonides was born, to name only a few of the outstanding Jewish scholars of that period. However, with the conquest of Cordoba in 1148 by the fanatical Almohads, the splendor of that great cultural center came to an end.

The author discusses briefly almost all celebrated authorities of the Golden Age of Jewish culture in Spain as an introduction to this study of Jehudah Halevi. But one misses the name of the illustrious Vizir Samuel Hanagid ibn Naghdela of Granada, great poet and grammarian who flourished in the 11th century and to whom Jehudah Halevi inscribed one of his most beautiful poems, which begins with the following charming dedication:

The chosen of crowns
For the chosen of crowned,
And the song of songs
For the prince of princes!

The author's treatment of Jehudah Halevi is adequate, though one should qualify some of his statements. For example, he emphasizes that Jehudah Halevi, while "devoutly praying for the return of Israel into the land of its fathers, did not have any national state in mind." But the concept of secular nationalism is comparatively modern. The religious and ethical character of his longing for Zion implied a return to the ancient homeland, linked with "independence from Edom and Ishmael, from Cross and Crescent. Israel must live its own life, based on its great tradition and Oriental faith." It obviously presupposes an independent national existence in whatever form of government he had envisaged it. On another occasion the author remarks, "As a philosopher of religion, he was certainly no mystic, but a disciple of Karaism which recognizes nothing but the words of the Bible as

authoritative," and that he "turned against rabbinical orthodoxy." But Part III of Halevi's philosophical work *al-Khazari* is almost entirely devoted to vigorous refutations of Karaite doctrines, and a brief historical review in strong support of rabbinical traditions.

Dr. Kayser's penetrating study is unfortunately marred by some minor oversights and errors. So, e.g. according to legend, Abraham ibn Ezra was not the father-in-law of Jehudah Halevi, but his son-in-law; ibn Ezra was about seven years younger than the latter. It was not Chanoth (Enoch) ben Moses who translated the Talmud into Arabic; but his prominent rival, Joseph ibn Abitur, translated the Mishnah (not the Talmud) into Arabic for the great library of the Caliph al-Hakam II. The scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages latinized the names of Arab scholars not "to conceal the fact that they had been sons of an Oriental race." Names like Avicenna, Avenzoar, Avempace, Averroës are just faulty transcriptions of their Arabic names as written in Hebrew characters, where *ibn* is frequently read *even* or *aven* by those who are not familiar with the Arabic language.

There are likewise a number of errors in names of persons and titles of books. So, e.g., the famous Arab poet Mutanabbi is named here Montenebbi. The name of the philosopher ibn Bajjah (Avempace) is changed to Ibn Bahya. The Arabic title of Halevi's *al-Khazari* is not *Book and Argument*, etc., but *Book of Arguments*, etc. The philosophical work of Maimonides is named here "Guide to the Perplexed" instead of "Guide of the Perplexed," the correct translation of the Arabic title *Dalālat al-Ha'irin*; the title of his code of Jewish laws is not *Mishnah Torah* but *Mishneh Torah*.

SOLOMON L. SKOSS
The Dropsie College

ARABIA

Die Pilgerfahrt nach Mekka, von der Weihrauchstrasse zur Oelwirtschaft, by Carl Rathjens. Hamburg: Robert Moelich Verlag, 1948. 144 pages, 23 illustrations, 10 maps.

One of the oldest routes in the world is that from Aden across the highlands of Yemen

and Asir to the city of Mecca. From approximately 3000 B.C. to the 8th century A.D., important incense was transported to this city and exchanged at the annual fair to which merchants from as far away as Eastern Africa and India came. In this book Carl Rathjens, an eminent German geographer and geologist who has been interested in the cultural geography of the Orient, and specifically of the Arabian Peninsula, for more than forty years, attempts to explain the growth and decline of the "Incense Road" and the continuous importance of the holy city of Mecca.

In his many visits to Arabia since 1894, Rathjens has studied the relationship of the physical geography of the Peninsula to the settlement pattern and cultural and political development of its inhabitants. Three times between 1931 and 1938 alone, he spent considerable time in the southern and western parts of the Peninsula, in Arabia *felix* and Arabia *petraea*. For several months he was a special guest of the Imam Yahya in Yemen, and of Ibn Saud in Saudi Arabia.

The task of covering so many centuries of historical geography in less than 150 pages is a difficult one. Rathjens, however, succeeds not only in relating the physical environment of the region crossed by the Incense Road to the importance of this road itself, but in various chapters discussing Mecca — its site, annual fair, social and political conditions both before and after Mohammed — in providing the reader with an excellent analysis of the origin of Islam and of the reasons for its rapid success and the continued importance of Mecca, regardless of political changes elsewhere.

One of the weaknesses of such a brief study is the necessarily incomplete treatment of certain historical developments. While the author gives much attention to the growth of the Incense Route, he skips over its decline; he never gives a satisfactory reason, for example, why the incense *boswellia* and *commiphora* suddenly went out of use. The latter part of the study, especially the discussion of the importance of oil to the economic development of the Arabian Peninsula, is sketchy and not always up-to-date. Postwar data probably was not available to the author and his conclusions, therefore, with regard to the future economic

possibilities of Saudi Arabia do not continue the scholarly work displayed in the earlier chapters. Rathjens expresses the opinion that the large income Ibn Saud derives from oil will be used to make it possible for all Muslims to visit Mecca, regardless of their own income. He foresees a time when railroads and modern highways will radiate from the Holy City and bring thousands annually to the birthplace of the Prophet Mohammed during the pilgrimage season.

It is unfortunate that the only paper available in Germany caused the many excellently drawn maps and pictures to lose much of their usefulness.

GEORGE W. HOFFMAN
The University of Texas

EGYPT

Les Problèmes du Travail et les Organisations Ouvrières en Égypte, by Dr. Zaki Badaoui. Alexandria: Société de Publications Égyptiennes, 1948. 183 pages.

Although, as Dr. Zaki Badaoui points out, the Egyptian trade union movement has had a surprisingly long historical record, it was only during and after World War II that it achieved any significant importance. With the passage in 1942 of the Egyptian Trade Union Act, workers were for the first time, although admittedly under restrictive conditions, given legal authority to form themselves into trade unions. Since that time the movement has advanced substantially so that today, albeit still far from realizing its potential power and influence, Egyptian labor is increasingly making itself felt as a factor in the political and economic life of the country.

The law which gave Egyptian labor the legal right to form trade unions at the same time made it very difficult for workers to enjoy the kind of freedom of association and trade union activity which has become commonplace in the United States. Political activity, for example, was strictly forbidden. Unions could be formed only with the approval of the government, and their financial reports and minutes of meetings were to be made available to the government. The meetings themselves

could only be held subject to the condition that a notice be given to the government, which might in any case withhold permission "if the meeting is contrary to public policy." On the positive side, however, the law protected trade unionists from recriminations by employers opposed to trade union activity, since it made it illegal for an employer to dismiss or discipline a worker for holding a trade union office or for carrying out a decision of the union.

Perhaps the most important restriction contained in the law was that which specifically forbade the formation of a general trade union federation. This, coupled with the fact that as years went by the government delayed the promulgation of legislation which would have permitted the formation of craft and industrial unions, as provided under the law, has, as Dr. Badaoui so clearly sees, made it impossible for the Egyptian trade union movement to develop strength, leadership, and clarity of purpose. The result has been that there are today in Egypt over 600 unions with a total membership of about 150,000 and with each union remaining essentially local in character. With the issuance, however, on October 13, 1949, of a ministerial decree authorizing the formation of industrial and craft federations, a significant step forward has been made. Now, for the first time, Egyptian trade unionists from similar industries have been given legal sanction to act together in seeking to obtain better working conditions, and thus one of Dr. Badaoui's more critical strictures about Egyptian trade union legislation has been met.

Dr. Zaki Badaoui has admirably and successfully tied together the legislative, historical, and organizational sides of the Egyptian trade union movement. One could have wished, perhaps, for a more detailed and intimate exposé of the actual working of Egypt's trade unions, especially of a few key ones, and for more biographical and analytical examination of trade union leaders. An Egyptian with the technical capacity and genuine sympathy toward workers, such as the author has, is in a position to provide the kind of information and insight concerning Egyptian trade unions, their leaders, problems, and day-to-day activities that no foreigner could, regardless of his qualifications. It is hoped that the author will

follow up the present work with just such a study.

WILLIAM J. HANDLEY,
Washington, D. C.

INDIA

Trade Unionism in India: A Study in Indian Democracy, by S. D. Punekar. Edited by C. N. Vakil. Bombay: New Book Co., Ltd., 1948. 407 pages. Rs. 17/5.

Two outstanding developments of modern industrial society are labor legislation and trade unionism, the analysis of which the present reviewer undertook as part of a study of India's labor economics: *Factory Legislation in India* (first published by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1922 and again in a revised edition in 1923), and *The Labor Movement in India* (1923). These works were followed by a series prepared by the reviewer and a number of other writers. As Labor Economist at the ILO, this reviewer also made a comprehensive survey of labor conditions in India, which formed the historical background of the Report of the Royal Commission on Labor in India (1931). He also made a study of industrial labor, which was published by the ILO as *Industrial Labor in India* (1938).

Mr. S. D. Punekar's *Trade Unionism in India* is a welcome contribution to the general subject. Tracing the origins of the Indian trade union movement to the postwar period of 1918-19, when there arose industrial disputes from increasing prices, inadequate wages, and growing unemployment, the author describes the local, provincial, and national unions and federations; analyzes their structures and functions; and gives an account of the rise and decline of communism in India and its effect on the growth of trade unionism. The author also mentions such impediments to the growth of Indian trade unionism as illiteracy and the migratory habits of industrial workers, employer's hostility and public indifference, and states very pertinently that Indian trade unionism is a "loose, uncoordinated structure with a number of weak federations at the top, having little touch with primary

unions at the base." For efficient working the author suggests three methods of trade unionism: mutual insurance, collective bargaining, and labor representation in legislatures, and recommends the formation of a Labor Party in India. The appendices include trade union statistics and a select bibliography.

Space permits the reviewer to make only two critical comments on *Trade Unionism in India*. First, there is no mention of the fact that a permanent class of industrial labor has not yet grown up in India, although a beginning has been made in some industrial centers. This explains the reasons for some of the author's complaints. The recent decision of the Government of India to build one million houses for workers in the next ten years is the first step in the development of industrial labor in India. Second, there is similarly lacking any mention of the Tripartite Labor Organization established in 1943, in which the representatives of government, management, and labor can discuss questions of national importance. Still more recently there have been established tripartite industrial committees for India's major industries — coal, agriculture, cotton textiles, cement, and tanning and leather goods — in which the representatives of labor can participate on equal terms with those of government and management in determining industrial and labor policies. These are among the highest achievements of the Indian trade union movement.

RAJANI KANTA DAS
Washington, D. C.

Indian Art, ed. by Sir Richard Winstedt. Essays by H. G. Rawlinson, J. V. S. Wilkinson, K. deB. Codrington, and John Irwin. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948. 194 pages. Illustrated. \$3.75.

Indian art, it has sometimes been said, was best admired and analytically understood by Western scholars other than British, because no individuals of an occupying power could preserve their sensitivity and yet maintain the necessary alienation demanded by political mastery. The deeper reality, however, lies in the fact that art lovers belong in a category by themselves and are seldom identifiable with any general class of rulers or ruled. Colonial

history, therefore, offers strange and apparent paradoxes: of French, British, and even Dutch administrators, not to speak of free-lance thinkers and roving artists unfettered by official contract, who have shown remarkable powers of both detachment and identification. General Cunningham is the obvious and outstanding name, but one can run one's mind through pompous and yet perceptive Lord Curzon to hard-worked official archeologists like Sir John Marshall, who, though belonging to the handicapped race of rulers, still illumined India's artistic annals with no less brilliance and eager clarity than Monsieur Hackin, Professor Levi, Sven Hedin, or a whole host of German critics and art scholars.

This slender volume, *Indian Art*, is the best example the reviewer knows of concentrated artistic research, interpretation, and sometimes an almost mediumistic communication of remote and relevant Indian artistic and spiritual ways of life, presented with a refreshing freedom from scholasticism. John Irwin's original and basic note on motifs of Indian sculpture, which also shows complete mastery of the latest accessible knowledge, is an exciting example. This essay also takes on the task, as do other articles, of acquainting the interested layman with the history and general features of the topic examined. Professor Rawlinson's introductory history of Indian civilization is a brave and honest attempt to present epochs, or rather millennia, of cultural history in a few pages. Where it fails, because of lack of material space and perspective, it does so free from imperial blemish — the whole history of the British period is given barely three pages. The essay is thin on the contemporary trend, although one or two living Indian artists, including Jamini Roy (misspelt Jaimini Roy) make a brief and unconvincing appearance.

The essays overlap, or repeat and even slightly contradict each other on topics which do not directly belong to their orbit. But such an authority on painting as J. V. Wilkinson proves that one can move out of one's chosen specialized field — for him, Persian painting — and give a reliable account of the main schools of a neighboring area of paint and canvas. Here, too, the bare page and a half on modern Indian painting is meagre and slightly

misleading. But this criticism does not apply to the masterly and altogether delightful essay by K. deB. Codrington who, even in his brief reference to the living context of Indian handicrafts, does not write superficially even though the entire article details previous periods with all the infinite variety of the regional minor arts of India. This essay goes to the main-springs of the people's art, revealing the subtle and utile beauty which characterizes the matchless native genius of Indian artisans and artists — their ability to express man's hunger for incarnate forms and his joy in the process of putting together silver or copper thread, or clay or bamboo, or silken and rough fabric as the case may be, to reflect the glory of transferred imagination. The book also portrays the splendor of sculptured or jeweled art, and of classic architecture and metaphysical contemplation turned into fresco and stone.

Indian Art, the short essays of which obviously are not too well-planned in their incorporation into the book, lacks a bibliography, and the reproductions are rather casually chosen and very inadequately printed. Yet the total effect of reading this series of light but knowledgeable comments on a whole world of art belonging to a single civilization is definitely stimulating and in some odd way confirmative of a universal creative principle. The issue of an American edition is a laudable event because it may stimulate a new school of art interpreters in this country, which has, on the whole, left India alone. No country can be understood without its art: a civilization which has emerged into global importance can be entered through the latticed gate of an Indian village, where beauty is bartered in terms of a few cents worth of priceless decorations in clay or scroll.

AMIYA CHAKRAVARTY
Howard University

Delhi-Chungking, by K. P. S. Menon. London: Oxford University Press, 1949. 245 pages. \$4.25.

Three years before India achieved dominion status, K. P. S. Menon, an Oxford-educated Hindu who was later to become India's first Ambassador to China, traveled across the Roof of the World from Delhi to Chungking. His

unpretentious travel diary, *Delhi-Chungking*, is a "must" for alert students of the modern world and mind.

The Marco Polo and Hsuan Tsang route Menon followed is the ultimate in travel experience. To one with a sense of space and time, a barrel-round Yak may be a better vehicle for thought than a reclining chair in a plane. No wonder Jawaharlal Nehru of the jet-propulsion mind flavors his forward to the book with regrets that he, too, cannot take such "arduous yet leisurely journeys."

Admirers of Owen Lattimore, Aurel Stein, the Roosevelts, Ella Maillart, Georges Le Fèvre, Peter Fleming, Eric Teichman, and Sven Hedin will recognize many long-famed sites. But Menon sees Asia through the eyes of an Asiatic. Through his book one can explore an Asiatic mind as well as Asiatic geography. In Tashkurgan, decadent hamlet on the once-glamorous Silk Route, two civil servants — the author and a Chinese Postal Superintendent — compared the teachings of Christ and Meitze. In print neither 25,550-foot Rakhashoshi nor the 4-mile Batura Glacier bulks larger than this meeting of Chinese, Hindu, and Christian thought in a far country. *Delhi-Chungking* is the travel diary of a philosopher at home in time and space, whose quotations from Wordsworth, Milton, or Tennyson spring from an agile mind rather than a heavy book.

Facet after facet of Asia's charm gleams in this modest volume, and its Western readers will find many a brilliant picture of the stony heart of Asia. But — a rarer privilege — they can gaze into the sensitive heart of an Asiatic, for the book's brightest jewels are the sparkling revelations of its author's personality. A father of two sets of twins, Menon is no ascetic. He measures the charm of Chinese women not against the meretricious web of nylons or the synthetic sex of silk and celluloid, but against the lively, comradely women of his native Travancore. Born on the Malabar coast of India, Menon is spiritually and physically at home among Muslims, Buddhists, Christians, materialists, poets. Natives of Normal saluted him as a Sahib, "presumably because I wear a hat"; we, because he wears his hat on a good head, linked to a gay heart.

His writ
at home
many ra

The S
Prito
Pres
This
of the
tory is
torians
rejoin
matica
Evans
ogy a
envial
Nuer
Amon
sive
Polit
study
eral
Arab
Polit
mini
O
leng
ing
stick
tion
Nor
Hij
the
(18
to
Cy
of
the
fec
ren
co
on
Sa
un
so
Sa

His writing should make westerners feel more at home in the one world to which men of many races and creeds contribute so much.

MAYNARD OWEN WILLIAMS
National Geographic Society

NORTH AFRICA

The Sanusi of Cyrenaica, by E. E. Evans-Pritchard. London: Oxford University Press, 1949. 240 pages. \$6.50.

This timely volume is a beautiful example of the old refrain that some of the best history is written by others than professional historians. Of course, one might be tempted to rejoin that whoever writes good history automatically becomes an historian. Professor Evans-Pritchard, professor of social anthropology at Oxford, has already established an enviable reputation with such works as *The Nuer* and *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande*, as well as the comprehensive treatise (with M. Fortes) on *African Political Systems*. His background for this study of the Sanusi was acquired during several years' residence in Egypt and travel in the Arab countries, plus wartime experience as Political Officer to the British Military Administration of Cyrenaica.

Originally planned for twice its present length, the book shows little evidence of having suffered from compression. The author sticks closely to his title, eschewing the temptation to follow the Sanusi into other parts of North Africa, the Sudan, Egypt, and the Hijaz. Setting the stage in a brief chapter on the "Origin and Expansion of the Sanusiya (1837-1902)," Evans-Pritchard introduces us to the physical and historical geography of Cyrenaica and to the intricate tribal pattern of its bedouin population. He then shows how the Sanusi succeeded in establishing their effective political control over most of Cyrenaica, exception being made for the few coastal cities, by grafting their system of lodges onto the existing tribal structure. In short, the Sanusi provided an ecclesiastical and political unity for the previously fragmented bedouin society of the jebel, steppe, and desert. The Sanusiya Order, with the Grand Sanusi at its

apex, was thus alone able to give the bedouin the leadership and elan which made them, despite their exiguous numbers and their poverty in the matériel of war, so troublesome a foe to the Italian invaders for over two decades, and which in the end have helped to earn them the right to independence.

The second half of the book is devoted to an orderly, documented account of the relations between the Sanusi and the Italians from 1911 to the end of Fascist rule in 1942. This unhappy story, as here unrolled, has never been told before in its entirety. *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* is therefore required reading for anyone who wishes to understand the Cyrenaican half of the background to Libyan independence. Would that there were a companion work for Tripolitania!

The author's bibliography is decidedly "select," and the diligent reader will have to search the footnotes of the text to discover further references to the sources, mainly Italian. Several items in Arabic are also included. Appendix I is a list of place names giving both the original Arabic, preferred by the author, and the Italian version favored by most cartographers in recent years. Some thirteen maps illustrate the text and in themselves comprise one of the important contributions of this wholly admirable volume.

ROBERT GALE WOOLBERT
University of Denver

North African Notebook, by Robin Maugham. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1949. 146 pages, photographs. \$3.00.

It is rewarding to hear the tale of an honest traveler who did not tarry at the slaughter of a ceremonial sheep because the scene is strange, nor hurry past the distress occasioned by relationships rooted in fear and inequality because such a spectacle is common. Just as he gives the important precedence over the picturesque, Robin Maugham lets sentiment take second place to reasoned criticism. Admiration for an ally, France, does not make him feel it inexpedient to criticize its policies. His admitted sympathy for the Arab movement of independence does not prevent him from characterizing certain Arab attitudes as intransigence, or impassivity, or vanity. The nephew of

Somerset Maugham here shows himself more diffident than when he proposed his *Approach to Palestine*, somewhat less personal than when he wrote *Nomad*, but possessed of the same sharp skill he has shown in novels like *The Servant* for selecting incidents and details to illuminate his story. Maugham had been a Captain in British intelligence in the Middle East, subsequently a yearly visitor to the Levant. It was with such qualifications, rather than those of a historian or Arabist that he traveled eastward once again and started his six-month journey across the Maghreb late in 1947.

Maugham is never the tourist. "A casual visitor would certainly enjoy Tangier provided he were rich and callous." In Spanish Morocco, especially near the birthplace of Abd-el-Krim, Maugham observed the oppression and destitution of Spain, exaggerated by the harshness of the colonial spirit. In French Morocco he found the heritage of good will left by General Lyautey dissipated by the virtually direct rule of the French and by the isolation which, by omission and design, has developed between Frenchmen and Arabs. A huge, unimaginative bureaucracy has descended here and upon the rest of French North Africa. Some administrators, Maugham notes, nonetheless work hard to improve the Arabs' lot. But "Arabs are more influenced by daily contacts with Frenchmen in trains and shops and factories than by the attitude of the French reformers in the Administration. They *hear* of a reform; they *feel* a slight in a bus or an insult from their employers on a farm. Moreover, it is the Frenchmen who are most nearly on the same level who treat them worst."

Maugham knows that the Arab answer is not without its complexities and difficulties. He suggests that Arab parties, though they voice the common aspiration for freedom from foreign domination, in their domestic policy often represent only special urban interests, seldom those of the peasants or bedouins. He is concerned about the capacity of the people to govern themselves. The educated take greater pride in politics than in production. The poor, too resentful of authority and finding the ultimate safety only in tradition, do not easily accept new techniques when presented merely by suggestion or imposed by rigid fiat.

Even so, to deny the Arab's impulse toward independence is, in Maugham's view, neither moral nor any longer practicable. "Everywhere, the French mistake has been to elevate dams against nationalism instead of building sluice-gates." He reports that moderate leaders in the Maghreb, like al-Wazzani, realize that even were Arab national states to arise now, French friendship and technical assistance must not be cut off. "Europeans have tried," says Maugham, "to exert the influence of books and bombs simultaneously. This method has failed . . . when French police have been removed, her moral influence will increase." For French North Africa, he therefore suggests treaty arrangements modeled on those which Britain has made with Iraq and Jordan. For Libya, he projects a solution basically the same as that which the UN came to adopt in November 1949.

To bring about this development peacefully, he places his main hope in the power of the United States and the know-how of Great Britain, underestimating, however, both the desire and the ability of France to be a partner of the Anglo-Americans in the Mediterranean. In other respects, his balanced opinion is such that neither European or Arab extremists can feel pleased. Following in the tradition of those Britishers in the Middle East who became more interested in the people with whom they lived than in the policy of their Foreign Office, Maugham, while pretending to no profundity, shows a sympathetic insight which has much to teach us. Amid the silence in the American press concerning recent trends in the Maghreb, his report is most helpful.

MANFRED HALPERN
Washington, D. C.

PALESTINE

Promise and Fulfillment: Palestine 1917-1949, by Arthur Koestler. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949. 335 pages. \$4.00.

Neither Ernest Bevin nor the Husseini nor the Mizrahi and Mapam will derive much solace from Arthur Koestler's latest exploration of the souls of men in politics and of peo-

ples in conflict. He has packed enough worm-wood into his book to choke all parties to the Palestine dispute.

The secret of Mr. Koestler's genius for infuriating all sides is his refusal as historian and reporter to use black or white labels. There are no heroes or villains in his story; only the confused, the foolish, the inept, the blind of heart and the simple folk of good will, with the last-named usually taking the worst beating. Since partisans and fanatics abhor balanced criticism of themselves or a hint of pity for their enemies, Mr. Koestler's ears are being made to ring all the way from Whitehall through Abdin Palace to the Kirya in Tel Aviv, with echoes in New York and possibly even in Gaza.

But for the dispassionate reader who wants to understand, this analysis of the Mandate's three decades, Israel's birth, and its current growing pains offers considerable satisfactions. Apart from a few errors in unimportant fact and an occasional tendency toward "psychosomatic" jargon, Mr. Koestler has produced a sane, monumental, and permanent contribution to the tortured literature of a bedevilled subject. In addition, he possesses a felicity of word, phrase, and idea which makes the book an experience in the expressiveness of language.

Mr. Koestler begins by noting that the Balfour Declaration was "one of the most improbable political documents of all time, [by which] one nation solemnly promised to a second nation the country of a third." From this he proceeds to show how all three belabored themselves and each other in a hit-and-run political, diplomatic, and shooting guerrilla war which ended in a still greater improbability, the creation of a sovereign Jewish state.

As in a Greek tragedy, Arabs and Jews were "both right in their own terms of reference and in their own universe of discourse." The British failed in Palestine not because of oil and empire, but because of mental blocks and "psychological imponderabilia." Mr. Koestler suggests that nothing else can explain Britain's loyalty to the myth of a Holy War and Arab unity despite the total lack of evidence; its 1939 White Paper, which locked the Jews out of their British-made homeland

just when the doors of the Nazi furnaces were opening; Labor's betrayal of pledges which it had reiterated even during the five years it was in the Coalition Government and had access to the information which later was supposed to have changed its mind; the British rejection of their own inquiry commissions and, finally, of the United Nations to which they themselves had appealed for deliverance. Britain could have had Israel as a faithful dominion. It could have had Abdallah as the grateful master of the Arab half of Palestine. It could have had these without war or Arab disaffection. But it preferred the Mufti and "Operation Deluge," the manufacture of a security vacuum which, after its ignominious departure, could not fail to set Palestine and the whole Middle East on fire. British policy is "no tale of diabolic scheming" but "a case-history for the psychologist." Mr. Koestler concludes that "without Mr. Bevin there would probably be no State of Israel today." Mr. Koestler is probably right.

Though vividly retold and acutely analyzed, the chronicle of the Mandate is essentially an old story. The book reaches fresher ground with the Arab-Jewish struggle of "David and Goliath," the "war on the installment plan" interrupted by UN truces, the "cloak-and-dynamite" war which the Arabs lost because they lacked a "minimum of coordination and guts." By their victory the Jews became, writes Mr. Koestler, "for the first time since Bar-Kochba's revolt against the Romans, not passive victims but active promoters of history."

Most valuable of all are the closing sections on the State of Israel as it is today. With perhaps too little attention to the more positive Israel achievements, but with great insight and even compassion, Mr. Koestler describes the temporary aberrations of Israel nationalism, the power of a Histadrut labor federation over economy and government, the pernicious "party-key" system, the arrogance of a half-baked civil service, the cultural blinders of an archaic language, the rabbinate's overweening interference, and other ailments of the Israel body politic at this fledgling moment in its history.

For this reviewer, Mr. Koestler is a shade too confident that the next generation of *sabras*

will cut the "Church" down to size, and a shade too obsessed with the need for non-Israel Jews henceforth to become non-Jews, a piece of advice which most Jews will doubtless find both unnecessary and somewhat naive. On the whole, however, his book should be studied by two groups of readers: by non-Jews for a sympathetic understanding of a new state whose people have the same kinds of problems as any other people; and by Jews for the critical basis of any effort to advance a right solution of those problems. These two groups of readers include practically everybody.

HAL LEHRMAN
New York, N. Y.

SUDAN

Islam in the Sudan, by J. Spencer Trimmingham. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949. 290 pages. 21s.

When it comes to books the foreigner to the Sudan has but little to guide him in getting to know the Sudanese. If he confines himself merely to politics and economics, he will remain a stranger to the thoughts of the people. He must inform himself not only of the faith which all Muslims hold in common, but also of the particular ways in which the Sudanese have molded that faith to their own needs and longings. J. Spencer Trimmingham, the secretary of the Church Missionary Society in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, has set himself to fill the almost complete gap in the printed literature of this second field. His book concerns the reception of Islam by a people on the edge of the Muslim world, having their feet in the African soil, their heads half inclined toward the West, and their hearts in Asia.

Trimmingham's historical outline leans heavily, as is proper, on MacMichael's *History of the Arabs in the Sudan*, although his attention dwells rather on the rise and fall of Sudanese Christianity in Byzantine times — on its destruction by reason of its isolation from the great Christian centers and its own inherent weakness, as well as from the pressure exerted upon it by the southward migration of the nomad Arabs fleeing from the constriction

of Egypt to the broad pastures of the south. This is appropriate, for when the Arabs had become more or less stabilized in the valley of the Sudan Niles and on the grazing grounds to the east and west, the type of Islam which emerged was already assuming its distinctive character: its vitality, its compromises with existing pagan practices, and, above all, the universal primacy which it accorded to sufism, the mystical ingredient of Islam. A parallel may be drawn from the pagan Berberine compromise with Umayyad Islam in North Africa, and the reader is left wondering just how far Latin Christianity was influenced by the African background of St. Augustine of Hippo.

Trimmingham's description of the *tariqa*, the Islamic brotherhood — "sect" is an inaccurate term — is thorough. Here, for the first time in any language, are collected the history and practices of nearly all of the many brotherhoods in the Sudan. The *tariqa* is an expression of the social and mystical side of Sudanese religious life and is so important that it obtrudes into party political activity today.

In the chapters devoted to the impact of the West on the Islamic way of life, the rapid march of recent events has overtaken some of the argument. And there are errors in detail. Trimmingham is too sweeping, for example, when he states that the *shari'a* condemnation of the use of intoxicants has always been disregarded by the people. True, *marisa*, a light beer brewed from sorghum, forms a balancing element in the popular diet, but *'araq*, a fierce spirit distilled from dates or cereal, is condemned not only by law but by opinion. Its consumption brings social stigma; the kinsmen of an *'araq*i addict speak of him with genuine shame. Whiskey, introduced by the British through the old Egyptian army, is drunk mainly by Sudanese officers and higher officials, and its social effects are negligible. Arabists will be riled by the occasional lapses in the pointing of transliterated words. But these are insignificant technical faults. Authors with more leisure than Trimmingham have often sown *'ain* and reaped *hamza*. That the concluding sections of the book read too much like a lecturer's notes is a weakness for which Trimmingham himself apologizes.

Only those who know their Northern Sudan

will de
occasio
intende
Arabist
to be c
tent fa
many
trast, v
useful

Beyon
Asi
and
290
enc

For
know
which
two
beria
garia
any
work
his c
in th

M
a res
is th
scrib
and
the
hab
Asia
tere
info
ruti
from
the
the
luc
ani
vey
ent

"I

will detect behind this sober survey a scholar's occasional chuckle. But these rare sallies are intended to illustrate, never to gibe, for no Arabist of Trimmingham's measure can afford to be cheap on Islam. Indeed, it is his consistent fairness in approaching a faith which has many points of similarity, as well as of contrast, with Christianity that makes this book so useful an addition to the literature on Islam.

RICHARD HILL

University of Durham, England.

TURKESTAN

Beyond the Caspian: A Naturalist in Central Asia, by Douglas Carruthers. Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1949. xx+290 pages. 6 color plates, 18 photographs, end map. 22s 6d.

For many years Douglas Carruther's *Unknown Mongolia* (2 vols., London, 1913), which recounted his observations made during two years of exploration and collecting in Siberia, Northwestern Mongolia, and Djungaria, has been a classic prized by all who have any interest in Central Asia. In the present work this great naturalist-explorer tells of his earlier experiences in Russian Turkestan in the years 1907-08.

Mr. Carruthers is primarily a naturalist; as a result of his collecting, the British Museum is the richer by a number of hitherto undescribed specimens of Central Asian mammals and birds. Thus a considerable part of *Beyond the Caspian* is devoted to discussions of the habitat, range, and habits of various Central Asian species and sub-species which he encountered. Because of the precise and illuminating information on this subject, in which Mr. Carruthers supplements his own findings with data from Russian publications, the work is of the greatest importance to anyone interested in the fauna of Central Asia. Yet his style is so lucid, his observations on the country and its animal inhabitants so perceptive, that he conveys to the layman reader his interest and enthusiasm.

Mr. Carruthers writes in his introduction, "It will be noted, and probably brought up

against me, that the so-called human element is lacking. I do not attempt to recall the departed glories of those strange capitals at the back of the world, Bukhara and Samarkand, and there is no conversation and back-chat with native guides, local hosts and fellow wayfarers, running continuously through my narrative; one learns more by keeping one's ears open, but one's mouth shut; while living alone tends to make one taciturn and unsociable. Even the ancient cities of Tartary savoured somewhat of civilization, and I would away from crowded bazaars to less frequented places." Yet when on occasion he does introduce the human element—some isolated villagers or nomads whom he has encountered in remote places—he manages to penetrate beneath the surface and in a few sentences illuminate the mode of life and temperament of the group. Although the sight of famed cities does not inspire him to embark on lengthy historical disquisitions, he is steeped in the history of Central Asia, seeing it always in its geographical perspective, and is able to identify as the sites of ancient caravan routes and the paths and camping grounds of past conquerors obscure valleys and passes which usually go unnoticed in histories and travelers' accounts alike.

Following the account of the Turkestan expedition are appended several miscellaneous chapters: one on the hunting dog that accompanied him during the Siberia-Mongolia expedition; one on pheasants. A brief résumé of the western Mongol invasions in the 13th century points out that the Mongol conquerors, whose military strength was derived from their use of horses, seemed unwilling or unable to extend their conquests beyond the boundaries of the grasslands into the forest areas of Siberia or Europe. A final chapter, based on the accounts of two 17th century travelers, traces the appearance, adventures, and disappearance of "the king's diamond." Two appendices deal with the classification and distribution of the *ovis* and *pheasant genera* respectively. The volume concludes with a comprehensive bibliography, an index, and a good map.

ELIZABETH E. BACON
Washington University
St. Louis, Mo.

BOOKS ALSO NOTED

Arab World

Aqaba, by Joseph Braslavsky. Tel Aviv: Cheval Yami Leyisrael, 1948. 94 pages.

Die Arabische Welt, by Hans Rorig. Cologne: Dreikonigen-Verlag, 1948. 153 pages.

Eastern Approaches, by Fitzroy MacLean. London: Jonathan Cape, 1949. 544 pages. 15s.

Education in Arab Countries of the Near East, by Roderick D. Matthews and Matta Akrawi. Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1949. 576 pages. \$6.00. Survey of modern education in Egypt, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon. Photographs, charts, and tables.

État Juif et Monde Arabe, by François Plessiers. Paris: Éditions Gautiers, 1948. 424 pages.

Land of Enchanters, edited by Bernard Lewis. London: Harvell Press, 1949. 157 pages. 10s. 6d. Egyptian short stories through the ages.

The Life of Lord Lloyd, by C. F. Adam. London: MacMillan and Company, 1948. 308 pages. \$5.00.

Mabahith fi al-Iqtisad al-Iraqi (Studies in Iraqi Economy), by Mir Basri. Baghdad: Publications Co., Ltd., 1948. 335 pages.

Al-Sharaq al-Awsat (The Middle East), by Abd al-Rahman Zaki. Cairo: Nahdha Library, 1948. 266 pages. General description of the economic condition of the various countries of the Arab world in relation to the countries of the west.

The Splendour That Was Egypt, by Margaret A. Murray. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1949. xxiii + 335 pages. \$10. A survey of the main elements that went into the making of the "splendour that was Egypt," divided into six sections: prehistory, history, social conditions, religion, arts and sciences, language and literature.

Ethiopia

Travels in Ethiopia, by David Buxton. London: Lindsay Drummond, Ltd., 1949. 200 pages. 18s. Excellent photographs.

India and Pakistan

A Barbarian in Asia, by Henri Michaux. New York: New Directions, 1949. 185 pages. \$2.50. Impressionistic description of India. Factually superficial.

And Gazelles Leaping, by Sudhin N. Ghose. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949. 238 pages. \$3.50. Fictional autobiography of an Indian child, beautifully illustrated by an Indian artist.

Are We Two Nations? Hindus and Muslims, a Study in Citizenship and Recent History, by M. S. Vairanapillai. Hima: Kodaikanal, 1948.

Finance of Indian Planning, by C. S. Zacharias. Bombay: Vora and Co., Ltd., 1948. 113 pages. Rs. 3/12. Discussion of the financial aspects of the economic planning of India.

Handbook of Town Planning, by S. C. Oak. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, Ltd., 1949. 138 pages. Rs. 7/8. General aspects of town planning are discussed as they apply to Indian conditions.

Location of Industries in India, by Tulsi Ram Sharma. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, Ltd., 1948. 319 pages. Rs. 10/8.

Rebuilding India, by T. N. Ramaswamy. Benares: Nand Kishore, 1948. 259 pages. Rs. 5/9.

Twilight in India, by Gervée Baronte. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1949. 366 pages. \$3.75. Discussion of the various manifestations of Hinduism in India, particularly the caste system.

Israel

A New Way of Life: The Collective Settlements of Israel. Foreword by Sir Wyndham Deedes. Introduction by Norman Bentwich. London: Shindler and Golomb, 1949. 148 pages. 12s. 6d. Account of the Jewish settlements in Israel by eight men and women who are themselves settlers. Compiled in conjunction with the Anglo-Israeli Association.

The Palestine Year Book and Israeli Annual, edited by Sophie A. Udin. New York: Zionist Organization of America and Palestine Foundation Fund, Inc., 1948-1949. 540 pages. Volume IV is primarily concerned with the establishment of the State of Israel. In various short articles prominent citizens of Israel discuss phases of the political, social, and economic life of the new state.

The Physical Planning of Israel, by K. H. Baruth. London: Shindler and Golomb, 1949. 116 pages. 15s. The physical planning, its present state and future potentialities, weaknesses and achievements are discussed in detail by an architect and townplanner located in Haifa for many years.

North Africa

Al-Haraka al-Istiqlaliyah fi al-Magrib al-Aqsa (The Independence Movement in the Arab West), by Allal al-Fasi. Cairo: Risala Press, 1948. 560 pages. Discussion of the independence movements in North Africa from Tunis to Morocco.

Palestine

Palestine, by David Brick. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1949. 33 + 96 pages. \$3.50.

Palestine Is Our Business, by Millar Burrows. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1949. 155 pages. \$2.50. Outspoken suggestions for establishing

justice and relieving the suffering of the native Arabs of Palestine, to whom the author feels a great wrong has been done. The background of the Palestine problem is dispassionately discussed.

Palestine: Mohammedan Holy Land, by Charles D. Matthews. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. 158 pages. \$3.00. The historical background of Islamic Palestine, using as the main sources of information two old Arabic manuscripts which were originally pilgrims' guides to the Holy Places.

The United Nations and Palestine, by L. Larry Leonard. New York: Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, 1949. 184 pages. 10¢.

Turkey

Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, by Uriel Heyd. London: The Harvell Press, 1949. 108. 6d. The personalities and ideas which have shaped modern Turkey and influenced its role in world affairs.

Religion and Ethics

The Code of Maimonides. Book Fourteen: The Book of Judges. Translated from the Hebrew by Abraham M. Hershman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949. 319 pages. \$5.00. The present volume consists of the following five treatises: Laws concerning the Sanhedron, Evidence, Rebels, Mourning, Kings and Wars.

Linguistics

A Practical Dictionary of the Persian Language, by John Andrew Boyle. London: Luzac and Co., Ltd., 1949. 193 pages. 21s.

Maps

Map of Middle East Oil. Oil Forum, 1949. \$7.50. Large-scale map showing locations of over 40 oil concessions, terms and ownership, oilfields, refineries, pipelines, current production.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer, Consultant in Near East Bibliography, Library of Congress

With contributions from: Elizabeth Bacon, Richard Ettinghausen, Abdollah Faryar, Sidney Glazer, Harold W. Glidden, Harvey P. Hall, George C. Miles, Leon Nemoy, M. Perlmann, William D. Preston, C. Rabin, Dorothy Shepherd, and Andreas Tietze.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East generally since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of excellent bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Moslem Spain, the Arab world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of Soviet Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field, *Zionism and Palestine*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library in New York.

For list of abbreviations, see page 142.

GEOGRAPHY

(General, description, travel and exploration, natural history, geology)

- 3076 "Modern Afghanistan." (in French) *Doc. Française* No. 1112 (Ap 19, '49) 3-39. A comprehensive description of Afghanistan: it geography, population, historical development, government, internal situation, and foreign relations, including the text of the country's constitution.
- 3077 "Transjordan." (in French) *Doc. Française* No. 1059 (Ja 21, '49) 21. A discussion of the economic evolution of Transjordan: the country's natural resources, agriculture, cattle farming, industries, public finance, including data on demography, government, and local administration. A map and the text of the treaty signed in March 1948 between Transjordan and the United Kingdom are also included.
- 3078 CHAPELLE, MAJOR. "The nomads of the southern Sahara." (in French) *Tropiques* 47 (Mr '49) 25-38. The author gives a description of the 300,000 to 400,000 Tuaregs, most of whom are scattered throughout French West Africa. An officer of the French colonial infantry reports on these nomads' history, ethnology, living conditions, customs, social structure, and economic life.
- 3079 EDMONDS, C. J. "The travels of Arthur MacMurrough Kavanagh in Kurdistan and Luristan in 1850." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 267-73. Excerpts from and comments on the diary of a mid-19th century traveler in Iran.
- 3080 FIELD, HENRY. "Some notes on the Al bu Muhammad of Iraq." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 274-77. Observations made during a trip to the marsh country of southern Iraq in 1934.
- 3081 KELLY, LADY. "Some notes on travel in modern Turkey." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 252-64. A tourist guide to Turkey, outside Istanbul, written by the wife of a former British Ambassador to Turkey. Map.
- 3082 PRICE, M. PHILIPS. "A visit to Afghanistan." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Ap '49) 124-34. The author presents his impressions of Afghanistan and reports that this country is steadily being molded into a national unity by the Durrani dynasty and family. He also states that materially it is the most backward of the Moslem states in the Middle East, but at the same time it is the most attractive and interesting to a traveller because one can still see the East as it has been for hundreds of years.
- 3083 PROUDLOCK, LIEUT.-COLONEL R. V. "The Miranzai Valley." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 307-8. Nostalgic note on

military events and tribal migrations through the Miranzai Valley on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

- 3084 ROTHSCCHILD, JULIUS JOTHAM. "Kurdaneh." *Palestine Exploration Quart.* 81 (Ja-Apr '49) 58-66. Description of this locality between Haifa and Acre, its crusader associations, and its archeological remains, mainly prehistoric.

See also: 3191, 3193

HISTORY AND POLITICS

(Ancient, medieval, modern)

- 3085 "The Azizan or the Princes of Bhotan." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 249-51. A note on the history of the Kurdish family of Bedr Khan, including information on the Kurdish nationalist movement.
- 3086 "King Feisal I." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 2 (Jl '49) 13-14, 52-54. A brief history of the modern political relations between Iran and Iraq commencing with King Feisal's reign in Iraq and an account of his trip to Iran in 1932.
- 3087 "Memoirs of Yephrem Khan." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 2 (S '48) 19-21. Second in the series of Yephrem Khan's memoirs about the conquest of Tehran during the Constitutional movement and the part he played in this fight.
- 3088 "Recent constitutional changes in Iran." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* (Jl-O '49) 265-6. Note on the action of the Constituent Assembly called by the Shah on February 28. "It approved by virtually unanimous vote two measures—one a new Article to the Constitution establishing the procedure whereby the Constitution is to be amended, and the other a revised version of Article 48 of the Constitution which deals with the method of dissolution.
- 3089 "Syria after Husni Za'im." *World Today* (London) 5 (O '49) 413-5. The author of this brief note appears to think little of Za'im and his accomplishments, even less of the standard of public and private morality now obtaining in the country.
- 3090 A. C. E. "Persia revisited." *World Today* (London) 5 (S '49) 308-97. After a 9-months' trip all over Iran, the author found: communications surprisingly good; morale vastly improved over what it was in 1946; steady progress being made toward democracy and personal freedom; the Shah a liberal-minded ruler; the 15th Majlis a free and independent (if somewhat ineffectual) assembly; and both resolved to carry out the Seven-Year Plan for which there is much support (accompanied by scepticism) on the part of the press and people.
- 3091 ABEGHIAN, ARTASHES. "History of Armenia." *Armenian Rev.* 2 (S '49) 3-27. A succinct study, of which the second part, that dealing with cultural history, is quite readable and useful.
- 3092 AKOPYAN, G. "American imperialist expansion in the Near and Middle East." (in Russian) *Voprosy Ekonomiki* 6 (Je '49) 42-59. Economic penetration, ideological influences, blood-stained hands of bribed agents, military bases—these will not suppress the national and progressive movements of the peoples of the East. This article, along with recent newspaper editorials, may herald a new Soviet thrust into the Middle East.
- 3093 'ALAMI, MUSA. "The lesson of Palestine." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 42-4. A summary. *Middle East J.* 3 (O '49) 373-405. Translation and partial digest from the Arabic of a pamphlet analyzing the reasons for the Arab defeat in Palestine and outlining a program for political, social, and economic regeneration.
- 3094 AMINI, REZA. "The Iranian senate." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 2 (Jl '48) 15-18. Asserts the necessity of having a second chamber, and by way of comparison describes the British House of Lords and the Senate in France, Belgium, U.S., Egypt, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
- 3095 AYALON (NEUSTADT), DAVID. "The Circassians in the Mamluk Kingdom." *J. Amer. Orient. Soc.* 69 (Jl-S '49) 135-47. Barquq was a Circassian who made his fellow-countrymen the ruling caste in the Mamluk Kingdom and thus accelerated the decline of the group that governed Egypt until the advent of the Ottoman Turks. (This article forms part of the author's work on the Mamluk army.)
- 3096 BANKS, WILLIAM. "Whither the Muslims?" *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 36-9. Urges the political leaders of the various Islamic countries to embark upon spiritual, social, and economic reforms lest the "great movement of religious and national rebirth should result merely in the extension of Stalin's Empire."
- 3097 BENTWICH, NORMAN. "The Arab refugees." *Contemp. Rev.* No. 1006 (Ag '49) 79-82. Points to the transfer of refugees between India and Pakistan and suggests a similar approach for the Arabs.
- 3098 BOMBACI, ALESSIO. "La collezione di documenti turchi dell'Archivio di Stato di Venezia." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 95-107. Summary of a report on these valuable documents which, when published, will throw much light on Ottoman diplomacy.

- 3099 COHEN, AHARON, "The Syrian coup d'état." (in Hebrew) *Yalqut Hamizrah Hatikhon* (Jerusalem) 1 NS (My '49) 1-5. Za'im's coup is interpreted as an American move, with Turkey and France willing partners of the U. S.
- 3100 DICKSON, ZAHRA. "Kuwait and its people." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 25-7. Since the advent of the oil company, western ideas have been slowly but steadily seeping down from the educated and business classes to the common people and thus gradually undermining their conservatism.
- 3101 ERMOYAN, HRANT. "Soviet Armenia today." *Armenian Rev.* 2 (S '49) 66-71. Summary of and comments on the comprehensive report of the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Armenia (opened Nov. 12, 1948) by Grigor Haroutinian, First Secretary of the Central Committee.
- 3102 HEYMANN, HANS. "Iranian oil concession: I, II." *Fortnightly* No. 993 NS (S, O '49) 185-90, 244-51. Describes the big powers' activities and concludes that the Soviets have a "justifiable" need for Iranian oil. Hence, an oil concession, if negotiated in good faith, would be "legitimate," and, if some related problems are settled, provide a basis for liquidating the "Iranian-Soviet incident."
- 3103 KHATISSIAN, ALEXANDER. "Memoirs of a mayor." *Armenian Rev.* 2 (S '49) 40-7. Eye-witness account of the impact of events in the Caucasus from 1910-1917, particularly the city of Tiflis, as they affected the Armenian population.
- 3104 KURDIAN, H. "Waziric dynasty of Badr al-Jamali, the Armenian." *Armenian Rev.* 2 (S '49) 93-7. Excerpts from the works of Hitti, O'Leary, and their chief source, the Egyptian historian al-Maqrizi, concerning the life of this interesting Fatimid prime minister who did so much for Egypt in the 11th century.
- 3105 LUSHIN, S. "Iran in the grip of a crisis." *New Times* (Moscow) No. 34 (Ag 17, '49) 12-3. The root of Iranian difficulties is to be found in the anti-peoples' policy of its rulers, who have delivered the country to American imperialists. In particular, Iran has been flooded by American goods, which are slowly threatening the national industries with total destruction.
- 3106 MARMORSTEIN, EMILE. "The fate of Arabdom: a study in comparative nationalism." *Internat. Aff.* 25 (O '49) 475-91. An exciting study of the rise of Arab nationalism. The author gloomily predicts the establishment of dictatorships in all the Arab countries, expropriation of Jewish wealth (ultimately the turn of other minorities will come), extortion of funds from foreign firms and oil companies, the union of the Fertile Crescent into one state, and finally an attack on Israel. "Eventually the slogan may be 'onward to Andalusia'."
- 3107 MASHKIN, M. "The struggle for the commune of 1870 in Algeria." (in Russian) *Voprosy Ist.* No. 6 (Je '49) 85-99. An interesting communication on the supporters of the Commune in overseas France, and on the confusion and disintegration in their ranks under the impact of the natives' revolt.
- 3108 MIRMIROGLU, V. L. "The battle of Pelekano between Orphan and Andronicus III." (in Turkish) *Belletin* (Istanbul) 13 (Ap '49) 309-21. A reappraisal of the importance of the battle (1329 A.D.) for the conquest of Byzantium by the Ottoman Turks. The location of the site is believed to be between Darica and Eskihisar.
- 3109 MAVAI, ABDOL HOSSEIN. "The capture of Tehran." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 2 (Jl '48) 19-21. Second in a series of articles describing the fight of the supporters of the constitutional movement to recapture Tehran from the forces of Mohammed Ali Shah who opposed the movement.
- 3110 PIASKOVSKI, A. V. "The peoples of Turkestan in revolution of 1905-7." (in Russian) *Izv. Ak. Nauk. SSSR, Otd. lit. i yez.* 6 (My-Je '49) 271-5. The local political awakening was, of course, accelerated under the impact of the tremendous events in European Russia.
- 3111 POPOV, M. V. "U. S. expansion in Iran in World War II." (in Russian) *Izv. Ak. Nauk Ser. Ist. i fil.* 6 (Ag '49) 363-7. The Millspaugh Mission is analyzed as a sordid stage of dollar penetration in preparation for a new war.
- 3112 RAFIKOV, A. "Racist ravings in Turkey." *New Times* (Moscow) No. 37 (S 7, '49) 30-2. Under present-day conditions, says the author who is a research worker in the Institute of Oriental Studies, "the poisonous ideology of racism is designed to help turn the Turks into cheap cannon fodder for the Anglo-American imperialists."
- 3113 REISSNER, H. G. "The *ummi* Prophet and the Banu Israil of the Qur'an." *Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 277-81. Offers the theory that the Banu Israil of the Qur'an, after their expulsion from the Hijaz, came to India where they are known as the Bene Israel, living in villages on the Konkan coast south of Bombay.
- 3114 RIF'AT BEY, MUHAMMAD. "The story of el Faluge." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 36-8. An account of the "most picturesque and most valiant episode of the Palestine

- campaign" by a prominent Egyptian journalist.
- 3115 RIGGO, ACHILLE. "Origini della guerra Veneto-Tunisina (1784-1792)." *Oriente Mod.* (Rome) 29 (Ap-Je '49) 75-82. Includes the text of unedited documents from the Venetian consulate in Tunis.
- 3116 ROBERTSON-SCOTT, J. W. "Who secured the Suez Canal shares?" *Quart. Rev.* No. 581 (Jl '49) 336-47. The decision to buy the Khedive's shares was due to information secured by Frederick Greenwood, editor of *Pall Mall Gazette*, and his pressure on Disraeli.
- 3117 SELTZER, M. "The minorities of the Near East." (in Hebrew) *Yalqut Hamizrah Hatikhon* (Jerusalem) 1 NS (Ap '49) 21-9. Stresses the contiguous character of Kurdish settlements.
- 3118 SMORGORZEWSKI, K. M. "Turkey turns toward democracy." *Contemp. Rev.* (O '49) 213-20. Turkey, writes the author after a month's visit, is still a police state, and "with such a neighbor as the U.S.S.R. it is difficult to think how it might be otherwise." Nevertheless, the revolution started by Atatürk is still going on and the country will eventually obtain democracy.
- 3119 TASHJIAN, JAMES M. "The American military mission to Armenia." *Armenian Rev.* 2 (S '49) 54-65. Additional details and documentation on this interesting post-World War I phase in the history of Armenian-American relations.
- 3120 VECCIA VAGLIERI, LAURA. "Le vicende del harigismo in epoca abbaside." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 31-44. Carries forward the researches made on this sect by Brünnow and Wellhauser, who had confined themselves to the Umayyad period.
- 3121 WAVELL, LORD. "The presidential address." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 233-36. Address to the Royal Central Asian Society in which Lord Wavell holds that the interests of the Soviet Union lie not in Europe, but in Asia, and that "the next great struggle for world power, if it takes place, may well be for the control of" the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.
- 3122 YALE, WILLIAM. "Ambassador Morgenthau's special mission of 1917." *World Politics* 1 (Ap '49) 308-20. Discusses the impact of influential private groups on foreign policy. The article uses as an example Henry Morgenthau's special mission of 1917, which started out to negotiate a separate peace with Turkey, but was circumvented by Zionist interests.
- 3123 YOUNG, RICHARD. "Saudi Arabian offshore legislation." *Amer. J. Internat. Law* 43 (Jl '49) 530-32. A brief discussion of the recently enacted Saudi-Arabian decrees on territorial waters and control over the submarine areas beneath the high seas.
- 3124 ZVYAGIN, Y. "Imperialist rivalry in the Middle East." *New Times* (Moscow) No. 38 (S 14, '49) 3-6. The Americans and British are engaged in a bitter struggle to oppress and exploit the peoples of the Near East, with the British having the upper hand at the moment as a result of the overthrow of the Za'im regime.
- 3125 ZWEMER, SAMUEL M. "Francis of Assisi and Islam." *Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 247-51. Description of an attempt made by St. Francis in 1219 to convert to Christianity the Sultan of Egypt, who had just inflicted a severe blow upon the crusaders.
- See also: 3076, 3078, 3082, 3083, 3171, 3173, 3187, 3193.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation, and communications)

- 3126 "Afghanistan to invite aid of U. S. oil companies." *World Oil* 129 (Ag '49) 244. Afghanistan has indicated that it will seek the aid of American oil companies for an intensive development of Afghan petroleum resources. A rapid industrialization program is under way in Afghanistan.
- 3127 "The economic life of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan." (in French) *Doc. Française* No. 1165 (Jl 15, '49) 1-21. This is a review of the Sudan's geography, hydrography, population, agricultural production, means of transportation, foreign commerce, and financial questions.
- 3128 "Egypt." *World Oil* No. 5 (Jl 15, '49) 216. Egypt, while reaching a new all-time peak in petroleum production during 1948, still finds itself in a rather uncertain position at the end of the year with regard to its future development. The new petroleum law has made operators feel that their activity will be too rigidly controlled by the government to allow them to lay out their normal long-range programs.
- 3129 "Ethiopian operations begin with spudding of Gumburo I." *World Oil* 129 (Je '49) 237. Sinclair Petroleum Company has spudded its first well in Ethiopia, as part of an intensive program to discover oil in as yet untested areas in the world. This well, Gumburo I, is in the Gumburo Hills in Ogaden, 250 miles by air and 475 miles by road, southeast of Dire Dawa.
- 3130 "The industrialization of the countries of the Middle East." (in French) *Doc. Française* No. 1120 (Ap 29, '49) 3-42. A report on the present status of industrialization in

- Turkey, Egypt, Palestine, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, with particular reference to the petroleum, textile, metal, tobacco, chemical, cement, leather, and electrical industries. New projects are also listed.
- 3131 "Iran's losses in oil royalties." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 2 (Jl '48) 1-9. Gives a description of oil production in the Middle East together with production statistics of various companies and maintains that Iran does not receive its fair share as compared with other countries in the area. It advocates oil concessions in Iran similar to those in Venezuela.
- 3132 "Middle East oil projects will double production by 1951; new refineries and pipelines essential in order to meet Marshall Aid requirements." *Gt. Brit. and the East* 65 (Je '49) 35. The part played by Middle East oil in future world requirements.
- 3133 "Middle East summary." *World Oil* 129 (Jl 15, '49) 225-48. Oil output of various Middle Eastern countries.
- 3134 "Mineral resources in Turkey." *Turkey Today* No. 4 (1949) 11. Survey of Turkish mineral resources.
- 3135 "Moroccan manganese ore." (in French) *Echo Mines et Metal* No. 3406 (Mr '49) 62. Important and minor manganese deposits in Morocco.
- 3136 "The political and economic evolution of Ethiopia since the end of World War II." (in French) *Doc. Française* No. 1094 (Mr 21, '49) 1-24. Discusses Ethiopia's geographical features, history, population, government and administration, agriculture, cattle farming, imports and exports.
- 3137 "Suez canal — 7th programme." *Gt. Brit. and the East* 65 (Ag '49) 37. This vast new five-year scheme will result in a by-pass on the canal that will accelerate the transit of convoys by providing an additional passing place.
- 3138 CRARY, DOUGLAS D. "Irrigation and land use in Zeiniya Baharai, Upper Egypt." *Geog. Rev.* 39 (O '49) 568-83. Description of the ancient basin system of irrigation, which permits only one crop a year, and the newer perennial system, permitting more than one crop, together with a brief discussion of techniques for raising water and settlement patterns and house types. Maps, photographs, and figures.
- 3139 DIAMOND, WILLIAM. "Activities of the International Bank in the Middle East." *Middle East J.* 3 (O '49) 455-60. A summary, with comment, of sections of the Bank's *Fourth Annual Report 1948-1949*.
- 3140 FISHER, W. B. "Population problems of the Middle East." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 208-20. A succinct and informative discussion of the problems involved in attempting to achieve a balance between food supply and population in the several countries between Iran and Egypt. Population map.
- 3141 FROOD, A. McK. "Some post-war economic developments in Egypt." *The Advancement of Science.* 6 (Ap '49) 45-50. This review of Egypt's population increase, agriculture, industry, and foreign trade, ends with the conclusion that although Egypt is attempting to adjust its economy to post-war conditions and is at present a relatively prosperous country, it still has to solve the long-term problem of supporting its increasing population.
- 3142 FRANCK, PETER G. "Problems of economic development in Afghanistan: II: Planning and finance." *Middle East J.* 3 (O '49) 421-40. A continuation of #2956.
- 3143 GUELFAT, I. "Economic trends in the Middle East." *Amer. J. of Econ. and Soc.* 8 (Ap-Jl '49) 277-86, 367-75. Discussion of the economic problems of the Middle East and their handling by the UN and its subsidiary organs.
- 3144 HANS, J. "Economic aspects of the Middle East." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 6-9. Reviews some salient features of the economic and social development within the world of Islam during the past 35 years.
- 3145 HENZE, PAUL B. "The economic development of Soviet Central Asia to the eve of World War II." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 278-96. An examination of Soviet methods as applied to a semi-colonial area. First part of a detailed study on the subject. Includes sections on historical background, population, agriculture, transportation. Statistical tables.
- 3146 NAJJAR, HALIM. "Land ownership." (in Arabic) *Al-Abhath* (Beirut) 2 (Ja '49) 151-68. Distribution of land in the Arab countries shows a preponderance of large estates and remnants of feudal relations, and of the *musha'*. The results are unfortunate for agriculture and for the social structure in general. The obsolete regime cannot cope with the emerging problems and it is thus a convenient target for communistic propaganda.
- 3147 SOUTHWELL, C. A. P. "Oil in Kuwait." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 221-27. On the practical mechanics of setting up a large new oil installation, with facilities for storing and transporting the oil, and accommodations for the personnel. Map.
- 3148 STEVENS, GEORGE P., JR. "Saudi Arabia's petroleum resources." *Econ. Geog.* 25 (Jl '49) 216-25. Good maps, illustrations, and statistical tables accompany a sketch of the development of the oil wells of Arabia. In 1947 Arabia produced 90

- million of the 314 million barrels produced in the Middle East.
- 3149 VATOLINA, L. "Egypt's foreign trade." (in Russian) *Vneshnaia Torgovlia* 19 (Je '49) 19-23. Surveys the data for the last decade.
- 3150 WILLIAMS, RANDALL S. "Iran: operations commence on \$650,000,000 development program." *For. Commerce Weekly* (Washington) 37 (N 14, '49) 3, 39. Describes some of the projects that have been activated, and notes both the discouraging and encouraging aspects of the program.

See also: 3077.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS

(General education, population and ethnology, medicine and public health, religion, law)

- 3151 "The feminist movement in Egypt." (in Arabic) *al-Mustami' al-'Arabi* (London) 10 (1949) 14. An account of the program of the *Ittihad Bint al-Nil*, an increasingly powerful Egyptian feminist organization, which publishes a magazine with the same name.
- 3152 J. M. B. "Combating Egyptian crime for a lifetime." *Gt. Brit. and the East* 65 (Jl '49) 35-6. Some experiences of Sir Thomas Russell Pasha, who for many years was Commandant of Police in Cairo. His most important work was in the suppression of drug traffic. He has recently published his memoirs, *Egyptian Service, 1902-1946*.
- 3153 'ALI, MUHAMMAD, "Divorce in Islam." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Ag '49) 5-9. Although marriage is sacred, Islam recognizes the necessity for divorce in exceptional circumstances, herein detailed.
- 3154 'ALI, MUHAMMAD. "Penal laws of Islam." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 7-11. Cites pertinent verses from the Koran and the Hadith dealing with murder, theft, adultery, and drunkenness.
- 3155 ASHKENAZI, TOUVIA. "La tribu arabe: ses éléments." *Anthropos* (Fribourg, Switzerland) 41-4 (1946-9) 657-72. Old and new terminology of tribal relations; concept of tribal relations; the native classification of tribes; the powerful impact of two world wars on tribal and semi-sedentary life.
- 3156 BEDR KHAN, EMIR DR. KAMURAN 'ALI. "The Kurdish problem." *Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 237-48. A brief description of Kurdish culture, followed by a plea for Kurdish autonomy.
- 3157 D'EMILA, ANTONIO. "Il bai' al-hiyār nella Mudawannah." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 45-58. The structure of the bai' al-hiyār can be cited as a notable example of Moslem jurisprudence.
- 3158 EBERHARD, W. "Some cultural traits of the Sha-t'o Turks." *Oriental Art* I (Autumn 1948) 50-5. The Sha-t'o, in spite of their strong signification, are shown to have preserved some customs of Central Asian, especially Turkish, origin.
- 3159 ISSAWI, CHARLES. "Population and wealth in Egypt." *Milbank Memorial Fund Quart.* (New York) 27 (Ja '49) 98-113. A frank and objective description of Egypt's most serious problem, for which two partial solutions are offered—emigration and industrialization. The difficulties inherent in these and other suggestions, as noted by the author himself, do not entitle anyone to view the matter with optimism.
- 3160 MAJID, 'ABDUL. "European biographies of the Prophet Muhammad." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 12-14. A bitter attack on European Orientalists for failing to use proper source materials and permitting their religious and political prejudices to produce distorted accounts of the life and personality of Muhammad.
- 3161 MINORSKY, PROFESSOR V. "The tribes of western Iran." *Royal Anthropological Institute* 75 (1945) 73-80. A discussion of the various tribes which have inhabited the western mountain area of Iran from pre-Iranian times to the present. Minorsky points out that the Guran, often classed as Kurds, are linguistically and historically distinct. Maps.
- 3162 NAYAR-NOURI, HAMID. "Persian women, past and present." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 2 (S '48) 15-18. First of a series of articles on the position of women in Iran throughout history. This article describes women's position in pre-Islamic days.
- 3163 NIZAMI, KHALIQ AHMAD. "Early Indo-Muslim mystics and their attitude toward the State." *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad) 22 (O '48) 387-98. Contrasts the attitude of the Suhrawardiyya School, which accepted government service and wealth, and the Chistiyya, who shunned both because they prevented the mystic from attaining his aims. Detailed account of the attitudes of some important Shaykhs.
- 3164 PANETTA, ESTER. "Su alcune costumanze popolari di Bengasi." *Riv. di Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 67-73. These customs, three examples of which are here interestingly described, appear to derive from Islamic concepts, but actually are the continuation of even more ancient practices under an Islamic veneer.
- 3165 PATAI, RAPHAEL. "Musha'a land tenure and co-operation in Palestine." *Amer. Anthropologist* 51 (Jl-S '49) 436-45. Arab peasants did not emulate Jewish co-opera-

- tive ventures because 1.) they did not grasp the ideological urge for collective living; 2.) they were repelled by the superficial similarity between collectivism and the old *mushā'*.
- 3166 SOORMA, C. A. "Proprietary and personal rights of women in Islam." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 16-7. Some pertinent Qur'ānic quotations.
- 3167 THOMSON, WILLIAM. "The ascetical and mystical movement of Islam." *Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 282-91. The last of four valued articles reassessing the major elements of Islam.
- 3168 WATT, W. MONTGOMERY. "A forgery in al-Ghazālī's *Mushkāt*?" *J. Royal Asian Soc.* No. 1, 2 (1949) 5-22. The section of the *Mishkāt al-Anwār* dealing in the tradition of the Seventy Veils is incompatible with al-Ghazālī's thought and is a forgery. There is no basis for the theory that al-Ghazālī in his later years accepted Neoplatonism or that he held a system of esoteric views radically different from his exoteric ones.
- See also: 3077, 3078, 3080, 3190, 3209.

SCIENCE

- 3169 BATRAWI, A. "The racial history of Egypt and Nubia. Part I: The Craniology of lower Nubia." *Royal Anthropological Institute* 75 (1945) 81-101. An anthropometric study of material excavated in 1929-34 in districts south of the First Cataract which were to be submerged by the raising of the Aswan dam.
- 3170 KHAN, MOHAMMAD 'ABDUL RAHMAN. "Muslim share in the advancement of science." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Ag '49) 16-9. Some of the outstanding discoveries are briefly discussed.
- 3171 RAYNOV, T. I. "Al-Biruni, the great scholar of Middle Asia." (in Russian) *Izv. Ak. Nauk. SSSR, Otd. lit. i yaz.* 8 (Mr-Ap '49) 101-16. December 13, 1948 marked 900 years since the death of Biruni. His views on science and history are here reviewed.
- 3172 SARNELLI, TOMMASO. "Il *Kitāb al-Lum'ah al-Kāfiyah* . . ." *Riv. di Studi Orient.* 24 (1949) 78-91. Description of this hitherto unknown medical text by a 14th century Yemenite King al-'Abbās b. Rasūl al-Ghassāni. The ms. belongs to Husayn b. 'Abd al-Qādir, governor of San'ā' who offered it to Dr. Sarnelli, a practising physician in the city.
- 3173 TOLSTOV, S. P. "Biruni and his times." (in Russian) *Vestnik Ak. Nauk. SSSR* 19 (Ap '49) 42-57. A Khorezmian, Biruni is "among the great men of science in our country."
- 3174 ZAHIDOV, V. Y. "Al-Biruni the thinker." (in Russian) 6 (Mr-Ap '49) 120-33. The scientific views of Biruni show how Europeans, e.g. Hegel, err when they arrogantly deny a place in the history of science and thought to Eastern scholarship.

ART

(*Archeology, architecture, epigraphy, numismatics, minor arts, painting and music, manuscripts and papyri*)

- 3175 BARTHOLD, W. "Uluğ Beğ's coins." (in Turkish) *Belleken* (Istanbul) 13 (Ap '49) 323-5. Interpretation of certain obscure words on coins of the Timurid Uluğ Beğ. The language of the inscriptions is shown to be Turkish.
- 3176 COOK, NILLA CRAM. "The theater and ballet arts of Iran." *Middle East J.* 3 (O '49) 406-20. Description of an experiment in welding a western art form with eastern art motifs to create a new medium of artistic expression.
- 3177 GROUSSET, RENÉ. "L'exposition iranienne di musée Cernuschi." *Oriental Art* I (Winter '48) 105-10. Exhibition of Iranian objects acquired by the museum in Tehran and private collections during the last decade. The five illustrations show pottery and metal objects from the middle of the second millennium B.C. till the 12th century A.D.
- 3178 HAMILTON, R. W. "The baths at Kirbat Majfar." *Palestine Exploration Quart.* 81 (Ja-Ap '49) 40-51. Kh. M. was constructed 724-43 A.D. Preserved blocks of fallen masonry made it impossible to reconstruct most of the buildings in its elevation. The larger part of the mosaic floor has been preserved, as well as some plaster sculptures and wall decoration, including human figures. The themes have strongly Iranian character. Illustrated.
- 3179 IBRAHIM, MUSTAFA KAMIL. "The house of the Prophet and his Mosque in Medina." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 18-21. Architectural details, including two sketches, and some historical background.
- 3180 NEWSON, J. "The influence of Islam on western art." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 10-11. Some scattered observations.
- 3181 NUR, A. S. 'ALI. "Islamic art." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49). Defines the attitude of Islam toward art, undertaking to refute the view that Islam explicitly forbids representation of the human form.
- 3182 PINTO, OLGA. "Manoscritti stampati orientali nelle biblioteche governative italiane." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 161-3. Brief note on some of the uncatalogued Italian collections.

- 3183 ROSENTHAL, FRANZ. "From Arabic books and manuscripts, II: Kindiana." *J. of the Amer. Orient. Soc.* 69 (Jl-S '49) 149-52. A Bodleian *majmū'ah* ms. containing several treatises on astrology, astronomical instruments, and music attributed to al-Kindi.
- 3184 TOLSTOV, S. P. "The 1948 archeological-ethnographic expedition of the USSR Academy of Sciences to Khorezm." (in Russian) *Izv. Ak. Nauk. SSSR. Otd. lit. i yaz.* 6 (My-Je '49) 246-62. Tokharians were possibly related to the Hittites. Hellenist Bactria was destroyed by a native revolt. Many documents on leather and wood were discovered to be written in a north-Iranian dialect.

LANGUAGE

- 3185 BARTHOLD, W. "Persian 'Ark-Erk', 'Kal-'ah', 'Citadel'." (in Turkish) *Belleten* (Istanbul) 13 (Ap '49) 327-30. A study of the use of the word in Persia and Central Asia. The word is of Greek or Latin, not Judeo-Iranian origin.
- 3186 FIRTH, J. R. "Sounds and prosodies." *Trans. Philological Soc.* 1948 (1949) 127-53. Contains a discussion of prosodic features of classical Arabic and Cairene colloquial.
- 3187 KAZARYAN, S. K. "A valuable book on the history of modern Armenia." (in Russian) *Izv. Ak. Nauk. SSSR Otd. lit. i yaz.* 8 (Mr-Ap '49) 165-6. On the volume by G. Sevak (Erevan 1948) in which the beginnings of modern Armenian are traced back to the 17th century. The first grammar appeared in Amsterdam in 1811.
- 3188 LESLAU, WOLF. "The meaning of ARAB in Ethiopia." *Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 307-8. Owing to the fact that the foreigners who uninterruptedly came to Ethiopia were Arabs, the word "Arab" is now used to designate a foreigner or imported object, and is thus comparable in usage to the word *frenġi* in Persia, Turkey, and the Arab world.
- 3189 PAGLIARD, ANTONIO. "Aspetti del diritto sasanidico: Hačašmānd 'Interdictum'." *Riv. di Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 120-35. Reactions of Sasanian law on both the Christian and Moslem worlds are to be presumed. Unfortunately this vast and suggestive field of study remains closed to historians of law because research in the Iranian sources is lagging.
- 3190 PANSEIRA, C. "Alcune precisazioni sull'espressione *al-Ma'ar al-Harām*." *Riv. di Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 74-7. Discussion of the meaning of this Qur'anic phrase which deals with the second of the three "stations" on the pilgrimage.
- 3191 PETECH, L. "Nota su *Māhd e Tawsmī*." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 142-4. Offers explanations for these two geographical names occurring in the *Akhbār al-Sin wa-al-Hind*, recently edited and translated by J. Sauvaget.
- 3192 SERGEANT, R. B. "'Cant' in contemporary south-Arabic dialect." *Trans. Philological Soc.* 1948 (1949) 121-26. Discussion and samples of four types of secret speech, formed by transpositions of, and additions to, ordinary words.
- 3193 STANGE, HANS O. H. "Where was Zayton actually situated?" *J. Amer. Orient. Soc.* 69 (Je-S '49) 121-4. Some methodological considerations for the interpretation of ancient and medieval geographical texts in general, and the texts of Marco Polo and the Islamic writers in particular. Zayton, said by Ibn Battutah to be the greatest harbor in the world, is considered by Stange to be the Arabic version of Hang-Chou, originally Ts'ien-t'ang.

See also: 3175, 3194, 3204.

LITERATURE

- 3194 BOROKOV, A. K. "A valuable source for the study of the Uzbek language." (in Russian) *Izv. Ak. Nauk. SSSR Otd. lit. i yaz.* 8 (Ja-F '49) 67-76. Notes on a translation of and a commentary on the Koran. The ms. is probably a 14th century copy of a much older compilation.
- 3195 CERULLI, ENRICO. "Una tradizione medievale sulle origini di Venezia e le sue fonti orientali." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 145-60. Diffusion of "the story of the cat" through most of the European and Oriental literatures.
- 3196 GABRIELI, FRANCESCO. "Un compendio arabo delli leggi di Platone." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 20-4. The importance of the *Mukhtasar* of al-Fārābī consists in its attempt to adhere directly to Plato's political theory.
- 3197 GARIBYAN, A. S. "Khachitur Abovyan, the great proponent of modern Armenia." (in Russian) *Izv. Ak. Nauk. SSSR. Otd. lit. i yaz.* 8 (Mr-Ap '49) 117-23. A century has passed since the mysterious disappearance of the man who sought to turn the vernacular into the recognized literary idiom.
- 3198 HUSAYN, TĀHĀ. "Sources of modern Egyptian literature — external influences." (in Arabic) *al-Mustamī' al-'Arabī* (London) 10 (1949) 4-5. Egyptians are now drawing inspiration from almost all the European cultures, unlike the past when they looked exclusively to England and France.

- 3199 MAS'UD, HABIB. "Arab literature in Latin America." (in Arabic) *Al-Abhāth* (Beirut) 2 (Je '49) 181-9. The editor of the Sao Paulo Arabic monthly, *Al-Uṣba*, established 1935, describes the activities of the "Andalusian" groups of Arab authors in Brazil.
- 3200 MORENO, M. M. "Mistica musulmana e indiana nel *Maḡma'ul-Bahrain* di Dārā sikōh." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 59-66. Analysis of an attempt to combine Hindu and Sufic thought, which leads to a syncretism wherein the Qur'an and Veda are considered equally texts of divine revelation.
- 3201 RIZZITANO, UMBERTO. "Un nuova trattato attribuito a Ibn al-Muqaffa'." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* 24 (1949) 25-30. A discussion of the *Yatimat al-Sulṭān*, included in Kurd 'Alī's third edition of his *Rasā'il al-Bulaghā'*.
- 3202 ROBSON JAMES. "The transmission of Muslim's *Sahih*." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* (1949) 46-60. Detailed description of the various editions, with a diagram and some criticism of the statements in the sources.
- 3203 ROSSI, ETTORE "Un libro dell' egiziano Mahmūd Taymūr sull'arte narrativa." *Orient. Mod.* (Rome) 29 (Ap-Je '49) 84-5. Interesting summary of Taymur's *Fann al-Qaṣaṣ*.
- 3204 ROSSI, ETTORE, "Studi su manoscritti del *Garibname* di 'Āṣiq Paṣa nelle biblioteche d'Italia." *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 108-19. This *Gharibnāme* is a Turkish mystical poem composed by a contemporary of Dante. It is particularly interesting from a linguistic point of view chiefly because it contains many archaic Turkish words.
- 3205 SHAFĀ, SHOJA-UD-DIN. "Goethe and Iran." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 2 (S '48) 9-10, 59. The writer, who is engaged in translating Goethe's works into Persian, describes Goethe's acquaintance with the works of Hafiz, the great Persian poet, in 1814, and their influence on some of his own writings.
- 3206 SMITH, B. "Arabian Nights in English literature." (in Arabic) *Al-Abhāth* (Beirut) 2 (S '49) 304-10. The influence of the *Nights* should be stressed in the history of romanticism. Addison's *Mirza* and Johnson's *Rasselas* are quoted as illustrations.
- See also: 3183, 3186.
- 3208 KIDEYS, MEHMET. "Islamic publications in Istanbul." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Ag '49) 9-10. These were suspended in 1924 and did not reappear until 1940. Eight periodicals are herein briefly described.
- 3209 LIEBESNY, HERBERT J. "Literature on the law of the Middle East." *Middle East J.* 3 (O '49) 461-9. Citation of titles, with comment, in Western languages on both Islamic law and influence of European law in the Middle East.

BIOGRAPHY

- 3210 "In memoriam Prof. A. P. Potseluyevsky." (in Russian) *Izv. Ak. Nauk. SSSR Otd. lit. i yaz* 8 (Ja-F '49) 83-4. Potseluyevsky (1894-1943) was a distinguished Turkologist who wrote some 70 studies, mostly on the dialects.
- 3211 HAYDAR, PRINCE 'ABDUL MAJID. "Nuri Pasha Killigi, a great son of Turkey." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 41-2. Nuri Pasha Killigi, a brother of Enver Pasha, was killed in March 1949 in Istanbul as a result of an explosion in a munitions factory.
- 3212 IQBAL, ABBAS. "In memory of the late Qazvini." (in Persian) *Ettela'at* (Tehran) 2 (Jl '48) 10-11. An obituary on the death of Mohammad Qazvini, noted Iranian scholar, describing his life and characteristics.
- 3213 NAJĪB BEY, SULAYMĀN. "Al-Ustādh Najīb al-Rihānī." (in Arabic) *al-Mustamir al-'Arabī* (London) 10 (1949) 14. Al-Rihānī, recently deceased, was a distinguished Egyptian stage actor.

BOOK REVIEWS

- 3214 AFNAN, SOHAIL. *Dar Bare-Ye Hunare-e Shir* (Aristotalis). *Oriente Mod.* 29 (Ap-Je '49) 90-1. (Francesco Gabrieli). This neo-Persian version of the *Poetica* is not "L'improvvisazione di seconda mano d'un dilettante, ma una veramentia diretta traduzione dal testo greco . . . da parte d'uno astudioso pienamente inizzato ai metodi della filologia europea."
- 3215 AHMAD, M. *Pakistan and the Middle East*. *Middle East J.* 3 (O '49) 477-8. (John F. Cady). Accurate in its description of the Middle East, but the author fails to identify Pakistan's Muslims historically with the political interests of their Middle Eastern coreligionists.
- 3216 AHMADIYYA, SADR ANJUMAN. *The Holy Koran with English translation and commentary*. *Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 294-5. (James Robson).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 3207 EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. "A select bibliography of writings on Cyrenaica." (Pt. III, Conclusion) *African Studies* (Johannesburg) 8 (Je '49) 62-5.

- 3217 AKAD. NAUK. SSSR. *Pamyati Akademika V.R. Oriente Mod.* 29 (Ap-Je '49) 89-90. (Francesco Gabrieli). Rosen was the founder of a famous school of Russian orientalists, among them Marr, Bathold, and Krachkowsky.
- 3218 AKAD. NAUK. SSSR. *Povest o Barlaame i Iosafe. Oriente Mod.* 29 (Ap-Je '49) 89-90. (Francesco Gabrieli).
- 3219 ANDRAE, TOR. *I Myrtenragarden (In the myrtle garden)*. *Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 296-8. (Richard N. Frye). The late professor of the history of religion at Upsala University was long a profound student of Islamic mysticism.
- 3220 ATEŞ, AHMED, ed. *Kitâb Tarjumân al-Balâghah. Oriente Mod.* 29 (Ap-Je '49) 91. (Francesco Gabrieli). Based on a unique manuscript found in the Fâtiḥ mosque of Istanbul. This old Persian text dealing with figures has commonly been attributed to Farrukhe and for a long time was believed lost.
- 3221 AYBEK, M. T. ed. *The great Uzbek poet.* (in Russian) *Sov. Kniga* (Ja '49) 109-11. (E. Bertels). This is the fourth volume published on Mir-Ali-Shir.
- 3222 BADAWI, ABD AL-RAHMAN. *Shatahât al-Sûfiyyah, I Abû Yazîd al-Bisṭâmî.* *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 177-8. (Francesco Gabrieli).
- 3223 BAMMATE, HAIDAR. *Visages de l'Islam Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 51. (I. de Y.). Attacks Von Grunebaum's review of this book for asserting that it is an inferior re-hash of an oft-told tale.
- 3224 BENAZET, H. *L'Afrique Française en danger. Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 54. (H.V.). "The confessions of an enlightened French imperialist."
- 3225 BERTELS, E. *Navoi. Oriente Mod.* (Rome) 29 (Ap-Je '49) 91-2. (Francesco Gabrieli). Bio-bibliographic study of 'Alî Shîr Navâ'î, well-known Timurid poet and statesman.
- 3226 DAVIS, JOHNSON. *Selections for translation. Al-Mustami'al-'Arabî* (London) 10 (1949) 9. A textbook for practice exercises in translating from and into Arabic.
- 3227 DARLING, MALCOLM LYALL. *At Freedom's Door.* *Middle East J.* 3 (O '49) 477. (Horace I. Poleman). Useful and stimulating for the author's general impressions while traveling about the Indian countryside, not for any exact facts or figures.
- 3228 DESPOIS, J. *Mission scientifique du Fezzan (1944-45). III: Géographie humaine. Geog. Rev.* 39 (O '49) 687-8. (Jean Gottman). "Presents results of a field study of the human and economic geography of a group of oases in the southwestern section of what was, before the war, Italian Libya, a model of its kind, a bright and thorough study of the regional problem arising out of the isolation of a small group of people in empty country."
- 3229 DORMAN, HARRY GAYLORD, JR. *Toward understanding Islam. Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 292-3. (J. Christy Wilson).
- 3230 DUDA, HERBERT W. *Balkantürkische studien. J. Amer. Orient. Soc.* 69 (Je-S '49) 174-5. (W. Eberhard). "The book is a valuable contribution to some economic and social problems of the early Ottoman Empire"; *Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 299-300. (Arthur Jeffry).
- 3231 DUDA, H. W. *Vom kalifat zur republik.* *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 173. (E. Rossi).
- 3232 ENKIRI, GABRIEL. *Ibrahim Pasha 1789-1848. Middle East J.* 3 (O '49) 471-2. (F. S. Rodkey). Replete with information, but unduly laudatory and "anti-Turkish, anti-Russian, and anti-British."
- 3233 EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica. Al-Mustami' al-'Arabî* (Rome) 10 (1949) 5. (John Whitehead); *Internat. Aff.* 25 (O '49) 539. (H. A. R. Gibb).
- 3234 ERDMANN, KURT. *Die Kunst Irans zur zeit der Sasaniden. Oriental Art I* (Autumn '48) 196. (Arthur Lane). "An admirably lucid text on a highly controversial subject."
- 3235 FARÊS, BISHR. *Une Miniature Religieuse de l'école arabe de Bagdad.* *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 179. (Francesco Gabrieli). This well illustrated volume deals with an unedited miniature (1217 A.D.) that adorns a text of the *Kitâb al-Aghânî* in the Egyptian National Library. It includes a summary in Arabic that is particularly valuable in defining Arabic technical artistic terms.
- 3236 GABRIELI, F. *Le Mille at una Notte.* *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* 24 (1949) 190. (E. Rossi). The first complete and direct Italian translation.
- 3237 GAVIGAN, JOHN J. *The Capture of Damietta. Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 295-6. (H. A. R. Gibb). Oliver of Paderborn's history of the Fifth Crusade, a little-known episode in medieval history.
- 3238 GIBB, H. A. R. *Mohammedanism. Islamic Rev.* 37 (Je '49) 56. *Royal Cent. Asian J.* (Jl-O '49) 317-18. (A.S.T.). "To the layman who knows only that Mohammed founded a religion, and to the specialist, who already knows a lot about Islam, this book can be heartily recommended; the former will find what he wants and the latter will find stimulating suggestions."
- 3239 GLAZER, SIDNEY, ed. *Manhaj as-Sâlik: Abû Hyyân's Commentary on the "Al-fyya" of Ibn Mâlik.* *Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 298-9. (Arthur Jeffry). Abû Ḥayyân was one of the greatest Arab grammarians.

- 3240 GOLDZIHHER, I. *Al-'Aqidah wa-al-Shari'ah fi al-Islām*. Oriente Mod. (Rome) 29 (Ap-Je '49) 86. (Mario Moreno). Detailed criticism of the *Vorlesungen über den Islam* translated into Arabic by several scholars, two of whom are Azhar professors.
- 3241 GORDON, C. H. *Lands of the cross and the crescent*. Islamic Culture (Hyderabad) 22 (O '48) 415. (M.H.). "a very superficial book . . . all of mere pastime value."
- 3242 GRAY, BASIL. *Persian painting*. Oriental Art I (Winter '48) 152. (E. F. Wellesz).
- 3243 HAMDĪ, HĀFIZ AHMAD. *Al-Daulah al-Khwaḍirīyah wa-al-Mughūl*. Oriente Mod. 29 (Ap-Je '49) 89. (Francesco Gabrieli).
- 3244 HINDUS, MAURICE. *In search of a future*. Commentary 8 (S '49) 307-9. (Joel Carmichael).
- 3245 HUSAYN, TAHA. *Al-Fitnah al-Kubra. I: 'Uthmān*. Riv. degli Studi Orient. (Rome) 24 (1949) 180-1. (Francesco Gabrieli). A retelling of the story of the third caliph based on Caetani's *Annali del-Islam*, but with occasionally divergent and challenging judgment.
- 3246 KAEMPFER, E. *Am. Hofe des persischen Grosskönigs (1684-85)*. Riv. degli Studi Orient. 24 (1949) 184-5. (O. Reser) A German translation of Walter Hinz' edition of the *Amoenitates Exoticae*, a valuable contribution to our knowledge of Iran in the 17th century.
- 3247 KARATAEV, N. M. N. M. *Przeval'skij, pervyj issledovatel' Prirody Central'noj Azii*. Riv. degli Studi. Orient. (Rome) 24 (1949) 186-7. (Luciano Petech). Przeval'sky occupies an important position in the history of the geographic, zoological, and botanical exploration of Central Asia.
- 3248 KASSARJIAN, BEDROS. *The Armenian Church and its doctrine*. Armenian Rev. 2 (S '49) 158. (Arpena Mesrobian).
- 3249 KIRK, GEORGE. *A short history of the Middle East*. Al-Mustami' al-'Arabī (London) 10 (1949) 14. ('Abd al-Rahmān Bishnāq).
- 3250 LANE, ARTHUR. *Early Islamic pottery*. Oriental Art I (Winter '48) 152. (Douglas Barrett).
- 3251 LENCZOWSKI, GEORGE. *Russia and the west in Iran: 1918-1948*. Middle East J. 3 (O '49) 478-9. (Edwin M. Wright). Fills out an important chapter in Iran's history, with much material collected on the spot.
- 3252 LITTMANN, E. *Arabic Inscriptions*. J. Amer. Orient. Soc. 69 (Je-S '49) 161-3. (Charles C. Torrey); Muslim World 39 (O '49) 301. (A. R. Nykl).
- 3253 LUGAL, NECATI and NEŞET ÇAĞATAY. *Zafernâme of Nizāmuddīn Shāmi Belleten* (Istanbul). 13 (Ap '49) 351-6. (Ahmed Temir).
- 3254 MAUGHAM, ROBIN. *North African notebook*. Islamic Rev. 37 (Ap '49) 51. (A.F.).
- 3255 MILLER, A. F. *A short history of Turkey, and an outline of the recent history of Turkey*. (in Russian) Vestnik Ak. Nauk. SSSR. 19 (Ag '49) 94-104 (E. G. Sarkisov).
- 3256 MONTAGNE, ROBERT. *La civilisation du désert*. Geog. Rev. 39 (O '49) 687-8. (Jean Gottmann). "Describes the general pattern of nomadic life in the Arabian and Sahara deserts, but devotes most of his attention to the Syrian desert. . . . It is a well-documented picture of a civilization that is indeed adapted to the physical environment."
- 3257 ORUJEV, A. G. *The Azarbayjan dictionary*. (in Russian) Izv. Ak. Nauk. SSSR, Otd. lit. i yaz. 8 (Jl-Ag '49) 395-6. Reviews the lexicographic work on the language, in particular a four volume Russian-Azarbayjan dictionary.
- 3258 PEARSE, RICHARD. *Three years in the Levant*. Middle East J. 3 (O '49) 472-3. (David S. Dodge). Observations of a member of the British intelligence service (1943-46); Royal Cent. Asian J. 36 (Jl-O '49) 321-3. (A.M.H.). "One of those rare books that are conducive to profound thought on all Middle East problems, and the author is to be congratulated."
- 3259 PERHAM, MARGERY. *The government of Ethiopia*. Middle East J. 3 (O '49) 474-5. (Wolf Leslau). "Objective and well-documented for the older periods; and it shows, at the same time, the sympathy of the author for the people of Ethiopia."
- 3260 ROOSEVELT, KERMIT. *Arabs, oil and history*. Commentary 8 (S '49) 307-9. (Joel Carmichael). "Mr. Roosevelt's book has a certain political weight, if only because his views are representative of a substantial, indeed, often decisive opinion in American government circles, and because of his moderation and general fair-mindedness."
- 3261 ROSSI, E. *Elenco dei Manoscritti Persiani della Biblioteca Vaticana*. Riv. degli Studi Orient. (Rome) 24 (1949) 174-7. (A. Bau-sani). The review includes a number of observations and corrections.
- 3262 ROUBEN. *Armenia upon land roads*. Armenian Rev. 2 (S '49) 157. (H. Kurdian).
- 3263 RUSSELL PASHA, THOMAS. *Egyptian Service 1902-1946*. Internat. Aff. 25 (O '49) 537. (R. M. Graves); Middle East J. 3 (O '49) 470-1. (Paulina Owens). "About politics and policies the author refrains from comment. . . . He writes from the

- standpoint of a policeman whose duty was primarily to preserve law and order."
- 3264 RYNDIN, M. Y. *Kirgiski natsionalnyi uzor. Sov. kniga* (Jl '49) 117-20. (N. M. Bachinsky).
- 3265 SAFRASTIAN, ARSHAK. *Kurds and Kurdistan. Armenian Rev.* 2 (S '49) 157. (H. Kurdian).
- 3266 STEPPAT, FRITZ. *Iran zwischen den Grossmächten 1941-1948. Internat. Aff.* 25 (O '49) 537-8. (R. W. Bullard). "The writer has consulted a wide range of sources and he writes impartially, but he is hampered by lack of personal knowledge."
- 3267 TAYMÜR, HAHMÜD. *Al-Makhba' Raqm 13. Oriente Mod.* 29 (Ap-Je '49) 90. (Francesco Gabrieli). This felicitous work of one of the leading Egyptian writers is particularly interesting because it is composed both in the literary language and the colloquial.
- 3268 THORNBURG, MAX WESTON; SPRY, GRAHAM; and SOULE, GEORGE. *Turkey: an economic appraisal. Middle East J.* 3 (O '49) 480-1. (X.). Puts its finger on many of the weak spots in Turkish economy, but fails to take sufficiently into account the depth of Turkish economic and social traditions.
- 3269 TOMLIN, E. W. F. *Life in modern Turkey. Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 320. (H.M.B.). "Although suffering from the severe handicap of lack of space, which renders it inevitably superficial in some respects, this little book nevertheless gives an excellent picture of life in modern Turkey."
- 3270 TOTHILL, J. D., ed. *Agriculture in the Sudan. Middle East J.* 3 (O '49) 473. (Afif I. Tannous). An exhaustive survey by 29 contributors, all with first-hand experience.
- 3271 VLADIRMIRTSOV, B. *Le régime social des Mongols. Riv. degli Studi Orient.* 24 (1949) 185-6. (Luciano Petech).
- 3272 WATT, W. MONTGOMERY. *Free will and predestination in early Islam. Royal Cent. Asian J.* 36 (Jl-O '49) 318-20. (George Kirk). The author "demonstrates that among the pre-Islamic Arabs and their neighbors there was a constant belief that man's life was predetermined and fixed by a mysterious and personal power, that of Fate. This belief persisted in many of the Muslim traditions, while the Qur'an, on the other hand, introduced the idea of the sovereignty of an all-wise God, and of human responsibility."
- 3273 WILBER, DONALD N. *Iran past and present. Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 304-5. (Mehmed A. Simsar). "In spite of certain undeniable shortcomings . . . the work will serve as a valuable guide to the student and layman alike."
- 3274 ZETTERSTE'EN, K. V. and LAMM, C. J. *Mohammed Asafi and the story of Jamal and Jalal. Muslim World* 39 (O '49) 301-2. (A. R. Nykl). An illuminated Persian manuscript of considerable philological and artistic value. *Riv. degli Studi Orient.* (Rome) 24 (1949) 174. (E. Rossi).
- 3275 ZURAYK, CONSTANTINE. *Ma'ná al-nakbah. Middle East J.* 3 (O '49) 469-70. (Cecil Hourani). An analysis, in a spirit of intense criticism, of the Arab defeat in Palestine and what needs to be done about it.

MISCELLANEOUS

- 3276 NÜR, 'ABD AL-SALĀM 'ALĪ. "Do the Arabs laugh at English humor?" (in Arabic) *Al-Mustamī' al-'Arabī* (London) 10 (1949) 15-7. Attempts to disprove the following notions current in the Arab world: the English do not laugh, they do not appreciate the subtleties at which the Arabs laugh, and English humor is so cold that Arabs simply cannot understand it. The author is a prominent artist, and illustrates his analysis with examples.

NEW PUBLICATION

- Hamizrah Hehadash.* (Tel Aviv). Quarterly journal of the Israel Oriental Society, edited by Yaacov Shimoni, Director of the Asia Division of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Articles, economic notes, current events, book section, listing of articles. In Hebrew.

INDEX TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

Volume III, 1949

(Nos. 2287-3075)

Numbers in boldface refer to pages, all others to individual items.

ART, 112, 234, 365, 490

Arab world, 2800, 2804
Egypt, 2788
India, 2540, 2545, 2986
Iran, 2375, 2540, 2544, 2545, 2549, 2550, 2554,
2789, 2795, 2803, 2805, 2807, 2808, 2991
Iraq, 2788
Jordan, 2788
Lebanon, 2367, 2545, 2788, 2796
Palestine, 2987
Sudan, 2797
Syria, 2540, 2545, 2788, 2802, 2806
Transcaucasia, 2373, 2984, 2985
Tunisia, 2799
Turkey, 2366, 2368, 2369, 2370-72, 2374, 2376,
2377, 2545, 2555, 2788, 2790, 2791, 2801,
2802, 2989

BIBLIOGRAPHY, 114, 237, 368, 492

India, 2590
Iran, 2842
Middle East (general), 2397, 2842, 3012
North Africa, 2841
Turkestan, 2843, 2591, 2842
Yemen, 2839

BIOGRAPHY, 114, 237, 369, 492

Arab world, 2399
Egypt, 2593, 2594, 2597, 3014
Iran, 2596, 2599, 2844
Iraq, 2595, 3016
Lebanon, 2400, 2402, 2636
Middle East (general), 2847
Palestine, 2846
Transcaucasia, 2401, 2403
Tunisia, 2398
Turkestan, 2848
Turkey, 3015

BOOK REVIEWS, 114, 238, 369, 492

Afghanistan, 2444, 3042
Algeria, 2419, 2612, 2855

Arab world, 2407, 2409, 2411, 2416, 2422, 2427,
2428, 2431, 2434, 2443, 2450, 2453, 2457,
2460, 2467-69, 2472, 2601, 2629, 2631, 2634,
2874, 2880, 2889, 3036, 3040, 3053, 3054

Cyprus, 2635

Egypt, 2408, 2438, 2446, 2655, 2681, 2682,
2690, 2875, 2895, 2898, 3024

Ethiopia, 2414, 2432, 2449, 2647, 2661, 2666,
2879, 3057

India, 3032

Iran, 2405, 2436, 2440, 2446, 2466, 2605, 2606,
2620, 2651, 2671, 2688, 2692, 2857, 2885,
2899, 3017, 3021, 3031, 3034, 3037, 3046,
3051, 3061

Iraq, 2447, 2638, 2898, 3017

Italian Colonies, 2415

Israel, 3038

Jordan, 2898

Lebanon, 2636, 2851, 2898, 3018, 3056

Libya, 2458, 2465, 2474, 2541, 2648

Middle East (general), 2404, 2406, 2441, 2600,
2613, 2632, 2640, 2642, 2652, 2675, 2685,
2849, 2877, 2898, 3032, 3038, 3045, 3050,
3062, 3065, 3072

Morocco, 2412, 2413, 2420, 2470, 2615, 3026,
3043, 3073

North Africa, 2451, 2454, 2663, 2854, 2858,
2882, 3029, 3066, 3074

Palestine, 2455, 2459, 2625, 2691, 2863, 2898,
3067

Sudan, 2435, 2439, 2633, 3070

Syria, 2627, 2636, 2686, 2863, 2888, 2898

Transcaucasia, 2403, 2684, 2733, 3023, 3067,
3068

Tunisia, 2890

Turkestan, 2426, 2667, 2669, 2853, 2887, 3063

Turkey, 2410, 2604, 2607, 2609, 2611, 2621-24,
2639, 2646, 2658, 2665, 2677, 2678, 2680,
2687, 2689, 2860, 2869, 2883, 3015, 3019,

3030, 3033, 3034, 3044, 3049, 3058, 3059, 3075

Yemen, 2672, 2870

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, 110, 232, 362, 488

- Afghanistan, 2761, 2956
 Arab world, 2329, 2333, 2340, 2343, 2742, 2743, 2753, 2754, 2760, 2762, 2766, 2952
 Egypt, 2328, 2335, 2519, 2521, 2756, 2758, 2954, 2960-62, 2964
 Eritrea, 2955
 India, 2765
 Iran, 2334, 2336, 2743, 2744, 2746, 2959
 Iraq, 2743-45, 2747
 Jordan, 2517, 2743
 Lebanon, 2328, 2338, 2339, 2516, 2743, 2749
 Middle East (general), 2331, 2332, 2337, 2515, 2518, 2524, 2741, 2742, 2750, 2755, 2757, 2765, 2958
 Pakistan, 2761
 Palestine, 2516, 2748, 2749
 Sudan, 2758
 Syria, 2328, 2338, 2516, 2522, 2523, 2743, 2749, 2759
 Tunisia, 2751
 Turkey, 2326, 2327, 2341, 2342, 2520, 2740, 2752, 2763, 2764, 2957

GEOGRAPHY, 107, 229, 359, 485

- Afghanistan, 2909
 Arab world, 2478, 2481, 2908
 Egypt, 2904
 Iran, 2479, 2480, 2693, 2696
 Middle East (general), 2698, 2906
 Morocco, 2694
 Syria, 2287
 Transcaucasia, 2697, 2903, 2907
 Turkestan, 2289
 Turkey, 2288, 2290

HISTORY, 107, 230, 260, 486

- Algeria, 2505
 Arab world, 2297, 2305, 2317, 2488, 2502, 2509, 2513, 2710, 2714, 2921, 2928
 Egypt, 2315, 2483, 2486, 2722, 2927
 Iran, 2489, 2491, 2492, 2497, 2498, 2503, 2504, 2507, 2570, 2708, 2713, 2715, 2717-19, 2721, 2724, 2725, 2730, 2735, 2737, 2925, 2929, 2940
 Iraq, 2734, 2935
 Lebanon, 2919
 Middle East (general), 2295, 2493, 2508
 North Africa, 2923
 Syria, 2706, 2738
 Transcaucasia, 2303, 2311, 2313, 2323, 2339, 2346, 2933, 2947
 Turkestan, 2512, 2721, 2731
 Turkey, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2496, 2500, 2501, 2702, 2930, 2947, 2948, 2951
 Yemen, 2712

LANGUAGE, 113, 235, 367, 490

- Afghanistan, 2813
 Arab world, 2385, 2810, 2816
 Egypt, 2817
 Eritrea, 2378
 Ethiopia, 2992
 Iran, 2813, 2823, 2991
 Jordan, 2987
 Syria, 2817, 2975
 Transcaucasia, 2379
 Tunisia, 2380, 2381, 2811
 Turkestan, 2825, 2826
 Turkey, 2556, 2557, 2559, 2989, 2990, 2993, 2994

LITERATURE, 113, 235, 368, 490

- Afghanistan, 2813
 Arab world, 2387, 2389, 2390, 2563, 2833, 2837, 3002
 Egypt, 2396, 2564
 India, 2580, 2584, 3005, 3010
 Iran, 2391, 2566, 2570, 2574, 2575, 2581, 2827, 2832, 2836, 2996, 3006, 3008
 Sudan, 2384, 3001
 Transcaucasia, 2386, 3000, 3005
 Tunisia, 2392-95
 Turkestan, 2827, 2830
 Turkey, 2567, 2569, 2571, 2573, 2576, 2578, 2583, 2585, 2828, 2997-99, 3003, 3004, 3007, 3009, 3011

POLITICS, 107, 230, 260, 486

- Afghanistan, 2926
 Arab world, 2298, 2301, 2302, 2312, 2482, 2494, 2514, 2703, 2728, 2739, 2910, 2932, 2938, 2941
 Egypt, 2306, 2318, 2699, 2736, 2920
 Iran, 2299, 2490, 2700, 2701, 2704
 Iraq, 2484, 2709, 2912
 Italian Colonies, 2291
 Israel, 2324, 2934
 Jordan, 2292
 Lebanon, 2307
 Libya, 2506, 2924
 Middle East (general), 2300, 2304, 2309, 2310, 2495, 2720, 2732, 2911, 2914, 2936, 2944, 2945, 2950
 North Africa, 2922, 2949
 Palestine, 2293, 2294, 2308, 2314, 2325, 2716
 Syria, 2307, 2916
 Transcaucasia, 2296
 Tunisia, 2707
 Turkestan, 2705, 2943
 Turkey, 2511, 2711, 2723, 2727

SCIENCE, 112, 365, 490

- Egypt, 2365, 2787
 Sudan, 2786
 Turkestan, 2980

SOCIAL CONDITIONS, III, 233, 364, 489

Algeria, 2775
 Arab world, 2348, 2358, 2364, 2526, 2536, 2539,
 2784
 Egypt, 2346, 2360, 2528, 2531-33, 2770, 2780,
 2970, 2973
 Eritrea, 2967, 2974
 Iran, 2363, 2768, 2773, 2781, 2968
 Iraq, 2527
 Jordan, 2987

Lebanon, 2355, 2782, 2978
 Middle East (general), 2344, 2770
 Morocco, 2966
 North Africa, 2352, 2354, 2767
 Palestine, 2353, 2362, 2972
 Sudan, 2976
 Syria, 2774
 Transcaucasia, 2359, 2361
 Tunisia, 2351, 2769, 2775
 Turkestan, 2529, 2777
 Turkey, 2538, 2771, 2779, 2971

LIST OF PERIODICALS REGULARLY SURVEYED

- Al-Abhāth al-Ijtīmā'iyah (Beirut)
 Aegyptus (Milan)
 Affrica (Rome)
 Africa (London)
 Africa (Madrid)
 African Studies (Johannesburg)
 African World (London)
 Al-Ā'lam al-'Arabī (Cairo)
 American Anthropologist (Menasha, Wis.)
 American Historical Review (Richmond, Va.)
 American Journal of Archaeology (New York)
 American Journal of International Law
 (Washington)
 American Journal of Sociology (Chicago)
 American Museum Novitates (New York)
 American Perspective (Washington)
 Annals of the American Academy of Political and
 Social Sciences (Philadelphia)
 Anthropos (Ascona, Switzerland)
 Armenian Quarterly (New York)
 Ars Islamica (Ann Arbor, Mich.)
 Artibus Asiae (Ascona, Switzerland)
 Asiatic Review (London)
 Asiatische Studien (Bern)

 Belleten (Istanbul)
 Bolshevik (Moscow)
 British Museum Quarterly (London)
 British Numismatic Journal (London)
 Bulletin des Études Arabes (Algiers)
 Bulletin of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts
 (Boston)
 Bulletin of Cleveland Museum of Art
 Bulletin of the Chicago Art Institute (Chicago)
 Bulletin of Detroit Institute of Art
 Bulletin of the History of Medicine (New York)
 Bulletin of the Iranian Institute (New York)
 Bulletin of the Metropolitan Museum (New
 York)
 Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies
 (London)
 Burlington Magazine (London)

 Civil Engineering and Public Works Review
 (London)
 Commentary (New York)
 Contemporary Review (London)
 Current History (New York)

 Department of State Bulletin (Washington)

 Economic Geography (Worcester, Mass.)
 Edoth (Jerusalem)
 L'Égypte Contemporaine (Cairo)
 Empire Forestry Review (London)
 English (London)
 En Terre d'Islam (Lyons, France)
 L'Ethnographie (Paris)
 Ethnos (Stockholm)

 Faenza (Faenza)
 Far East Quarterly (New York)
 Foreign Affairs (New York)
 Fortnightly (London)
 Fortune (New York)

 Geographical Journal (London)
 Geographical Magazine (London)
 Geographical Review (New York)

 Hatteva' Wehaaretz (Tel Aviv)

 Idea (Rome)
 Illustrated London News (London)
 Institut des Belles-Lettres et Arabes (Damascus)
 International Affairs (London)
 International Journal (Toronto)
 International Labour Review (Geneva)
 Isis (Cambridge, Mass.)
 Izvestiya Geograficheskogo Obshchestva
 (Moscow)
 Izvestiya Akademii Nauk — Seriya Geografii i
 Geofiziki (Moscow)
 Izvestiya Akademii Nauk — Otdeleniye Ekonomii
 i Prava (Moscow)

- Izvestiya Akademii Nauk — Otdeleniye Literatury i Yazyka (Moscow)
 Izvestiya Akademii Nauk — Istorii i Filosofii (Moscow)
 Jaabericht van het Vooraziatisch-Egyptisch Genootschap Ex Oriente Lux (Leiden)
 Jahrbuch der Hamburger Kunstsammlungen (Hamburg)
 Jewish Frontier (New York)
 John Rylands Library Bulletin (Manchester, England)
 Journal of the American Oriental Society (Baltimore, Md.)
 Journal of the Art Institute (Chicago)
 Journal of the Cleveland Museum (Cleveland)
 Journal of Geography (Chicago)
 Journal of Modern Education (Cairo)
 Journal of Modern History (Chicago)
 Journal of Near Eastern Studies (Chicago)
 Journal of Political Economy (Chicago)
 Journal of Politics (Gainesville, Fla.)
 Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences (New York)
 Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society (Jerusalem)
 Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (London)
 Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society (London)
 Journal of the Walters Art Gallery (Baltimore, Md.)
 Kabul (Kabul)
 Al-Kātib al-Misrī (Cairo)
 Al-Kitāb (Cairo)
 Language (Baltimore, Md.)
 Life (New York)
 Listener (London)
 Majallat al-Majma 'al-'Ilmi al-'Arabī (Damascus)
 Man (London)
 Marine Corps Gazette (Washington)
 Al-Mashriq (Beirut)
 Middle East Journal (Washington)
 Mining and Metallurgy (New York)
 Mirovoye Khozyaystvo i Mirovaya Politika (Moscow)
 Modern Review (Calcutta)
 Muslim World (Hartford, Conn.)
 Al-Muktataf (Cairo)
 Al-Mustami' al-'Arabī (London)
 National Geographic Magazine (Washington)
 Nauka i Zhizn' (Moscow)
 New England Review (London)
 New Palestine (New York)
 New Times (Moscow)
 Numismatic Chronicle and Journal of the Royal Numismatic Society (London)
 L'Orient Philatélique (Cairo)
 Orientalia (Rome)
 Orientalia Christiana Periodica (Rome)
 Oriente Moderno (Rome)
 Pacific Historical Review (Berkeley, Calif.)
 Palestine Affairs (New York)
 Palestine Exploration Quarterly (London)
 Perspective (Washington)
 Politica Estera (Rome)
 Political Quarterly (London)
 Political Science Quarterly (New York)
 Politique Étrangère (Paris)
 Quarterly Journal of the Geological Society of London
 Railway Gazette (London)
 Review of Politics (South Bend, Ind.)
 Revue de Defense Nationale (Paris)
 Revue de Géographie Marocaine (Rabat)
 Revue de la Méditerranée (Algiers)
 Revue du Caire (Cairo)
 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International (Alexandria, Egypt)
 Revue Generale Belge (Brussels)
 Revue Historique (Paris)
 Revue Numismatique (Paris)
 Al-Risālah (Cairo)
 Round Table (London)
 Ruzgār-e-No (London)
 Saturday Evening Post (Philadelphia)
 Science and Society (New York)
 Southwest Journal of Anthropology (Albuquerque, N. M.)
 Sovetskaya Etnografiya (Moscow)
 Sovetskaya Kniga (Moscow)
 Speculum (Cambridge, Mass.)
 Tomorrow (New York)
 Tropiques (Paris)
 Türk Dil ve Coğrafya Dergisi (Istanbul)
 Türk Dil ve Edebiyat Dergisi (Istanbul)
 La Turquie Kemaliste (Ankara)
 Al-Urwa (Bombay)
 Vestnik Akademii Nauk (Moscow)
 Vestnik Drevnei Istorii (Moscow)
 Voprosy Istorii (Moscow)

World Affairs (London)
 World Affairs (Washington)
 World Affairs Interpreter (Los Angeles)

World Petroleum (New York)
 World Review (London)
 World Today (London)


ABBREVIATIONS

English
 Acad., Academy
 Amer., American
 Bull., Bulletin
 Cent., Central
 Contemp., Contemporary
 Dept., Department
 East., Eastern
 Geog., Geographical
 Gt. Brit., Great Britain
 Hist., Historical
 Illust., Illustrated
 Inst., Institute
 Internat., International
 J., Journal

Mag., Magazine
 Mod., Modern
 Mus., Museum
 Natl., National
 Numis., Numismatic
 Orient., Oriental
 Pal., Palestine
 Philol., Philological
 Polit., Political
 Quart., Quarterly
 Res., Research
 Rev., Review
 Soc., Society
 Stud., Studies
 Trans., Transactions

Arabic
 K., Kitāb
 Maj., Majallah, Majallat
Italian
 Mod., Moderno
Russian
 Akad., Akademii
 Fil., Filosofi
 Ist., Istorii
 Izvest., Izvestiya
 Lit., Literaturi
 Otdel., Otdeleniye
 Ser., Seriya
 Yaz., Yazika

THE ISLAMIC LITERATURE

 *A cultural monthly publication in English* 

- ★ Reflects Islam's ambition to reconquer its lost field of cultural glory.
- ★ Presents a new interpretation of Islam to fit in with the changed conditions of the world.
- ★ Analyzes boldly and critically the present situation—unearthing the hidden treasures of Islam's past, ignorance of which has made Muslims doubtful of their future.
- ★ A forum where the scattered sections of the Muslim world meet and exchange views in order to feel the reality of their spiritual brotherhood.

\$4.25 for twelve issues

Make checks in favor of, and address all communications to, the Sponsor:

Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf

Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore (Pakistan)